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Abstract
According to social construction theory, cases are not objective entities waiting to be
discovered or revealed; they cannot exist without case-makers. Construction of a case
is a subjective process of choosing, increasing, decreasing, selecting, and reshaping.
Therefore, a natural gap exists between the constructed and the real world. This
dissertation delves into the gap, not from the existing angle of selectiveness, but from
the angle of compliance. The study uses empirical data to try to answer the following
question: Since the police standardization reform of law enforcement—at least parts of
them—aim at controlling the evidence-collecting process and at improving the quality
of dossiers, do investigative officers actually conform to standardization rules, and do
dossiers meet standardization requirements? After carefully examining the contents of
16 homicide cases collected from two police departments and interviewing the relevant
participants, the study reveals unintended consequences of the standardization
reform—expansion of formality. Investigative behaviors have become ceremonial or
ritualized, and the outcome of those behaviors (i.e. evidence collected) is like an empty
shell. It looks reasonable and ostensibly meets requirements of norms, but has little
meaning, if any, and may not fulfill its original purpose. The theoretical analyses of this
dissertation reflect the view that participants (i.e. investigative officers, case reviewers,
or supervisors) must be embedded into the working environment where they take action
for collecting and preserving evidence. Inspired by the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) Framework proposed by Professor Elinor Ostrom, the
interpretation of the study’s findings places the organizational structure of the
investigative officers and the texture of the collective culture in the center of the stage.
Only through the lens of influencing factors, such as conflicting norms and interests of
investigative officers, can the true roots of administrative logic over judicial logic in
the course of action be seen.

Chapter 1. Introduction
Dossiers lie at the center of the criminal justice system in China.1 Participants in
this system rely heavily on dossiers, which contain written materials treated as
evidence reflecting facts, as well as records of the fact-finding process. To
investigative officers, the criminal dossier is the carrier of all their work for a case. To
prosecutors, the criminal dossier is nearly all they can rely on before making a
decision on whether they ought to press charges. To judges, the criminal dossier
works as a bridge between investigation and trial. However, without restrictions on
the use of hearsay evidence and the opportunity for cross-examination, the
dossier-centered mechanism in China has obvious negative effects, which have been
widely criticized.2
To solve problems caused by the dossier-centered mechanism, China has
undertaken two key reforms. First, in the field of criminal procedure law, the
trial-centered procedural reform3 limits dossiers’ effects of judges who form their
opinions when they evaluate evidence with discretion and cuts off the determinative
See Zuo Weimin (左卫民), Zhongguo Xingshi Anjuan Zhidu Yanjiu (中国刑事案卷制度研究) [Research on
Chinese Criminal Dossier System], 6 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究), 94 (2007).
2 See Chen Ruihua, Initial research on the malfunctions of the criminal process, 20 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 359
(2011).
3 The trial-centered procedural reform aims at changing formality of criminal trials and makes it substantive. The
essence of the reform is to replace the unfair trial with fair trial that calls for updating of the concept of justice,
reforming institutions, creating rules of evidence, etc. In a trial-centered procedural system, the defendants' guilty
judgment must be made by judge, and the implementations of criminal compulsory measures concerning the
defendants' fundamental rights in pretrial proceedings have to be subject to judicial review, in order to avoid
misjudgment and protecting the innocent. See generally Sun Changyong (孙长永) & Wang Biao（王彪）, Lun
Xingshi Tingshen Shizhihua de Linian Zhidu he Jishu (论刑事庭审实质化的理念、制度和技术) [On the Idea,
System and Technology of Making Criminal Trials Substantive], 15 ZHONGGUO JIANCHAGUAN (中国检察官), 79
(2017); Min Chunlei (闵春雷), Yi Shenpan wei Zhongxin: Neihan Jiedu yu Shixian Lujing (以审判为中心：内涵解
读与实现路径) [The Trial-centered System: Its Connotative Interpretation and Implementation Approach], 3 FALV
KEXUE (法律科学), (2015).
1
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connection between investigation records and courts’ decisions. Second, in the field of
policing, the law enforcement standardization reform project is another endeavor to
address dossier-centered issues through quality control measures during the
dossier-making process.
If the process of making a dossier can be compared to the process of making
commercial goods, the trial-centered substantive reform acts as a guard on the export
of products, but changes and improvements at the rear of the “assembly line” cannot
directly or completely influence the performance at the early stage. “The history of
criminal proceedings in China and foreign countries has repeatedly proved that the
evil consequences of wrong trials have always been on the wrong branches of
investigation.”4 Investigative officers without enough evidence-gathering ability may
wrongly “pre-convict” innocent people or let trials in the following proceedings face
insufficient evidence.5 Thus, trial-centered reforms cannot be substituted for reforms
within police departments, which aim at importing quality products. One of the
focuses of standardization reforms is to supervise investigative officers’ behaviors
during the evidence collection process. The goal is to encourage investigative officers
to conform to norms and rules and to improve the quality of investigation records for
as long as dossiers are used to evaluate investigative officers’ performance in
administrative management.
The premise of the standardization reform is seemingly indisputable. If police

LI XINJIAN (李心鉴), XINGSHI SUSONG GOUZAO LUN (刑事诉讼构造论) [Criminal litigation theory], Zhongguo
Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe (中国政法大学出版社), 179 (1992).
5 See Luo Haimin (罗海敏), Woguo Taiwan Diqu Sixing Chengxu Kongzhi Jieping (我国台湾地区死刑程序控制
介评) [A Review of the Control of Death Penalty Procedures in Taiwan], 12 FAXUE ZAZHI (法学杂志), (2009).
4
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officers strictly follow operation manuals, little room is left for evidence manipulation
or abuse of power. At the same time, the evidence collection process can be seen
clearly through texts in the dossier, ensuring transparency. Yet, that premise missed a
crucial part of the investigating process; the inherently subjective nature of the dossier.
On the one hand, as the bridge between the fact-finding process and the ultimate
presentation of evidence at trial, records in the dossier are supposed to be truthful,
visualized, accurate, and comprehensive, as stipulated under the requirements of the
criminal procedure. On the other hand, inevitably, subjective factors, such as
individual cognition, judgment, and ability in expression of the recorder, may affect
transcripts as texts.
Existing literature has observed a natural gap between the constructed and the
real world.6 According to social construction theory, cases are not objective entities
waiting to be discovered or revealed; they cannot exist without case-makers.
Construction of a case is a subjective process of choosing, increasing, decreasing,
selecting, and reshaping. The official version of any “fact” the police have built has
flaws regarding its reliability. 7 Moreover, the “selective mechanism” used by
investigative officers during the process of evidence collection may lead to formality.8
This study delves further into the gap between the constructed and the real world,

See Liu Mingna (刘明娜), Xingshi Anjian Xunwen Bilu Duanpianshi Xushu de Buqueding Yinsu zhi Shizheng
Fenxi （刑事案件讯问笔录断片式叙述的不确定因素之实证分析） [An Empirical Analysis of the Uncertain
Factors in the Fragment Narration of Criminal Case Interrogation], 2 ZHONGGUO RENMIN GONG’AN DAXUE
XUEBAO (中国人民公安大学学报》, (2004); Hu Lan (胡兰), Shilun Zhencha Bilulei Zhengju Guifanhua (On
Standardization of Evidence in Investigation Transcripts), 6 SHANGHAI GONG’AN GAODENG ZHUANKE XUEXIAO
XUEBAO (上海公安高等专科学校学报), (2013).
7 See Yu Mou, The Constructed Truth: The Making of Police Dossiers in China, 26 SOC. LEG. STUD. 69 (2017).
8 See Ma Jinghua (马静华), Tingshen Shizhihua: Yizhong Zhengju Diaocha fangshi de Luoji Zhuanbian (庭审实
质化：一种证据调查方式的逻辑转变) [Trial Substantive: a Logical Change of Evidence Investigation], 5
ZHONGGUO XINGSHIFA ZAZHI (中国刑事法杂志), (2017).
6
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not from the existing angle of selectiveness, but from the angle of compliance. This
study uses empirical data to try to answer the following question: Since the
standardization

reforms—at

least

parts

of

them—aim

at

controlling

the

evidence-collecting process and at improving the quality of dossiers, do investigative
officers actually conform to standardization rules, and do dossiers meet
standardization requirements?
After carefully examining the contents of 16 homicide cases collected from two
police departments and interviewing the relevant participants, the study reveals
unintended consequences of the standardization reform—expansion of formality.
Investigative behaviors have become ceremonial or ritualized, and the outcome of
those behaviors (i.e. evidence collected) is like an empty shell. It looks reasonable and
ostensibly meets requirements of norms, but has little meaning, if any, and may not
fulfill its original purpose. Although formality has not reached alarming proportions
compared with serious violations of law or abuses of power caused by corruption, it
still clearly reflects a deviation of investigative officers from goals of the rule of law.
In the long run, it could endanger investigative officers’ level of respect for the rule of
law. In addition, the large amount of investigative resources spent on formality
requirements limit the space for other reforms to survive.
The starting point in understanding the unintended consequence is the kind of
double logic that people who handle criminal cases must have. In most of the world’s
police authorities, criminal investigation agencies belong to the administrative
machinery, both in terms of their functions and their attributes. In China, by contrast,

4

criminal investigation agencies’ work is also inseparable from litigation. Therefore,
the police responsible for criminal investigation (also known as judicial police in
some areas) are facing tension between judicial logic and administrative logic. On the
one hand, all activities related to litigation, including investigation, must be taken
around exercise of judicial power so that penalty rights of the state can be easily
realized. On the other hand, investigation activities are also subject to bureaucracy,
restriction, and assessment within the police department. Investigative officers’ minds
during entire investigation and evidence collection process are accompanied by the
two conflicted logics, which have great impact on outcomes of internal reforms.
Thus, the theoretical analyses in this study reflect the view that participants (i.e.
investigative officers or supervisors) must be embedded into the working environment
where they take action for collecting and preserving evidence. Inspired by the
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework proposed by Professor
Elinor Ostrom, the interpretation of the study’s findings places the organizational
structure of the investigative officers and the texture of the collective culture in the
center of the stage. Only through the lens of influencing factors, such as conflicting
norms and interests of investigative officers, can the true roots of administrative logic
over judicial logic in the course of action be seen. As David Thomas has pointed out,
“The police may or may not be legally lawless in exercising their discretion, but their
conduct must not be ruleless in itself.”9
The dissertation proceeds as follows:

9

DAVID A THOMAS, THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 140 (na. 1974).
5

Part I, referring to Chapters 2 to 5, addresses the context of this study, providing
a background of criminal procedure in China, relevance of policing to collection of
criminal evidence and production of dossiers, and the existing literature and data
collected. Chapter 2 provides background information regarding the criminal justice
system in China, focusing on the role of the investigation stage, relationships among
police, prosecutors, and judges, and the position of the police in the criminal justice
system. Chapter 3 introduces China’s reform efforts aimed at standardization,
including the history, the range of the “standardization” concept, and the relation
between criminal procedure reforms and standardization reforms. Chapter 4
summarizes existing Chinese literature examining investigation and evidence
collection. After combing individualized and systematic research, this study follows
the systematic study approach, focusing on the overall issue of investigation and
evidence collection. Chapter 5 describes the data collected and methods used in the
empirical analysis and indicates limitations of this study as well.
Part II, referring to Chapters 6 to 10, reports the results of an empirical analysis
that identifies the formality issue. Chapter 6 focuses on the interrogation process by
analyzing patterns of interrogation transcripts in dossiers, trying to reconstruct the
time when investigative officers and a suspect meet and comparing transcripts and
investigative officers’ behaviors with laws and standardization requirements. Chapter
7 focuses on the witness interview process by examining testimonial statements
recorded in dossiers. Due to rare regulations for testimonial statements collection
behavior, investigative officers follow “hidden” rules and habits, which lead to

6

relevance, authenticity, and legitimacy problems. Chapter 8 discusses problems in the
identification process. Although the identification materials in this study mostly
comply with the standardization requirements, careful textual analysis still reveals
issues hidden beneath that formal compliance. Chapter 9 examines the regular means
that investigative officers use to obtain physical evidence, including but not limited to
site inspection, search, and seizure. Although they are presented with good
appearance, these materials are gathered in circumstances rife with conflicting
regulations, trade-offs among all interested parties, the intentional avoidance of
certain measures, meaningless approval controls, and symbolic rights protection.
Chapter 10 summarizes the findings from the empirical study. One prominent issue is
formality meaning actions that are compliant with norms in form, but are
non-compliant in substance. As detailed in all processes examined in previous
chapters, evidentiary materials that seemingly meet regulatory requirements, but
actually deviate from intents of norms, are flooding the files.
Part III, referring to Chapters 11 to 13, focuses on theoretical explanations of the
expansion of formality under the standardization reform. Chapter 11 examines the
process of criminal evidence collection using the IAD framework. Seven elements
affect the action situation of the criminal evidence collection: namely, participants,
position, actions, outcomes, control, information, benefits, and costs are separately
examined. Chapter 12 shifts the focus to one of three extrinsic variables, rules-in-use,
which shape incentives of participants in the situation. Each of the seven types of
concrete rules and problems related are covered first, followed by inquiries into

7

nomothetic problems relating to the rules. Chapter 13 discusses community attributes
of the police as another category of essential exogenous variables that affect
subjective value of police individuals within the community and contribute to the
formality issues.
Part IV, referring to Chapter 14, draws conclusions with implications for future
reforms or policies concerning investigative power and control.

8

Chapter 2. Criminal Procedure and Policing in China
A. From a Suspect to a Defendant
Generally speaking, the Public Security Organ (police) and the People’s
Procuratorates (prosecutors) are in charge of investigating crimes within the scope of
their jurisdiction. The investigation divisions of the Procuratorate are responsible for
cases of occupational crimes by officials, such as embezzlement, bribery, and
malfeasance, 10 while the investigation divisions within police departments are
responsible for all other crimes. When reports, complaints, and information are
received, investigative officers shall promptly examine the materials provided by a
reporter, complainant, or informant and the confession of an offender who has
voluntarily surrendered to decide whether to file a case on the basis of whether facts
of a crime and criminal responsibility exist or not.
Article 113 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) states: “active criminals or
major suspects may be detained first according to law, and criminal suspects who
meet the conditions for arrest shall be arrested according to law.” This simple
sentence implies three sequent phases: the go-to-case phase, the criminal detention
phase, and the arrest phase. At the initial stage of the criminal investigation, the
suspect can be called or summoned to the police station. This phase is entirely
different from the arrest phase in western countries. A western-style arrest is an action
issued by magistrates and enforced by police officers. After the arrest, the general

After the supervisory commissions were set up on March 23, 2018, investigating duty-related illegal activities
and duty-related crimes have been transferred from the procuratorates to the supervisory commissions.
10

9

requirement is that the suspect shall be brought to the magistrate within 48 hours. In
contrast, suspects in China are called voluntarily to go to the police station or
summoned, even compulsorily made to go to the police station. When summoned,
they will be given a subpoena issued by police. The duration of the summons may not
exceed 12 hours. In cases with particularly serious or complicated circumstances, the
duration of the summons may extend, but not exceed, 24 hours. It is called the
“go-to-case” phase in China.11
Criminal detention is a process before the Chinese-style arrest. It requires a
warrant issued by the chief of police. The typical detention period is three days. Under
“extraordinary circumstances,” detention can last up to seven days with approval. A
“major suspect” may be held for as long as 30 days. Detention by police normally
begins a formal process that leads to an arrest, which must be approved by the
division of investigation supervision of the Procuratorates. Then, such an arrest is
usually followed by a prosecutorial indictment and a trial in court.
After being arrested, a criminal suspect will be held in police custody (which
may also be called “detention after arrest”) during the investigation stage, and the
time limit shall not exceed two months. If complex cases cannot be concluded within
the time limit, an extension of one month may be allowed with the approval of the
Procuratorate at the next higher level. For some specific cases, a provincial
Procuratorate may approve an extension of another two months.
After the investigation stage, the police will immediately transfer criminal
Ma Jinghua (马静华), Zhencha Dao’an: Cong Lixiang dao Xianshi (侦查到案: 从理想到现实) [Investigation
Dao’an: from Ideal to Reality], 2 XIANDAI FAXUE (现代法学), (2007).
11
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dossier to the Procuratorate with their recommendation to initiate an indictment.
Prosecutors will examine the case by interrogating suspects, consulting defense
lawyers, victims etc., and asking the police investigative officers for more evidence
materials if needed. If a supplementary investigation is necessary, prosecutors may
remand the case to the police or conduct he the investigations themselves. After
examining the case, the prosecutor shall make a decision on prosecution within one
month. If the prosecutor decides to go to trial, the suspect then becomes a defendant.

B. The Assembly-Line Mode of the Criminal Justice System
After passively entering the criminal justice system, the suspect or the defendant
has been embedded into the “legal complex” consisting of legally trained and
practicing actors.12 Those relationships among actors are complex and filled with
conflicts. There is a well-known Chinese metaphor showing the relationship of the
three agents: “The police is cooking, and then the prosecutor selling, the judge eating.”
This differs from the triangle structure in the United States, where neutral judges
preside over the process.
This twisted relationship derives from the assembly-line mode of the criminal
justice system in China. A statement in Article 7 of the CPL indicates: “In conducting
criminal proceedings, the People’s Court, the People’s Procuratorate, and the Public
Security Organ shall divide responsibilities, coordinate their efforts and check each
other to ensure the correct and effective enforcement of law.” In other words, the three
agencies deal with one part of the assembly-line procedure in sequence to produce
12

Lucien Karpik & Terence C Halliday, The legal complex, 7 ANN. REV. OF LAW & SOC. SCI. 220 (2011).
11

“social products,” to fulfill their duty of punishing crime and protecting the people.
Under this system, three main stages exist: the investigation stage, the prosecution
stage and the trial stage. As the “producing stage,” the investigation is the most
important stage in the assembly line because both prosecution and trial have turned
into phases that merely check and review upstream products. As a result, the
investigation naturally becomes the key in asserting the facts of a case, which is called
“investigation centralism.”13
The dossier plays a pivotal role in the assembly-line mode. Procurators and
judges generally deal with documents and records in dossiers, which are made and
sent by investigative officers. Because it contains the main forms of evidence, the
dossier is the basis on which the procurator chooses to press charges and the judge
rules. The dossier usually includes transcripts of questioning and interrogation, as
well as records of examinations, searches, and identifications. In practice, the
procurator usually writes a formal indictment based on what is called the “proposal
letter for prosecution,” which is submitted by the investigative officers, with only a
few or even no sentences changed. Then, the court revises that formal indictment and
absorbs it into the written judgment. Thus, it is no surprise that parts of the “proposal
letter for prosecution” are kept intact in opinions of courts.14
The assembly-line mode also gives little room to defense attorneys. With a weak
position in the criminal justice system and a lack of protection of practicing rights,

See Chen Ruihua (陈瑞华), Lun Zhencha Zhongxin Zhuyi (论侦查中心主义) [The Investigation Centralism], 2
ZHENGFA LUNTAN (政法论坛), (2017).
14
He Jiahong, Case study on the causes of wrongful conviction in Chinese criminal proceeding, 10 FRONTIERS L.
CHINA, 670(2015).
13
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defense lawyers may encounter difficulties in routine tasks, such as obtaining
accessing to dossiers, meeting with suspects, collecting evidence, and so on.15 Most
of the time, they endeavor to avoid the riskiest part—for instance, collecting evidence
by themselves—in the investigation stage. Then, they constrain their work in court
with caution, making general arguments rather than making direct confrontation with
prosecutors or judges during trial.16

C. The Police Organization in China
The Police Law in 1995 was treated as a milestone that manifested China’s
efforts of creating a more professional and modern police force.17 According to the
Police Law, the Chinese police system includes five types of police force: the public
security police, the state security police, the prison police, the judicial police in
Procuratorates, and the judicial police in courts. 18 The police in this study are
specifically referring to the public security police, which account for 86% of police
across all types of police force.19
The police system in China is both centralized and decentralized. 20 As a
centralized one, police departments at provincial, county, and town levels are under
the leadership of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The MPS sets up the
See Ethan Michelson, Lawyers political embeddedness and institutional continuity in China’s transition from
socialism, 113 AM. J. SOC. (2007); Sida Liu & Terence C Halliday, Political liberalism and political embeddedness:
Understanding politics in the work of Chinese criminal defense lawyers, 45 L. & SOC. REV. (2011).
16 SIDA LIU& TERENCE C HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF LAWYERS AT WORK
(Cambridge University Press. 2016).
17 Yue Ma, The Police Law 1995: Organization, Functions, Powers and Accountability of the Chinese Police, 20
POLICING: AN INT’L J. POLICE STRAT. & MGMT (1997).
18 ZHENG CHEN, MEASURING POLICE SUBCULTURAL PERCEPTIONS: A STUDY OF FRONTLINE POLICE OFFICERS IN
CHINA, 26 (Springer. 2015).
19 KAM C. WONG, CHINESE POLICING: HISTORY AND REFORM 158 (Peter Lang. 2009).
20 See Chen Baifeng (陈柏峰), Dangzheng Tizhi Ruhe Suzao Jiceng Zhifa (党政体制如何塑造基层执法) [How
does the Party and government system shape grassroots law enforcement], 4 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究), (2017).
15

13

professional standards, norms, and regulations for local police departments, as well as
the same nationwide criteria for recruiting, training, and promotion of personnel. At
the same time, the police system’s decentralized nature derives from the leadership of
the local governments. Local governments control budgets and personnel
management and have autonomy to decide the priorities in policing.21
Under this dual leadership, the public security police have a wider range of
functions than any other police force worldwide,22 covering things “from criminal
investigation, social order maintenance, traffic control to fire prevention, household
registration, and safeguarding important officials,”23 as well as providing “service” to
the masses based on the mass-line and community policing principles.24 These broad
duties—with a lot of “non-police” work—dilute the core responsibility of criminal
investigation.
The “non-police” work is highly controversial. It represents, partially, the idea of
community policing, which has been a world tide in the past few decades. Under the
philosophy of community policing, the police’s role involves a number of different
tasks and responsibilities. Even in the United States where law enforcement is
regarded as the main responsibility,25 most police work still involves activities of
peacekeeping and social service, while only a small part involves crime fighting or
law enforcement.26 Regardless of how much importance the community policing has

Mengyan Dai, Policing in the People's Republic of China: a review of recent literature, 50 CRI. L. & SOC.
CHANGE (2008).
22 See KAM C. WONG, supra note 19.
23 ZHENG CHEN, supra note 18, at 27.
24 See KAM C. WONG, supra note 19.
25 Allan Y Jiao, Police and culture: A comparison between China and the United States, 4 POLICE Q. (2001).
26
See SAMUEL WALKER KATZ, ET AL., THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION, (McGraw-Hill Education,
2005).
21
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in theory; Steve Herbert found that community policing is very limited in practice. 27
“As agents of coercive force, the police should not be a prominent player in building
community. If the state wishes to help create effective communal organizations, then
it must avoid over-reliance on the police to help accomplish this.”28
Furthermore, the “non-police” work in China extends the range of community
policing and embraces more other activities allocated by local governments, including
social management, social order maintenance, etc. One of the most ridiculous
activities was that, in the 1990s, police officers in some police stations spent a
significant amount of time collecting grain and castrating pigs.29 Police involvement
in non-police activities is widely criticized by scholars and police officers. It may
hinder professionalism and go against the principles of performance, such as economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness.30

See STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY, (University of
Chicago Press. 2009).
28 Id. at 137.
29 See Hua Ling Fu, A Bird in the Cage: Police and Political Leadership in Post‐Mao China, 4 POLICING & SOC.
AN INT’L. J. (1994).
30 ZHENG CHEN, supra note 18, at 28.
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Chapter 3. Standardization Reform of Law Enforcement
A. A Brief History
On September 7, 2008, at a conference held in Nanjing, the Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) initiated the reform of law enforcement standardization in response to
the public’s strong dissatisfaction with certain phenomena in the field of law
enforcement. That same year, the MPS held a forum for provincial police chiefs
where it announced the standardization reform as one of the “Three Constructions.”
The other two are the Informatization

31

Construction and the Harmonious

Police-Citizen Relationship Construction. Since then, the “standardization” concept
accompanying the law enforcement reform has formally entered the official discourse
system.
The standardization idea mainly formed in situations where a surge of
contradictions in the process of social transformation had brought tremendous
pressure on the authorities. A huge gap existed between law enforcement practice and
the new requirements put forward by the emerging rule of law principle. In recent
years, the negative public opinion on law enforcement has further exacerbated
challenges towards the authoritativeness and effectiveness of the police. On the one
hand, police’s violent practice and the closure of law enforcement environment have
caused the public’s intense criticism of the abuse of police power. On the other hand,
when the plight and chaos of social order or issues of public safety emerge, the police

Informatization is a word directly translated from Chinese characters “信息化”, which means the upgrading of
a system through application of information technology.
31
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are the first to be challenged for misconduct. This kind of public opinion not only
affects the legitimacy and accountability of law enforcement, but also profoundly
undermines the professional identity and sense of accomplishment within the public
security organs.32 Therefore, the standardization of law enforcement has become an
important means of responding to such an impact, treated officially as an important
mechanism for preventing arbitrarily exercising law enforcement power and
corruption.
Since 2008, the reform of law enforcement standardization in China can be
divided into two stages. First, during the strengthening stage, from the initiation in
2008 to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2012, the goal of
reform was to make comprehensive improvements to the ability and the credibility of
law enforcement of public security organs. Second, during the deepening stage, from
the 18th National Congress to the present, the primary goal is to establish public
security organs ruled by law. After nearly a decade of fermentation, the construction
of standardization has become the mainstream of public security organs’ law
enforcement work. In 2016, the Opinions on Deepening Standardization Construction
of Law Enforcement in Public Security Organs, issued by the Communist Party of
China Central Committee General Office and the State Council General Office,
confirmed the importance of the standardization reform. The “Opinions” pointed out
that this reform has global and fundamental status in the entire public security work.33
Fu Dalin (傅达林), Gong’an Zhifa, Yi Zhuanye cu Guifanhua (公安执法，以专业化促规范化) [Gong’an Law
Enforcement, using Professionalism to Promote Standardization], PEOPLE’S DAILY (人民日报) (May 23, 2016),
available at http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0523/c1003-28369829.html.
33 Xinhua News Agency (新华社), Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting Guowuyuan Bangongting Yinfa Guanyu
Shenhua Gong’an Zhifa Guifanhua Jianshe de Yijian (中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅印发关于深化公安执法
32

17

B. A Vague Concept
Despite remaining a hot topic ever since its implementation, the concept of law
enforcement standardization has always been ambiguous, with extensive discussions
on its connotation and denotation. When the party committee of the MPS at the
Nanjing Conference formally proposed this concept, there was no corresponding
explanation in most official files. Instead, “standardization” was directly placed in a
specific context:
So as to comprehensively improve law enforcement ability and credibility of the public
security organs, based on the current and long-term perspectives, major measures are
taken to comprehensively promote the law enforcement standardization, such as
strengthening the subject of law enforcement, completing the system of law
enforcement, improving the law enforcement venue, enhancing the level of law
enforcement management, and applying information technology in law
enforcement…34

From the consistent main line of the official context, the standardization of law
enforcement is actually tantamount to the legalization of police work. The scope of its
extension covers all aspects of law enforcement, such as the subject, the behavior, the
venue, the management, and the informatization. Although the original concept did
not have such a meaning, the “standardization of law enforcement” has evolved into a
“political correctness” bag that can include any content related to law enforcement.
This usage of law enforcement standardization as a blanket rule has caused many
problems in practice. The most prominent is difficulties for grassroots police officers
规范化建设的意见) (Sep. 27, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-09/27/c_1119634702.html.
34 According to the Guiding Opinions on Strengthening the Standardization Construction of Public Security
Organs (Gong Tong Zi (中通字) [2008] No. 49), the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China on Further Strengthening and Improving Public Security Work (Zhongfa (中发) [2003] No. 13), and the
spirit of the 20th National Public Security Conference. Sun Yu (孙宇), Xin Shiqi Gong’an Jiguan Zhifa Guifanhua
Yanjiu Suping (新时期公安机关执法规范化研究述评) [A Review of the Research on the Standardization of
Public Security Organs in the New Period], 1 YUNNAN JINGGUAN XUEYUAN XUEBAO (云南警官学院学报), 77
(2016).
18

to grasp the concept of standardization, which results in vastly different methods of
target recognition, understanding, and pursuit.35
Divergent theories in the academia have also aggravated the ambiguity of the
concept of standardization. There are three main types of academic understanding on
the subject. The first is the Criterion-Standard,36 which draws upon Max Weber’s
theory of professional inner criteria and takes the fundamental purpose of
standardization as to determine the inner standards of law enforcement officers for
their work. The second is Technology-Design, 37 which emphasizes the technical
aspects of law enforcement norms from a micro perspective, aiming to achieve the
goal of law enforcement by combining with the Informatization construction and
other technical operations. The third is Comprehensive Rule-of-law, 38 which
completely equates standardization with the connotation of legalization from a macro
perspective. After synthesizing the academic views, Yi Jicang defined the concept of
standardization as “that the public security organs use to achieve certain objectives of
law enforcement, within the framework of the law, and a systematic project that
makes law enforcement activities accord with procedures and norms.”39
In general, ambiguity may be unavoidable to an empirical concept. According to
See Yao Zhanjun (姚占军) & Chen Hua (程华), Falv Shijiao xia de Gong’an Zhifa Guifanhua Jianshe (法律视
角下的公安执法规范化建设) [The Standardization Construction of Public Security Law Enforcement from the
Perspective of Law], 1 ZHONGGUO RENMIN GONG’AN DAXUE XUEBAO (中国人民公安大学学报), (2009).
36 Id. at 94.
37 Lin Shuihu (林水湖) et al., Guanyu Gong’an Zhifa Guifanhua Jianshe de Renshi yu Sikao (关于公安执法规范
化建设的认识与思考) [Understanding and Thinking on the Standardization Construction of Public Security Law
Enforcement], 2 GONG’AN YANJIU (公安研究), 52 (2009).
38 See Zhang Caifeng (张彩凤) & Liuyang (刘洋), Gong’an Zhifa Guifanhua de Fali Luoji (公安执法规范化的
法理逻辑) [The legal logic of the standardization of public security law enforcement], 5 ZHONGGUO RENMIN
GONG’AN DAXUE XUEBAO (中国人民公安大学学报), (2011); See also Lin Shuihu (林水湖) et al., Id.
39 Yi Jicang (易继苍), Gong’an Jiguan Zhifa Guifanhua Jianshe Yanjiu Suping (公安机关执法规范化建设研究
述评) [A Review of the Research on the Standardization Construction of Public Security Organs], 1 GONG’AN
XUEKAN (公安学刊), 22 (2011).
35
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Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of so-called “private language,” a
concept has an innate publicity. In other words, language is something public. The
publicity requires consensus on the connotation of a concept. However, the consensus
can be vague and may even always be vague.40 Specific to the current situation, when
the notion of “standardization of law enforcement” is in use, its kernel still exists and
can be understood by people—with vague room left, of course. This ambiguity has
created a huge obstacle to furthering implementation. Grassroots law enforcement
officials may feel overwhelmed by its abstractness and vagueness, and those feelings
may further affect their operability. Although these kinds of issues will be discussed
as factors in the following section, conceptual difficulties are not the focus of this
research. This article instead uses the concept of “standardization of law enforcement”
in the sense of Yi Jicang’s opinion.

C. The Relation to the Criminal Procedure Reform
The standardization of law enforcement is a systematic project involving all parts
of public security organs. A slight move in one part may affect the situation as a
whole. The research for this article focused on the action situation of investigation and
evidence collection and tried to figure out how the relevant regulations set up by the
police authorities affect the practice in the context of standardization. Since
investigation and evidence collection activities are also subject to the criminal
procedure law, before getting to the core topic of this research, another question
40

See WITTGENSTEIN: PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH, translated by Chen Jiaying, (Shanghai People's

Publishing House, 2005).
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should be answered first: how do these internal management requirements reconcile
and interact with the regulations of the criminal procedure reform?
The criminal procedure law amended in 2012 marks the start of the criminal
procedure reform, which has covered a wide range of criminal procedures and
systems. The mainstream value of the criminal procedure reform is to highlight and
protect human rights, which greatly affects the investigation. Currently, “the key to
advance the trial-centered reform of the criminal procedure system lies in the strict
implementation of the principle of evidence adjudication in all aspects of criminal
proceedings.”41 As one of the statutory bodies that collect criminal evidence, the
investigating organ must collect, fix, review, and use the materials according to the
requirements and standards of the trial, put emphasis on evidence and investigation,
keep skeptical on oral confessions, and take physical evidence seriously. The
case-handling model has to transform from a confession-to-evidence mode to an
evidence-to-confession mode.
The criminal procedure reform asks for the higher capability of the investigating
authorities that collect evidence or even comprehensively enforce the law. This
request finally becomes an opportunity to promote the standardization of law
enforcement. In particular, “forced” effects of criminal procedure reform have helped
to raise the standardization level of criminal law enforcement in many fields. The
measures taken in the name of standardization include but are not limited to reviewing
coercive measures, implementing an online case handling system, establishing the

“Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Issuing the Implementation Opinions on Comprehensively Promoting
the Reform of the Trial-Centered Criminal Procedure System,” No. 5 [2017] SUP. PEOPLE’S CT.
41
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interrogation audio-visual recording system, and the financial management system.
Furthermore, measures were taken to prevent the police from extorting confessions by
torture or obtaining evidence illegally.
First, to undertake the new requirements of criminal proceedings, internal
regulations and operating rules have been overall revised and improved, and new
measures have been implemented. The Criminal Procedure Law and the Procedures
for Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs were amended and improved
concerning

defense,

evidence,

investigation,

coercive

measures,

penalties

implementation, and others. Operational Rules of Law Enforcement was enacted to
refine guidelines for handling criminal cases. Regulations also include coordinating
standards for filing criminal cases with standards for pressing charges and clarifying
the scope and procedures of exclusionary rules.
Second, technical measures are combined to control the evidence collection
process. The proof of authenticity and legitimacy of evidence highlights the
importance of transparency in the process, as well as the necessity to expand the
normative and supervisory functions of the information system. In the information
system all electronic traces of law enforcement activities should be kept from the
“entrance” of the assembly line to the “exit.” At the beginning, audio-visual devices
shall continuously and unbrokenly record the entire process of law enforcement
activities on the spot without interruption. Then, criminal suspects brought back from
the scene shall be video monitored until they are brought into the interrogation center.
As of July 2017, the standardized construction of law enforcement venues has
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basically been completed across the nation with 3,885 centers built, where the entire
region is monitored by video surveillance.

42

In the meantime, the online

case-handling system was also used. Beginning with the early stage of an
investigation—such as emergency calls—all case information must be recorded
online until the end of the entire investigation process. Each operative step during the
process is input into the computer and leaves traces that cannot be changed. These
records comprise the online law enforcement files. Last but not least, the property
(physical evidence) management system was developed to further standardize the
seizure, sealing up, and suspending procedures involving property and physical
evidence, so that more transparency could be brought into the handling process.43
Third, both internal and external supervision are used to standardize exercise of
law enforcement discretion. As the main internal supervising tools, the performance
evaluation system and the case quality assessment mechanism focus on guiding the
police to perform their duties exactly according to law. Those assessments are
produced by legal affair departments, which are pivotal in internal law enforcement
supervision by taking action on routine supervision and inspection, periodic
assessments, research on difficult cases, etc. The MPS promulgated the Provisions on
the Assessment of the Quality of Law Enforcement Activities by Public Security
Organs as a whole framework. The public security organs at various levels

Xinhua News Agency (新华社), Zhifa Xiaoxijie, Fazhi Dajinbu (执法小细节，法治大进步) [Small details of
law enforcement, great progress in the rule of law] (July 3, 2017),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2017-07/03/c_1121256287.htm.
43 The Blue Book of Rule of Law in Sichuan (四川法治蓝皮书), Sichuan Guifan Xingshi Susong She’an Caiwu
de Guanli Chuzhi Gongzuo (四川规范刑事诉讼涉案财物的管理处置工作) [The Management and Disposal of
the Property Related to Criminal Proceedings in Sichuan] (March 23, 2017),
http://wap.pishu.cn/psgd/468635.shtml
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continuously refine the specific index, aiming to establish a complete performance
evaluation index system that is expected to legally, scientifically, effectively, and
uniformly evaluate police work. Supervision outside the police primarily comes from
prosecutors, whose opinions and suggestions are usually seen in major, difficult cases,
and other legal participants, such as lawyers or parties.
Fourth, to enhance the police capacity of collecting, fixing, preserving,
reviewing, and using evidence according to law, standardization reform focuses on
officers’ training and qualification exams. Trainings include on-site disposal,
investigation, evidence collection, and the use of weapons and police vehicles, as well
as skills practice, such as centralized training, combat exercise, and case review. Apart
from trainings, the qualification examination system was also introduced to foster an
elite force. The certificate of exam will only be valid for five years, then a
re-examination is needed. Exams are divided into basic level, intermediate level, and
advanced level. If a police officer cannot pass the basic level test, he or she cannot
handle cases. As of 2016, a total of 2,087,100 (person-times) police officers have
passed the basic law enforcement test, 1,115,000 (person-times) have passed the
intermediate test, and 35,100 (person-times) have passed the advanced test.44

Xinhua News Agency (新华社), Guifan Minjing Zhifa, Gong’anbu Fangchu Naxie Dazhao (规范民警执法，公
安部放出哪些大招) [Standardize the police enforcement, what major measures the Ministry of Public Security
released] (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-10/18/content_5120991.htm.
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Chapter 4. Literature Review
In terms of investigation and evidence collection, extensive research has been
conducted in China over the past few decades. The research has followed two
paradigms: the individualized study and the systematic study. The former focuses on
one single type of evidence and observes ways to obtain this evidence, such as
confessions, witness testimony, physical evidence, transcript evidence，etc.45 The
latter is much less common. The systematic study grasps a big picture of investigation
and evidence collection scenarios. Specifically, the systematic study could be divided
into two angles: one is concerning dossiers, which represent outcomes or products of
the evidence collection action; the other is concerning procedures and constraint
measures, which pay attention to process. A comprehensive literature review may
provide a broad context for this study and help provide a position where it could
possibly stand.

A. Individualized Research
a. Suspect Confession
In China, confession-centrism is a concept created to describe the extreme
importance that confession of suspects has in making a case. One empirical study,
which selected 50 criminal cases each year in a region in 1984, 1994, and 2004 as

It should be noted that, for the study convenience and being consistent with the logic of evidence collection, this
paper does not adhere to the classification of evidence listed in the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law, in which
evidence and the investigation are clearly distinguished in different chapters. However, this paper will sort
according to evidence materials combined with evidence methods_, and using the source of evidence and the main
carrier as the dividing standards.
45
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samples for evidence analysis, indicated the ratio between the number of confessions
and all other evidence is about 1:2. This ratio has not significantly changed over the
last two decades.46
Another current study collected 1,986 valid questionnaires and analyzed about
200 criminal dossiers. It proposed the main manifestations of confession-centrism in
different stages. 1) In the investigation stage, the initial confession rate is as high as
70%. The rate even rises to more than 90% when the investigation is over. 2) In the
prosecution stage, the primary work of case review is to check interrogation
transcriptions, which are put in the center of evidence proof system. Confession is
also the basis for the prosecutor making a decision. Generally, the prosecutor does not
dare to press charges without a confession on record. 3) In the trial stage, confessions
also play a fundamental, irreplaceable role. An acquittal is very rare as long as the
defendant gives a confession, regardless of whether it was in court or not.47
The investigation depending on the confession is not only a unique problem in
China. In the United States, where the criminal justice system emerges in a relatively
stronger rights protection atmosphere, confession dependence could also emerge in
plea bargain areas. Nonetheless, the problem in China is more overt compared to the
counterpart in the US because, through weakening or concealing the compulsion, the
legitimacy of obtaining confessions has been basically guaranteed in the US.48
See Liu Fangquan (刘方权), An’juan zhong de Kougong yu Zhengju (案卷中的口供与证据) [Confession and
Evidence in Dossiers], 23(6) ZHONGGUO RENMING GONG’AN DAXUE XUEBAO (中国人民公安大学学报), 140
(2007).
47 See Yan Shaohua (闫召华), Kougong Zhongxin Zhuyi Pingxi (口供中心主义评析) [Comment on Confession
Centralism], 4 ZHENGJU KEXUE (证据科学), (2013).
48 See Zhu Kuibin (朱奎彬), Quanli Huayu Zhebi xia Meiguo Xingshi Sifa de Kougong Yilai (权利话语遮蔽下美
国刑事司法的口供依赖) [The Confession Dependence of American Criminal Justice under the Cover of Rights
46
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The negative side of the sole reliance on the confession is so well known that
such discussion in my

research seems

unnecessary. To deal

with

the

confession-centrism problems, most existing Chinese literature has focused on
discussing the right to silence, the establishment of lawyer’s presence during
interrogation, the improvement of the exclusionary rule, and rebuilding the proof
model and the proof standard.49 A few scholars shifted from the rights protection
discourse to the power control discourse in reference to preventing involuntary
self-incriminating statements. Specifically, the power control model is designed to
make the interrogation environment less coercive by cutting off temporal, spatial, and
acting conditions on which the unlawful interrogation depends. The star among the
power control measures is video surveillance on interrogation.
Subsequent studies have shown that interrogation surveillance could easily be
manipulated, though. Once combined with selective transcripts, it is difficult to prove
legitimacy of the interrogation process. The monitoring role might fail.50 In addition,
the reform trying to decrease interrogation-related coerciveness cannot reach to
pre-custody talks between the investigative officer and the suspect. Especially from
the time when the suspect is controlled to the time when the official interrogation
starts, it is the main stage when torture occurs.51 Solutions proposed by one study
Discourse], 6 SICHUAN DAXUE XUEBAO (四川大学学报), (2007).
49 See generally He Jiahong(何家弘), Zhongguoshi Chenmoquan Zhidu zhi Wojian (中国式沉默权制度之我见)
[My Opinion on the Chinese System of Right to Silence], 1 ZHENGFA LUNTAN (政法论坛), (2013); Chen
Guangzhong(陈光中) & Wang Haiyan(汪海燕), Zhencha Jieduan Lvshi Bianhu Wenti Yanjiu (侦查阶段律师辩护
问题研究) [Research on Lawyer's Defense in Investigation Stage], 1 ZHONGGUO FAXUE(中国法学) , (2010); Yang
Wenge (杨文革), Chenmoquan zhi Fuyu yu Zhengming Biaozhun zhi Zhuanxing (沉默权之赋予与证明标准之转
型) [Transformation of the right to silence and the standard of proof], 1 FAXUE ZAZHI (法学杂志), (2012).
50 See Ma Jinghua (马静华), Gongsu Ziyuanxing de Quanli Baozhang Moshi (供述自愿性的权力保障模式)
[Authority Mode of Voluntariness Guarantee], 3 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究), (2013).
51 See Chen Ruchao (陈如超), Xingxun Bigong de Zhongguo Zhili (刑讯逼供的中国治理) [Chinese Governance
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appeal to an idea called “full range” of surveillance that asks for the full-time
coverage of surveillance. It also introduces a broader concept of “interrogation” to
cover the “informal interrogation” phase, encompassing all forms of interrogation in
practice.52

b. Witness Written Testimony
Existing research on witness testimony has focused on topics with regard to
witnesses giving testimony at trial. This mainstream is understandable. Because once
the live witness testimony takes over the written testimony as the basis for reviewing
and judging a case, problems caused by written testimony could be solved.
Accordingly, the new Criminal Procedure Law in 2012 enacts a clause that “force
witness to court.”
However, the rate of live witnesses is still not ideal after the enactment of the
CPL. In the view of defense counsels, the environment for witnesses appearing in
court did not change significantly. From judges’ point of view, the approach that
forces witnesses to go to court can cause troubles. Judges get used to disposing cases
by reading files, “given that the testimony of witnesses and other content has been in
the file, forcing witness to show in court does not make too much sense.”53 Some
scholars have pointed out that the new Criminal Procedure Law, which tries to

of Extorting a Confession by Torture], 1 GANSU ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO (甘肃政法学院学报), (2015).
52 See Ma Jinghua(马静华) & Zhang Lianhan(张潋瀚), Xunwen Luyin Luxiang yu Feifa Zhengju Paichu (讯问录
音录像与非法证据排除) [Interrogation Video Surveillance and Exclusion of Illegal Evidence], 7 XI’NAN MINZU
DAXUE XUEBAO (西南民族大学学报), (2016).
53 See Chen Weidong (陈卫东) & Zhao Heng (赵恒), Xingshi Zhengju Zhidu Zhongdian Wenti SHishi
Zhuangkuang Diaoyan Baogao (刑事证据制度重点问题实施状况调研报告) [Investigation Report on the
Implementation Status of Key Issues in the Criminal Evidence System], 6 ZHENGJU KEXUE(证据科学), (2014).
28

establish the live witness testimony system fails its original purpose with problems
and shortcomings left. Take forcing witnesses to court for example. How to enforce it
and what the punishment is if witnesses do not appear in court are still unclear.
If the witness does not appear in court, written testimony can still be used. This
is the key that makes a system an apple of Sodom under the relatively complicated
reality in China.54 If the dossier-centrism mode cannot be changed, if prosecutors’
and judges’ decision-making still relies on what they read in files, only the “force
witnesses to court” rule cannot change anything. The written and pre-trial testimony
will continue existing and having a crucial effect on the criminal justice system,
unavoidably.
Since the written testimony will not disappear in the near future, the evidence
ability of the pre-trial testimony and the “illegal written testimony” that violates the
legal procedure needs academic attention.55 Despite being unheeded, the approach to
improve the capacity of investigative officers and help them obtain qualified
testimony transcripts still has value.56

c. Identification
Identification transcripts can be divided based on two dimensions: the subject
who makes the identification and the object that is identified. As a result, all of the
See Wan Yi (万毅), Xinxingsufa Zhengren Chuting Zhidu de Ruoganfa Jieshi Wenti (新刑诉法证人出庭制度的
若干法解释问题) [Several Legal Interpretations of the New Criminal Procedure Law Witness Appearing in Court],
GANSU ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO (甘肃政法学院学报), (2013).
55 See Chen Ruihua (陈瑞华), Lun Zhengren Zhengyan Guize (论证人证言规则) [Witness Testimony Rules], 2
SUZHOU DAXUE XUEBAO (苏州大学学报), (2012).
56 See Jiang Jun (姜军) & Sun Yasai (孙亚赛), Yi Shenpan wei Zhongxin Yaoqiuxia de Zhengren Zhenyan
Quzheng Wenti yu Wansan Duice (以审判为中心要求下的证人证言取证问题与完善对策) [Witness Testimony
and Countermeasure Based on Trial-centralism], 6 JINGYUE XUEKAN (净月学刊), (2015).
54
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records of identification form a loose system. The identification given by a suspect is
a supportive means to verify his or her confession. Figures, places, or items
mentioned in the identification should nail counterparts in real life. This kind of
identification given by suspects is a form of confession in nature. Investigative
officers often arrange this identification immediately after interrogation, asking
suspects to identify victims, accomplices, places, and items used in the crime.
The widely enforced practice has not received equivalent attention from
researchers. The items identified by the suspect are generally discussed within the
range of physical evidence or the evidence admissibility (see the next section). The
victims and accomplices identified by the suspect are mentioned in witness
identification research, which represents the mainstream in this field. Only the crime
scene identified by the suspect has been sporadically discussed. Back to 2000, there
had been studies saying that identification records were widely used in criminal
investigation.57 Until 2015, according to some studies, the scene identification was
not regulated by meaningful legislation, and plenty of controversies existed in
practice.58 The identification of a concealed crime scene and the relevant defense
strategy59 were relatively hot topics in this field due to the specialty of the hidden
crime scene and its importance as evidence in criminal investigation.

See Li Shouqi (李守岐), Xianchang Bianren Bilu Buneng Tidai Xianchang Kancha Bilu (现场辨认笔录不能替
代现场勘查笔录) [On-site Identification of Transcripts is not a Substitute for On-site Survey Transcripts], 6
ZHONGGUO XINGSHI JINGCHA (中国刑事警察), (2000).
58 See Cai Qiuming (蔡秋明), Xianchang Zhiren gai Hequhecong (现场指认该何去何从) [Where On-site
Identification Goes], 05 FAZHI BOLAN (法制博览), (2015).
59 See Guo Taiping (郭太平), Xingshi Xianchang Zhiren Bilu de Bianhu Celue (刑事现场指认笔录的辩护策略)
[Defence Strategy for Identifying Transcripts at Crime Scene], 10 ZHONGGUO LVSHI (中国律师), (2010).
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As for the witness identification, it has been a hot topic for a long time, because
errors deriving from the witness identification have always been considered an
essential factor in wrongly convicted cases.60 Based on psychological theories, some
studies indicated the high possibility of incorrect identification and appealed to
procedures as safeguards.61 Research pointed out that witnesses’ confidence could be
influenced by many factors, such as hosts, identification procedures, and
self-conditions,62 as well as the line-up arrangement which could be taken as a clue
when a witness is making a decision.63 Apart from the natural cognitive factor, the
psychological factor and others that may affect the accuracy of recognition, some
studies also focused on investigative agencies where the identifying problems are
caused by rule breach and procedure violation.64 The existing proposals to those
problems mainly count on the legislation that is expected to create or complete
identification rules and evidentiary effect of identification.65
See Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培), Lun Bilulei Zhengju de Fadinghua yu Yancihua (论笔录类证据的法定化与言词化)
[On the Legalization and Verbalization of Evidence in Transcripts], 7 BEIJING SHEHUI KEXUE (北京社会科学),
(2016); Li Fenfei (李奋飞), Xingshi Wupan Zhilizhong de Shehui Canyu (刑事误判治理中的社会参与) [Social
Participation in Criminal Misjudgment Governance], 1 BIJIAOFA YANJIU (比较法研究), (2016).
61 See Huang Weizhi (黄维智), Muji Zhengren Bianren de Kexinxing jiqi Chengxu Baozhang (目击证人辨认的可
信性及其程序保障) [The Credibility of Witness Identification and Procedural Guarantee], 6 SHEHUI KEXUE
YANJIU (社会科学研究),(2004); Liu Kezhong (刘克忠), Muji Zhengren Cuowu Jiyi de Yingxiang Yinsu Yanjiu
Zongshu (目击证人错误记忆的影响因素研究综述) [A Review of the Research on the Influencing Factors of
Witnesses' False Memory], 3 ZHENGFA XUEKAN (政法学刊), (2014); Chen Xiaoyun (陈晓云), Zhixing Renyuan
Dui Muji Zhengren Bianren Jieguo de Yingxiang ji Guizhi (执行人员对目击证人辨认结果的影响及规制)
[Influence of Executives on Identification of Witnesses and Regulation], 6 FUJIAN JINGCHA XUEYUAN XUEBAO (福
建警察学院学报), (2014).
62 See Jiang Lina (姜丽娜), et al., Muji Zhengren Bianren Yanjiu (目击证人辨认研究) [Research on Identification
by Eyewitness], 5 XINLI KEXUE (心理科学), (2007).
63 See Jiang Lina (姜丽娜), et al. Butong Liedui Chengxian Fangshixia Fankui dui Muji Zhengren Bianren
Zixingxin de Yingxiang (不同列队呈现方式下反馈对目击证人辨认自信心的影响) [The influence of feedback
on the identification of self-confidence of witnesses in different queue presentation modes], 1 XINLI YU XINGWEI
YANJIU (心理与行为研究), (2013).
64 See Chen Xiaoyun (陈晓云), Jingcha dui Yingxiang Muji Zhengren Bianren Jieguo Kexinxing Yinsu de Renzhi
(警察对影响目击证人辨认结果可信性因素的认知) [Police's Cognition of Factors Affecting the Credibility of
Witnesses' Identification Results], 5 FUJIAN JINGCHA XUEYUAN XUEBAO (福建警察学院学报), (2015).
60
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See Liu Liming (刘黎明), Wanshan Bianren Zhengju Xiaoli zhi Gouxiang (完善辨认证据效力之构

想) [The Idea of Perfecting Effectiveness of Identification], 5 ZHENGFA XUEKAN (政法学刊), (2005); Chen
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d. Physical Evidence Collection and Preservation
Physical evidence in this paper refers to “forms of evidence with material
carriers such as objects, traces, documents, audio or video recordings, etc. In general,
real evidence, documentary evidence, audio-visual recordings and electronic evidence
are all physical evidence.” 66 The research on procedures of physical evidence
collection and preservation cannot circumvent the transcripts formed by investigation,
such as documents transfer, on-site inspection, search, and seizure.
Research with a topic on a specific type of physical evidence is voluminous.
For instance, audio-visual recordings and electronic evidence have drawn much
attention in recent years.67 The study on the collection and preservation procedures
under the integrated concept of physical evidence seemed rare. A pioneer was
Professor Chen Ruihua’s “Authentication of Real Evidence,” which sharply stated that
the competency of physical evidence and probative force of physical evidence are
neglected, both in legislation and in practice.
In terms of how to rule out the application of illegal physical evidence, existing
literature cannot reach a consensus. The rights protection is not usually involved in
the collection of physical evidence, and the procedural violation may not affect the
authenticity of physical evidence, so evidence exclusionary rules do not apply. As a

Xiaoyun (陈晓云), Muji Zhengren Cuowu Bianren de Lifa Fangfan (目击证人错误辨认的立法防范) [Legislative
Precautions for Eyewitness’ Wrong Identification], 2 ZHONGGUO XINGSHIFA ZAZHI (中国刑事法杂志),(2011).
See Chen Ruihua (陈瑞华), Shiwu Zhengju de Jianzhen Wenti (实物证据的鉴真问题) [Authentication of Real
Evidence], 5 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究), (2011).
67 Eg. Chen Yongsheng (陈永生), Dianzi Shuju Soucha, Kouya de Falu Guizhi (电子数据搜查, 扣押的法律规制)
[Legal Regulations on Search and Seizure of Electronic Data], 5 XIANDAI FAXUE (现代法学), (2014).
66

32

result, the investigation and collection of physical evidence only have to follow
relatively technical procedures.68
Subsequent studies revealed that both the substantive laws and the procedural
safeguards have flaws, and the exclusion rule of illegal physical evidence turns out to
be a declaration in books.69 Researchers began to pay attention to physical evidence,
treating it as an important factor in causing the wrongly convicted case.70 Among
them, one stated that natural or human factors might affect the objectivity of evidence
in the process of collection, transportation, and preservation because evidence could
be destructed or changed.71 Professor Chen Yongsheng’s “Evidence Chain of Custody
System” is the latest and most important achievement in this field. For the first time, it
suggested that appropriate mechanisms should be established to standardize the
procedure and constrain misconduct of participants in the evidence collection,
transportation, preservation, and identification process, so that no substantial change
appears while the evidence goes through several phases from investigative officers to
judges.72

See Chen Ruihua(陈瑞华), supra note 66.
See Yan Yongli（闫永黎）& Zhang Shunqin (张书勤), Lun Feifa Zhengju Paichu Guize de Goujian (论非法实
物证据排除规则的构建) [Establishment of Exclusionary Rules of Illegal Evidence], 7 ZHONGGUO XINGSHIFA
ZAZHI (中国刑事法杂志), (2013).
70 See Du Wenhai (杜文海) & Zeng Min (曾敏), Shiwu Zhengju Yinfa de Cuoan Pouxi yu Fangfan (实物证据引
发的错案剖析与防范) [Analysis and Prevention of Wrong Convictions Caused by Physical Evidence], 12
ZHONGGUO JIANCHAGUAN (中国检察官), (2014).
71 See Liu Jingkun (刘静坤), Zhengju Dongtai Bianhua yu Zhencha Jieduan Zhengju Baoguan Jizhi zhi Goujian
(证据动态变化与侦查阶段证据保管机制之构建) [Establishment of Mechanism According to Dynamic Change
of Evidence and Related Storage in Investigation Stage], 1 SHANDONG JINGCHA XUEYUAN XUEBAO (山东警察学院
学报), (2011).
72 See Chen Yongsheng (陈永生), Zhengju Baoguanlian Zhidu Yanjiu (证据保管链制度研究) [Studies on the
Systems of the Chain of Custody], 5 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究), (2014).
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B. Systematic Research
a. Criminal Dossiers
Among existing literature on the criminal dossier system in China, two articles
provided a comprehensive view. One is “On the Trial Mode Centralized on Files and
Notes” written by Professor Chen Ruihua, and the other is “On the System of China’s
Criminal Files” written by Professor Zuo Weimin.
On the basis of practice of criminal dossiers applied in China, Chen revealed the
characteristics of the criminal trial that puts dossiers at the center. To the court, the
dossier made by police is “evidence with natural competency and judgment basis with
superior probative force.”73 Hearings and trials are merely the ritualized confirmation
of the records in dossiers, and they cannot conduct a substantive examination on the
facts of cases. The court presumes evidence competency in the investigative dossier.
Without regulation on the dossier from criminal evidence rules, the legitimacy of
investigative officers’ behaviors cannot be subject to judicial review, and evidence
rules are hard to establish in China. In addition, the court assigns priority to the
written witness testimony collected in the investigation stage. With discretion, the
judge can even accept the pre-trial written testimony instead of the testimony given in
court. As a result, the modern judicial proof system can hardly be implemented.74 An
outstanding contribution of Chen’s research is that it suggests the dossier as a carrier
bridges the investigation and the trial. Decisions made in the investigation stage
See Chen Ruihua (陈瑞华), An’juan Bilu Zhongxin Zhuyi (案卷笔录中心主义) [On the Trial Mode Centralized
on Files and Notes], 4 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究), 79 (2006).
74 Id.
73
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obtain an absolute influence on those made in the judgment. Thus “Investigation
Centralism”75 in the criminal justice system emerges.
Zuo’s study chose an empirical perspective. It investigated the composition and
institutional features of the criminal dossier, which could be divided into the
production, the transfer, and the use phase. All cases selected in 1984, 1994, and 2004
manifested a relatively stable dossier system. At the center of this system are evidence
materials, 99% of which are formed in the investigation stage. More than 90% are
made before the official arrest. With comparison to the counterparts in two major
legal systems, Zuo’s study found the uniqueness of the Chinese dossier system from
the perspectives of the judicial organization type, the purpose of judicial power and
the structure of litigation. It revealed that dossier systems in China and in common
law counties have essential differences in purpose, content, and function. The system
in China is official, one-way, made at early stage, used from the beginning to the end,
and produces decisive outcomes. Instead, the dossier system in common law countries
is internal, non-transitive, and inconclusive. The study also revealed the difference
between China and civil law countries. Both systems have reliance on dossiers, but
the reliance in the civil law system is relative. Furthermore, the subject who produces
the dossier in China is unilateral and openness at early stage is insufficient.76
The most important contribution of Zuo’s study is its insight into the structural
factors in the Chinese dossier system. First, the extreme expansion of the dossier
system is rooted in the unified pattern of the judicial organizations. The more
75
76

See Chen Ruihua (陈瑞华), supra note 13.
See Zuo Weimin (左卫民), supra note 1.
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centralized the model is, the heavier reliance on dossiers would be. Second, as long as
truth finding is deemed epistemologically possible and crime control is given priority
in value sequence, criminal suspects are objectified. There is no room for them to
participate in dossier production. Third, the investigation-centered structure makes the
trial court rely almost exclusively on the investigation to provide decision-making
information. Thus, the dossier is widely and universally used. As a pioneer, Zuo’s
study correctly predicts that most of the current features of the dossier system will
remain over a relatively long time. Follow-up and continuous research are necessary.

b. Restraint Mechanisms
Studies with a topic on restraint mechanisms describe measures of procedure
control taken by internal and external efforts to balance investigative power during
operation with suspects’ rights protection.77 From different observing standpoints,
those studies can be classified into three main types: research on the subject of
evidence collection, research on relations between prosecutors and police, and
research on the supervision of investigation.
First, research on the subject noticed the pivotal position the investigating organ
has when obtaining evidence, and it focused on an establishment of a comprehensive
mechanism that would restrict all evidence collecting procedures and investigative
officers’ conduct to laws and regulations.78 For example, one study indicated the
See XU MEIJUN (徐美君), ZHENCHA XUNWEN ZHENGDANGXING YANJIU (侦查讯问正当性研究) [Interrogation
Legitimacy Research], Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (中国人民大学出版社), (2003).
78 See Chen Wengao (陈闻高), Lun Bianhu Quzhen yu Zhencha Quzheng de Guanxi (论辩护取证与侦查取证的
关系) [Relationships between Defense Evidence and Investigation Evidence], 2 ZHENGFA XUEKAN (政法学刊),
(2014); Yuan Minli (苑民丽), Xin Xingshufa Zhengju Zhidu de Xiugai dui Gong’an Zhencha Quzheng de
77
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proof of the legitimacy of evidence collection should follow the direction that requires
the police to establish a dual evidence system, including evidence to prove case facts
and evidence to prove legitimacy. The evidence to prove legitimacy should be
documented by investigative officers through case handling logs and other procedural
recordings, transferred with the case. Apart from that, investigative officers have to
testify in front of a judge to give particulars of the collecting process. As a result, the
evidence legitimacy ought to be treated as the starting point to guide the police to
establish a standard for evidence collection and case quality management system.79
Research in this field also referred to a large number of internal supervision
mechanisms within investigation agencies. “A set of power control rules has stably
formed within the investigation organs.”80 Internal regulations and rules were used to
restrain the exercise of investigative power from abuse, with a legal affair department
implementing internal control. The police, as bureaucratic organizations, provide a
structural guarantee for such an internal power control mechanism.81 Some empirical
studies show that the legal affair department plays a role in the internal power control,
but with many limitations.82 One study criticized that, under the current Chinese legal

Yingxiang (新刑诉法证据制度的修改对公安侦查取证的影响) [The Influence of the Revision of the Evidence
System of the New Criminal Procedure Law on Public Security Investigation and Evidence], 5 ZHENGFA XUEKAN
(政法学刊), (2012).
79 See Hao Weixin (郝炜欣) & Liu Jingkun (刘静坤), Feifa Zhengju Paichu Guize yu Zhengcha Quzheng Jizhi
Jianshe (非法证据排除规则与侦查取证机制建设) [Illegal Evidence Exclusionary Rules and Construction of
Investigation and Evidence Mechanism], 6 ZHONGGUO RENMIN GONG’AN DAXUE XUEBAO (中国人民公安大学学
报), (2015); See also Liu Quan (刘权), Lun Zhencha Quzheng Chengxu Hefaxing de Zhengming (论侦查取证程序
合法性的证明) [On the Proof of the Legality of the Procedure of Investigation and Evidence], 9 GONG’AN YANJIU
(公安研究), (2013).
80 Ma Jinghua (马静华), Zhencha Quanli de Kongzhi Ruhe Shixian (侦查权力的控制如何实现) [How to Control
Power of Investigation], 5 ZHENGFA LUNTAN (政法论坛), 55 (2009).
81 Id.
82 See Chen Tao et al. (陈涛等), Zhenchaquan Neibu Kongzhi Shizheng Yanjiu (侦查权内部控制实证研究)
[Empirical Study on Internal Control over Power of Investigation], 6 ZHONGGUO XINGSHIFA ZAZHI (中国刑事法杂
志), (2011).
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environment that is greatly influenced by the administration, the internal performance
evaluation has many negative effects.83
Second, research on the relationship between prosecutors and police emphasizes
that police-led criminal investigation has brought problems. More attention should be
paid to the role of prosecutors. Research appealing to establishment of an integrated
pattern of prosecutors and police—in other words, to put investigation under the
guidance of prosecution—has prevailed for more than a decade. 84 However,
prosecutor-led investigation and supervision also have many problems in practice.85
The latest research, after demonstrating the integration of prosecutors and police in
China, shows that the integration may improve investigation quality and effectiveness,
but has limited effects on supervising the investigation. In fact, the real effectiveness
of investigation supervision depends on participation of multiple supervisors, such as
judicial review, lawyers’ assistance, and restraints on investigative officers’
behavior.86
Third, some research discussed the whole process of investigation and evidence
collection based on different types of cases and proposed comprehensive solutions
accordingly. The feature of this kind of research is that a package of solutions is
provided. For instance, a study started with homicide cases aimed at finding problems
See Ma Mingliang (马明亮), Sifa Jixiao Kaoping Jizhi Yanjiu (司法绩效考评机制研究) [Research on Judicial
Performance Evaluation Mechanism], 7 ZHONGGUO SIFA (中国司法), (2009); Bao Xianrong (包献荣), Xingshi
Sifa Jixiao Kaohe de Kunjing yu Chulu (刑事司法绩效考核的困境与出路) [The Dilemma and Outlet of Criminal
Justice Performance Appraisal], 4 SHEHUI KEXUEJIA (社会科学家), (2015).
84 See Liu Jihua (刘计划), Jianjing Yitihua Moshi Zai Jiedu (检警一体化模式再解读) [Reinterpretation of the
Integrated Mode of Prosecuratorate and Police], 6 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究), (2013).
85 See Zuo Weimin (左卫民) & Zhao Kainian (赵开年), Zhencha Jiandu Zhidu de Kaochao yu Fansi (侦查监督
制度的考察与反思) [Investigation and reflection on the investigation and supervision system], 6 XIANDAI FAXUE
(现代法学), (2006).
86 See Liu Jihua (刘计划), supra note 84.
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in the entire investigation and evidence collection process. The study sorted out
problems—including formality—in the crime scene investigation, unlawful
procedures of acquisition and fixation of evidence, ignorance of using details to
corroborate a confession, rare attention to confidentiality, and use of “Description of
Situations” without regulation. At last, it proposed solutions from the systematic level:
establishing specialized agencies, creating a system that makes the officer in charge
take responsibility, transforming from “Confession, the King”to the physical
evidence-based proof, improving methods and techniques for verbal evidence
collection，implementing the rule that police must testify in court，and encouraging
prosecution on guiding investigation.87

C. Insufficiency and Contributions of Existing Literature
a. Insufficiency
The existing literature tended to focus on themes at a decentralized and
micro-level rather than those at a systemic and macro-level. In one of the rare
systematic studies, Professor Chen Ruihua made a brief comment on the
“dossier-centralism,” indicating, “investigative officers have an instinctive motive to
gather evidence of guilt, thus they do not hesitate to make transcripts in violation of
legal procedures.”88 But Chen did not provide a further discussion on specific ways
to deal with legal procedures’ violation. Professor Zuo Weimin’s study on the criminal
See Li Jun (李俊), Dui Min’an Zhencha Quzheng Xianzhuang de You yu Si (对命案侦查取证现状的忧与思) [
Worries and Thoughts on the Status Quo of Homicide Investigation and Evidence Collection], 4 ZHONGUO
JIANCHAGUAN (中国检察官), (2013).
88 Chen Ruihua (陈瑞华), supra note 73, at 72-73.
87
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dossier system revealed the comprehensive and detailed contents of dossiers in
Chinese criminal cases, which lays a solid foundation for my research. “The Chinese
criminal dossiers are to some degree the most complete criminal files at the present
era, especially in terms of written evidence.”89 However, Zuo’s study did not touch
upon the formality issue regarding case contents, nor did it consider whether the
“comprehensive and detailed” files were necessary to construct a case, whether the
requirements driven by the “comprehensive and detailed” principle would increase
the burden on investigative officers, or whether the purpose of truth finding and rights
protection would be distorted. Besides, Zuo’s study did not explore the pragmatic
rationales that investigative officers follow in the process of making dossiers.
The existing literature, from a perspective of procedural restraint, rarely takes the
internal supervision seriously, not to mention address the irreplaceability of a quality
control department within public security organs. However, due to the basic pattern of
investigation power control in China, i.e., “internal bureaucratic control supplemented
by external decentralized control,” 90 the preconditions that investigation power
control discussions have to face are vital roles routinely played by an internal
evaluation system, supervising functions of a quality control process, and normative
requirements.
The existing literature also failed to notice the operational mechanism and logic
of the quality control system inside police departments in the context of the law

Zuo Weimin (左卫民), supra note 1, at 107.
Zhan Jiancheng (詹建成) & Zhangwei (张威), Woguo Zhenchaquan de Chengxuxing Kongzhi (我国侦查权的
程序性控制) [The Procedural Control of Investigative Power in China], 3 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究), 139 (2015).
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enforcement standardization. Factors affecting the system’s positive role and factors
affecting investigative officers’ individual behavior stayed unknown. Consequently, in
terms of the evidence collecting process and the dossier as a form of its output,
existing literature did not fully reveal effects that the structure of an organization and
individual behaviors might have.
The existing literature has touched upon a mechanism that takes advantage of
using power smartly instead of granting rights simply, but merely with the scope of
the confession voluntariness. Power balance has fundamental goals, which are to
control power, to avoid abuse of power, and to protect legal rights of people who are
facing those in power. Thus, the applicability of the power control model can in fact
overflow from one single category of interrogative power and extend to various uses
of investigative power in obtaining and preserving evidence. As long as power
exercise nodes can be targeted and put under control, overall investigation and
evidence collection behaviors can be regulated.
The existing literature did not cover what is of great importance for the power
control mechanism. If specific requirements cannot be made as the inner standards for
organizational management and individual behavior patterns, the power control
mechanism becomes an empty shell. Since internal power control may easily
encounter “customary resistance” or some situation called “overtly agree but covertly
oppose.” The necessary standpoint to solve this kind problem relates to “people's
hearts and minds.” For example, the organizational structure embedded in the
investigation and evidence collection system, its management style, and the pragmatic
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rationality behind organizational culture and investigative officers’ actions are
channels through which we can look at an organization’s or a person’s motivation.
Unfortunately, the existing literature did not say much about those.

b. Key Contributions
Notwithstanding these limitations, the existing literature is helpful to this study.
Especially, three articles have contributed to my research to some degree.
(1) Selective Mechanism
Strictly speaking, “Substantive Trial: A Logical Change in the Way of Evidence
Investigation—A Summary of the Experiences from the Reform in Chengdu”91 by
Professor Ma Jinghua, first touches upon the formality issue of investigation and
evidence collection. Ma’s article points out that the investigating subject who is
responsible for obtaining evidence, such as investigative officers and their supervisors,
is not always focused on ideal principles like “presumption of innocence” or
“comprehensive evidence collection.” On the contrary, they adopt a selective
mechanism according to the principle called “presumption of guilt.”
The selective mechanism represents that investigative officers collect evidence
according to their own understanding of elements needed to construct a case, and that
they screen, filter, and keep pieces of evidence they believe to be true. The selective
mechanism about evidence formation reveals an important aspect that there is a
separation of evidence materials between what exists in the dossiers and what actually
91

See Ma Jinghua (马静华), supra note 8.
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happened. In this sense, all investigative evidence naturally has a very strong
character of being formal. In terms of truthfulness, Ma emphasized the formality that
investigation dossiers have. Thus, he suggested that dossiers should be regarded as
evidence materials rather than evidence. Moreover, the true substance of evidence and
the truth proved by evidence should be built on the trial dossier rather than the
investigation dossier.
My research will follow the lead of the formality, but choose another angle:
which evidence materials are collected or produced to complete the “prescribed
actions.” These “prescribed actions” derive from the normative requirements of law
enforcement and do not completely serve the facts proving process. Thus, the theme
of my research is not the reduction style of formality reflected in the selective
mechanism, but rather the “increment” style of formality reflected in compulsorily
meeting normative requirements.
(2) Psychological Analysis
“An Analysis of Factors of Sustainable Development of Criminal Procedure
System in China” by Li Fenfei emphasizes a factor called “Participating Subject.”
This factor, along with “Litigation Pattern” and “Legislative Text,” is labeled by Li as
the driving force behind the continuous development of the criminal procedure system.
First, Li thought the “Litigation Pattern” would not change significantly in the near
future, so the bureaucratic litigation pattern is not the target of the criminal procedure
reform. Li appealed to more attention on the possibility that lack of external
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regulation in the bureaucratic hierarchy would suffocate consciousness and spirit in
the system.92
Second, “Legislative Texts” has a tendency of “anti-sophisticated precision.” The
legislation is getting more complicated, but the problems in practice are, therefore,
more complicated. This tendency will have an adverse effect on investigative officers,
rendering them overly dependent on interpretation of laws and becoming “case
handling machines” with their initiative lost.93 These assertions have considerable
insights and coincide with the formality trend in investigation and evidence
collection.
Last but not least, in “Participating Subject,” Li stressed that people cannot be
totally bound by sophisticated design procedures because it is easy to fall into the trap
of procedural instrumentalism. Instead, the key to participation relies on the
matureness of participants. He used “Seeking Identity” and “Desire, Reason and
Passion” as the framework for discussion, and pointed out that the judicial
participants need to complete the transition from “utensils” to “disposition.”
However, only judicial personnel were defined as participants in Li’s study. He
ignored another important participant—investigative officers—and disregarded
factors that may affect a transformation of investigative officers’ “psychological”
nature. It is well known that investigative officers enjoy discretionary power

Li Fenfei (李奋飞), Woguo Xingshi Susong Chixu Fazhan Yinzi Tanxi (我国刑事诉讼制度持续发展因子探析)
[Analysis on the Sustainable Development Factors of China's Criminal Litigation System], 5 FASHANG YANJIU (法
商研究), 109 (2016).
93 Id. at 110-112.
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unmatched by other participants. The importance of "psychological" analysis of
investigative officers makes no difference as to judicial personnel for a sustainable
development of criminal procedure system. When “investigation centralism” is not
materially changed under the current bureaucratic litigation pattern, analyses on
investigative officers seem even more important.
(3) Embedded Organization
“Psychological” analysis cannot be separated from the organizational analysis,
because “investigative officers are not robots that mechanically enforce the law after
all, collective actions taken by investigative officers, individuals’ institutional
awareness, and interactions between individuals and the organization should be
highlighted as the core of questioning.”94
Wu Danhong's “Role, Context and Social Tolerance - Law Sociological
Perspective on Torture” 95 is enlightenment in this field. He used sociological
methods to examine social roots of torture. He indicated that the internal basis of
torturers is their social role, and the interrogation situation provides a broad stage for
extorting a confession by torture. As spectators, the public has a high tolerance for it,
which provides a deep social soil. Therefore, curbing torture should start with
changing the situation and social tolerance.
As a systematic study focusing on the overall issue of investigation and evidence
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RICHARD V. ERICSON, MAKING CRIME: A STUDY OF DETECTIVE WORK, (Butterworths Toronto, 1981).

Wu Danhong (吴丹红), Juese Qingjing yu Shehui Rongreng: Shehuixue Shiye zhong de Xingxun Bigong (角色、
情境与社会容忍：法社会学视野中的刑讯逼供) [Role, Situation and Social Tolerance: Extorting a Confession by
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collection, Wu’s study is different from previous studies that purely take evidence as
outcomes or purely care about the collection procedures. Instead, Wu explored the
evidence in an action context that included both behaviors and outcomes. Based on a
comprehensive empirical analysis of evidence in dossiers accompanied with
observations and interviews, Wu combined advantages of “dividing points and the
whole picture.” The research was placed in the context of the standardization reform
of law enforcement to analyze effects that the institutional management and
organizational culture have on investigative officers, as well as such effects traced in
the process or on the evidence materials.
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Chapter 5. Methodology
A. Research Questions
The theme of this dissertation is the formality issues in investigation and
evidence collection that are aggravated by the standardization reform of law
enforcement by public security organs. The institutional explanations for the formality
issues are also discussed.
The concept of “evidence collection” in this study covers two aspects: the
actions of making evidential materials and results of these actions, i.e., the formation
of the dossier. The first category refers to specific acts, methods, techniques and
processes taken to collect individual pieces of evidence. The second refers to the
objective and substantive outcomes obtained by investigation and evidence collection
acts, which constitute the written evidence system as basic materials.
The structure, logic and specifications of the whole evidence system guides the
collection of individual pieces of evidence, and, because results of evidence collection
actions are used to complete a case, the actions ought to be influenced by the goals
that the results pursue. Moreover, investigation and evidence collection cannot act
recklessly, and they are inevitably subject to certain regulations. The form and content
of results cannot be arbitrary, and certain requirements must be followed. Thus, there
emerges a trend called “standardization” covering the evidence collection actions and
results.
The meaning of “standardization” is to “make it suitable for a certain standard.”
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More specifically, it is a status evaluation of whether actions and results meet

certain criteria. The big issue of “standardization” this dissertation deals with is that
the “standardization in form" and the “standardization in substance” have not
achieved their ideal unification. The standardization in form mainly comes from the
view whether materials have perfect appearance about forms and content. It refers to
what appears to be finished on the surface, such as requirements that are completed,
and everything keeps in line with the relevant rules. In contrast, the standardization in
substance mainly comes from the view of whether the action actually complies with
the intended purpose of the normative requirements. It requests that evidence
materials must reflect the real happening and must have real meanings and practical
effects.
Therefore, two dimensions and four types are used to organize the empirical
study. The two dimensions refers to: one, whether certain kinds of evidence collection
actions and results are in conformity with standards in form; and the other, whether
certain kinds of actions and results are in conformity with standards in substance.
Crossing the two dimensions will produce four types of actions and results: (1)
compliance, both in form and in substance; (2) compliance in form, but not in
substance; (3) compliance in substance, but not in form; (4) non-compliance, both in
form and in substance.
This dissertation will first use the analytical framework above to go through

XIANDAI HANYU CIDIAN (现代汉语词典) [Modern Chinese Dictionary], Shangwu Yinshuguan (商务印书馆),
513 (2005).
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evidence materials in dossiers and sort them out. Among the four types, the first one is
the most ideal type and most in line with the spirit of law enforcement norms, while
the second to the fourth need to be avoided because they fall into the category of
“non-compliance,” which may affect the authenticity of the evidence or the legitimacy
of the evidence, or both.
In sum, the empirical part reveals that the law enforcement reform aimed at
improving the quality of cases has led to some unintended consequences, which is a
series of “non-compliance” problems in evidence collection, concerning both the
results and the actions. The most prominent one is called formality, which refers to
“standardization in form” rather than “standardization in substance.”
One concept in sociology, or the organizational behavior field, is that of
deviation, which may help us understand non-compliant actions. Deviation97 refers to
those activities or behaviors that violate the norms of social behavior. Most western
research in reference to deviation theory generally discussed the police’s action in
violation of, or not exactly following, the requirements of laws and regulations
(non-compliant in form)—except for Richard Ericson. He developed the scope of the
theory further by referring not only to cases where the law has not been strictly
exercised but also to the fact that police appear to obey the provisions of the law with
actual violation of the original legislation purpose or the spirit of the rule of law
(non-normative in substance).98
Police deviations are similar to what we often call police irregularities, but the two are still conceptually
distinct.
98
CLIFFORD D. SHEARING, ORGANIZATIONAL POLICE DEVIANCE: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTROL, 5 (Butterworths
Toronto. 1981).
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On the basis of empirical findings, the core theoretical questions of the
dissertation are the institutional environment where the “unintended consequences”
are rooted and the prospect of whether negative consequences can be avoided.
The theoretical explanation part draws on the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework to take the entire investigation and evidence
collection process as the action situation for analysis. Interacting and entangled
components in the action situation, i.e., the specific motives of investigative officers,
and the intrinsic and extrinsic factors that affect motivations are able to fit into the
IAD framework. Comparative law research methods are also appropriately used. The
empirical findings under the Chinese scenario are compared with experiences in the
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and other countries. Similarities and
differences between the Chinese police and the western police are also discussed.

B. Areas Studied and the Sample
Data used in this study was collected from the police in N District in D City and
Z District in S City99 over three periods of time: from January 22, 2016 to February
20, 2016; from June 7, 2016 to July 1, 2016; and from July 11, 2017 to July 22, 2017.
Both districts are located in the same province in western China. N District is the

These two districts are chosen due to a multiple of factors. First and the most important, I have access to police
in these two districts. They are willing to accept the request for field works and interviews not because they are
confident about their work and eager to brag about it, but because the research team I am in has built a solid
relationship with them on the basis of several research projects in the past. In addition, due to personal connections,
some officers in these departments are familiar with my studies and me, then, they share their trust in me with their
colleagues. Second, these two have representative nature. The police department in District N has a notable
reputation about its achievements in standardization reforms within the S province, safe to say “one of the best”.
And the counterpart in District Z is an ordinary department, just looking like most in other cities and districts.
Third, leaders of the legal affair department in the two districts care about their work and also encounter confusion
about it. They really want advice or proposals from the academia so that they can improve the work.
99
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center of a large urban and densely populated area with a population of over 1.2
million at the time of the study. Its GDP in 2015 was more than 80 billion yuan. The
number of officers in the police department is more than 1,200, accounting for about
10 per 10,000 of the total resident population in the region. The number of criminal
detention cases in 2015 was 1,036, as well as 982 arrests and 776 prosecutions. The
management of law enforcement standardization in N police department has long
been recognized as being at the highest level.
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Z District is the downtown area of a

relatively small city, where the GDP was more than 280 billion yuan and the resident
population was 580,000 in 2015. The number of police officers in the police
department is 435, accounting for the region’s population less than 10 per 10,000. The
number of criminal detention, arrests and prosecuted cases in 2015 were 537, 441 and
490, respectively.101
The 16 fatal cases (24 defendants) in N and Z districts in 2015 constitute the
sample of this research, which accounts for 62% of all fatal cases (19 in District N
and 7 in District Z) in the two regions that year. Given that I collected data from
police departments where only dossiers in electronic version can be kept while
materials of dossiers were transferred, 16 murder cases are I was able to collect to the
maximum extent under limited research conditions. In the past, investigation
authorities did not keep dossiers after the transfer of cases to prosecution. When I was
conducting fieldwork, the construction of the electronic dossiers system in the two

According to the "Statistics on National Economic and Social Development in District N in 2015" and the
general situation of the public security organ in District N.
101
According to the general situation of the public security organ in District Z.
100
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police departments had just started. Not all dossiers are listed in the electronic system.
Although systematic sampling is not carried out, the cases collected can be
representative of random sampling because the police did not exclude the missing
cases deliberately.
Since each case has an enormous number of materials that constitute the dossier,
the sample includes 169 interrogation transcripts in total, l82 inquiry transcripts
generated from 152 witnesses, over 300 arrays of identification materials, and
considerable “documents”, such as CSI reports, search warrants, seizure lists, written
expert’s opinions on forensic evidence, etc. Due to differences in material
composition between the two research sites, simply combining the statistics is
impossible in most cases. Thus, the 12 cases with 20 suspects involved in District N
will play a dominant role, and the 4 cases in the District Z will be used as either
corroboration or comparison for findings derived from District N.
The fatal case is a widely used concept in the criminal justice system in China.
Once a death is involved in cases such as homicide, robbery, kidnapping, or injury, it
is called a fatal case. Selecting fatal cases as the sample is the best option available.
First, the number of cases is small, thus detailed case analysis and statistics are
feasible. Second, the interests involved in the fatal case are the greatest, including the
victim's right to life, the potential highest penalty for the suspect—life sentence or
capital punishment—and the great interest the police have in such cases. On the one
hand, the public and the superior always place high expectations on the performance
of the police in fatal cases. On the other hand, to solve such cases is often an
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important aspect of defining success of the police department and investigative
officers. Third, such cases are also prone to wrongful convictions or having
investigative officers take evidence illegally. Most of the wrongful convictions found
in the past belong to the category of the fatal case. Since the investigating authorities
and personnel have to meet the requirement of “A fatal case must be solved,” if
investigative officers are overly confident in their own judgment or influenced by
some inappropriate factors under tremendous pressure, there could easily emerge
illegal procedures or wrongful convictions. Fourth, almost all kinds of evidence can
be found in fatal cases, including a large amount of verbal and physical evidence,
which is able to provide variety to the research. Fifth, the quality of evidence can
represent the highest level of local police’s work. Facing subsequent rigorous scrutiny,
when the local police department is arranging the investigation and evidence
collection works, they invest the most resources in fatal cases, such as sending the
most capable personnel, using advanced technology, and granting fatal cases higher
priority within the internal approvals process. Sixth, due to strict requirements of fatal
cases and relatively fixed elements of those crimes, in practice, means and procedures
for obtaining evidence can easily form a set of fixed action patterns. A detailed
analysis of the patterns can help uncover investigative officer’s motives and the
influence they get from organizational factors. Seventh, the fatal case always involves
defense counsel. If the suspect who may face a potential life sentence or capital
punishment does not hire a lawyer by himself, the police must notify the legal aid
agency to assign the suspect a lawyer for free.
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It should be noted that the dossiers used for this study only come from the police
because my study involves the internal review or approval process and aims at
exploring the interactive dynamics within the organization, which asks for a high
level of completeness that is only seen in the investigative dossiers.102
In addition, management documents related to investigation and evidence
collection were reviewed to aid in the analysis of dossiers. To a certain extent,
documents can reflect the working environment where investigative officers are
exposed; work arrangements and various requirements that the officers encounter in
their daily work can provide evidence support for exploring the institutional-level
motivation of investigating actions.
Documents in the two police departments include: (1) Policy interpretative files,
such as, Opinions on Strengthening the Management of Criminal Cases, Work
Program on Building a Criminal Evidence System for Promoting the Reform of the
Litigation System Centered on Trial, Notice on Case Handling, etc.; (2) Operation
manuals, such as Operation Manual of Policing Integrated Application Platform,
Implementation Measures for New Mechanism of Crime Scene Investigation, etc.; (3)
Official statistical reports, such as Case Management and Allocation Sheet, Clearance
Rate Sheet, etc.; (4) Annual or quarter reports, such as Summary of Work in the Legal
Affair Department in 2014 and Ideas for 2015; and (5) Performance evaluation data,
such as Implementation Measures for Performance Evaluation Management, Rules of

Dossiers formed in the investigation stage can be divided into two parts, one is available to transfer to the
following procedures in the criminal system, and the other part is not available to transfer, only kept within the
police department.
102
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Evaluation for the First Quarter of 2015, Contents and Grading Standards of
Performance Evaluation System, Scores for Quality Assessment of Law Enforcement
Activities, as well as related memos and briefs.

C. Data Collection Methods
The empirical study in this dissertation adopts a combination of qualitative
description and quantitative analysis.
First, the text analysis of the fatal cases identifies problems existing in the
dossiers. Materials in dossiers are classified on the basis of both categories of
evidence and methods of proof. Thus, instead of fully following the classification of
evidence listed in the Criminal Procedure Code, I use the source of the evidence and
the main carriers of evidence as a criterion of division.
The nature of the dossier and the status quo of the dossier system in the criminal
justice system help researchers in text analysis. (1) Researchers are able to see
materials in the dossier just like every participant in the entire criminal litigation
process, as well as analyze what can be personally sensed or validated by criminal
participants. (2) The weak position the defense has in the practice of investigating and
obtaining evidence makes the evidence contained in the investigative dossier
represent almost all the evidence in the case. (3) The large volume of evidence
contained in the dossier can reflect the closed procedure. Investigative confidentiality
and temporal uncertainty make optimal field observations inviable. It is extremely
difficult for researchers to obtain first-hand material through presenting in
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interrogation, witness interrogation, and on-the-spot investigation. Thus, the
suboptimal option left is reading the specific records in the dossier. (4) The analysis of
transcripts can reflect the process more truthfully because the final appearance of the
transcript cannot be completely controlled by a single investigative officer or a
reviewer unless it is totally overridden due to the random occurrence of time and the
uncontrollable factors such as technical isolation. Text conflicts may even reveal the
fact that some participants attempt to “manipulate” the process.
The empirical part also includes ethnographic approaches. I interviewed more
than 30 police officers to find the motivation behind their investigation and evidence
collection behavioral patterns. A total of 30 in-depth interviews were conducted, and
all of the interviewed officers were involved in the production of the dossiers in
different aspects and to different extents (interrogation, witness visits and interviews,
on-site inspection, physical evidence collection, etc.). And I took up one desk in an
open office of the legal affairs department in each studied police department and
learned by on-site observation for a long period of time, following the police officers’
work and rest schedule and seeing the whole process about case distribution, review,
and transfer. In the meantime, I read several internal documents carefully to find out
the dynamics of the evidence collection process, disciplinary rules and investigative
officers’ compliance with those rules. I also inspected the construction and operation
of law enforcement sites, including two police stations and one centralized
case-handling site in N District and three police stations and one centralized
case-handling site in Z district.
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D. Limitations
First, the generality or universality of this study needs to be regarded with
dialectical views. The Party-Government model of the line-block structure in China
made the grassroots law enforcement of the police authority shaped by “Line” and
“Block” at the same time.103 From the perspective of the “Block,” since the surveyed
areas belong to the same province, the level of economic and social development in
that province may likely lead to similar status. Thus, the universality of the study may
not necessarily cover areas where the level of development varies too much.
However, from the perspective of the “Line,” the police authority is heavily
controlled by a top-down management, which leads to a considerable degree of
homogeneity. For instance, the police department in District N has shown excellent
performance concerning law enforcement. Its law enforcement norms and standards
have been learned or simply followed by other police departments, which means, to
some extent, the practice in District N represents the direction of the recent
development of investigation and evidence collection. If not happening at present, the
behavioral model in District N is likely to occur in other police departments
throughout the province soon.
Second, this study may not be able to uncover some more serious misconduct or
illegal activities, such as corruption and deliberate power abuse. Well-known

“Line and Block” is used to describe the bureaucratic structure in China. The line structure refers to vertical
hierarchy management from the Central government to the locals. The block structure refers to the horizontal
management within one local government, which is consisted with many bureaus and departments. See Chen
Baifeng (陈柏峰), supra note 20.
103
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misconduct could possibly be hidden in the transcripts recorded by the investigative
officers or be automatically filtered by the investigative officers during interviews.
Thus, it cannot be touched upon by this research. However, this does not belong to the
main focus of this study.
Third, the reliability of findings in this study need to be considered with the low
visibility of the process of investigation and evidence collection in mind. Absent any
chance of investigating or collecting evidence in person, I have to rely solely on
materials recording and reflecting the process, rather than observing the entire process
by myself. Thus, this study can only stay in what can be reflected in the analysis of
evidence materials to explore the areas where the code of law enforcement is not
strictly followed or completely avoided. Although this exploration is sufficient to
show something, the results revealed must have limitations. Although the evidence
text analysis will be complemented by in-depth interviews, observation, and rules and
regulations analysis, it still can only partially reflect, or partially reconstruct, the
deviation and motivation of investigative officers and reviewers in specific situations.
Fourth, this study cannot represent investigative officers’ actions or behaviors in
all kinds of crimes. Although the fatal case model can represent the highest or most
cautious level of interrogation and transcript production, the serious burden of
evidence and pressure on investigative officers in fatal cases may not appear in cases
of misdemeanors nor even of ordinary felony cases. Therefore, some investigative
officers’ behavior patterns reflected in fatal cases may not necessarily appear
regularly in the investigation process of ordinary or simple cases. For reasons of
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discussion, this article will complement primary material with existing secondary
literature if sporadic research and interviews based on non-fatal cases suggest similar
trends.
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Chapter 6 Interrogation
The focus of this chapter is police interrogation based on what is reflected in the
record of dossiers: such as interrogation transcripts that reveal enforcement measures
and internal documents that demonstrate the approval process. First, text analysis
allows for the best possible reenactment of the situation when investigative officers
talk face-to-face with suspects by examining the elements of the transcripts, such as
subject, time, location, the right to inform, etc. This kind of recreation can help
explore possible gaps between what officers recorded and what actually took place
during the interrogation. Second, the relevant requirements of the standardization
reform are further used to evaluate if transcripts were produced in compliance with
norms. The specific question this chapter attempts to answer is whether any gaps
occurred due to deception in transcripts in order to make them appear to meet
standardization requirements.

A. Overview of Interrogation Transcripts in Fatal Cases
In criminal investigation practice, the interrogation transcript is the most
important piece of evidence for fatal cases. This section outlines the basic
composition of transcripts in sixteen cases with a total of twenty-four suspects
involved. Types of crimes include intentional injury (six cases), intentional homicide
(six cases), either robbery or looting (three cases), and kidnapping (one case). There
are 169 interrogation transcripts in total, which means 169 separate instances of
interrogation occurred. The average number of interrogations for a single suspect is
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seven (four at least and eleven at most). One transcript has an average length of five
pages (one page at least and twenty-five at most) (see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2).

B. Deviations in “Go-to-case” phase
The use of the concept of “deviation” is to emphasize that these acts are not
violations of law in the general sense, and they cover a broader range than violations.
The deviation of the interrogation at the “go-to-case” stage means that, when the
suspect has just arrived, investigative officers’ conduct during the interrogation was
not in full compliance with the relevant requirements or with the corresponding
jurisprudence when such requirements do not exist. It is worth noting that the
manifestation of deviation may be obvious but may also disguised as a form in
accordance with norms.
This study found that cases appeared to be carried out through legitimate
measures, accompanied with necessary warrants and completed within the allowed
amount of time. However, this appearance did not tell the whole story. In fact,
suspects were mostly subdued first and warrants were issued after. The facts sheet,
called “go-to-case phase” (到案阶段情况说明), is often used to cover up instances
when the length of time exceeded 24 hours as stipulated by the law. Text analysis also
reveals the existence of “informal interrogation” that cannot be considered
standardized. At this very early stage, these deviations will seriously hinder the intent
of the relevant norms to protect the rights of suspects.
a. Summoning Warrants that Deviate in Substance
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At the go-to-case phase, the suspect is summoned or escorted to the public
security organ and kept there for a relatively short period of time. During that time,
investigative officers will decide on whether to send the suspect through the criminal
detention procedure or to release the suspect.104 At this stage, the law provides a
small but clear set of guidelines:
(1) Measures: The Criminal Procedure Law of 2012 (CPL) provides
“summon”(传唤) and “summon by force”（拘传） as separate procedures that make
suspects go to the case, and it also legalizes “oral summon” (口头传唤) as a special
tactic for summoning. According to Article 117: “A criminal suspect found on the spot
may be verbally summoned by the officers who present a work I.D., but the process
shall be indicated in the transcript of the interrogation.” Oral summons is expressly
limited by the legislation to circumstances where the suspect is “found on the spot.”
(2) Writs: In accordance with Article 75 of the Procedures for Handling Criminal
Cases by Public Security Organs (PHCC), when suspects are summoned by force, “a
summoning warrant shall be produced and be signed and sealed by the suspects. After
going to the case, the suspects shall report the exact time when they were
summoned.”
(3) Time control of the go-to-case phase: Both the CPL and the PHCC stipulate
that the period between when the summons takes place and when the subsequent
decision is made must not exceed 24 hours.
These three institutions complement each other to ensure that the suspects go to
MA JINGHUA (马静华), ZHONGGUO XINGSHI SUSONG YUNXING JIZHI SHIZHENG YANJIU VOL. 3 (中国刑事诉讼
运行机制实证研究（三）), Falv Chubanshe (法律出版社), 27 (2010).
104
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the case according to law and that their rights will not be seriously infringed upon by
the investigation organs.
However, this study revealed that some police procedural practices actually fall
into a pattern that what appears compliant in form but is non-compliant in substance.
There is good practice, indeed. As shown in Table 1, nine of the total twenty suspects
in District N do not have a physical summoning warrant in the dossier. They are
active criminals; thus, these cases satisfy the requisite of oral summons. However,
among eleven suspects who do have a summoning warrant on file, police caught ten
of them. As explored below, some of their warrants look suspicious. Officers might
post-acquire or post-produce the summoning warrants in order to circumvent the
standardization requirements.
According to the regulations, police must issue a summoning warrant before a
suspect is held in police custody, so that the suspect can sign and confirm the
case-starting time. Because the time announced in that warrant is usually used as the
starting line of the time calculation of “go-to-case” phase, it shall record the true
beginning of the case. In appearance, most interrogation transcripts in sample cases
seemingly have no question regarding the starting time of the case and obtaining the
suspect’s signature, but exceptional cases can provide an excellent breakthrough for
this study. Judging from the fact that time in the suspect-signed transcript was later
than the time stated in the “go-to-case phase” facts sheet, the real situation regarding
when those summoning warrants were issued and when they announced could be
inferred.
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The Zeng robbery case is one of those exceptional cases. The starting time listed
on the two suspects’ summoning warrants was both 6:00 p.m., while the fact sheets
reported that the suspects were caught at 3:00 p.m. that day. No legal basis existed for
depriving the personal freedom of the suspects for nearly three hours in this case. One
interviewed officer, DNLA04, said that it is not surprising that the time on the warrant
sometimes does not match the time indicated on the facts sheet because many
summoning warrants are produced after the suspect arrives at the police station, and
the time that is supposed to match each other could be easily contradicted if
investigative officers are careless.
In fact, given the complicated situation at the scene of catching the suspect, it is
not realistic to show the summoning warrant on the spot or even produce it in advance
at all. Thus, the practice has gradually self-adjusted by taking advantage of the oral
summons, which is supposed to be voluntary but is actually enforced mandatorily.
The suspect is often taken by force to the public security organ, then, the summoning
warrant is issued after. This logic could even be found in the highest investigative
organ. The third and fourth paragraphs of Article 195 of the PHCC (Revised Draft)
formulated by the MPS in July 2012 stipulates:
A criminal suspect who does not accept the summons without justified reasons may be
summoned by force on the spot with the approval of the person in charge of the public
security organ at or above the county level. After the suspect is brought to the public
security organ, a warrant shall be issued.

Although these provisions were eventually deleted in the final draft due to conflicts
with the CPL, they had successfully reflected the pragmatic thinking of the
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investigative organs.105
b. Informal Interrogations
The compliant in form but non-compliant in substance summoning warrants may
also be used in practice to “whitewash” “informal interrogation” behavior, in other
words, to make the informal interrogation invisible. Current legal provisions do not
explicitly mention whether suspects shall be immediately interrogated after they go to
the case, and the concept of interrogation is not clearly defined. Therefore, in practice,
both “informal interrogation” and “formal interrogation” exist, while only the formal
interrogation produces a transcript. To delve into a case, investigative officers
incorporate the nature of “interrogating” in all forms of conversation with the suspect.
Informal interrogation may occur at the crime scene, on the way to the agency, in the
interrogation room, in the inquiry room, or in any other location. Since there is no
transcript, the informal interrogation activity cannot be reflected in the dossier, which
means it is unknown to the outside world.106
This study points out a few clues regarding the existence of some “hidden”
informal interrogations through careful analysis of interrogation transcripts. First, the
initial interrogation started late. In District N, the average interval from the summons
to the first interrogation was 211 minutes, indicating that the suspects would not be
formally interrogated within three and a half hours after they were taken into police
custody. The interval in complex cases is over four hours. Apart from reasonable
105

Ma Jinghua (马静华), 2 Xin Xingshi Susongfa Beijing xia Zhencha Dao’an Zhidu Shishi Wenti Yanjiu (新刑事

诉讼法背景下侦查到案制度实施问题研究) [Implementation of Dao’an in the Context of New Criminal
Procedure Law], DANGDAI FAXUEY (当代法学), 121 (2015).
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Ma Jinghua(马静华) & Zhang Lianhan(张潋瀚), supra note 52, at 87-95.
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traffic time and routine inspections before entering an interrogation site, the
investigative officers may still have a surplus of time to engage in certain tactics, such
as informal interrogation.
Second, a longer interval before the first interrogation tends to correlate with a
shorter duration of the first interrogation (see table below). In several complicated
cases where the go-to-case phase lasted over ten hours, such as the Tang murder case,
the Zhang kidnapping case, the Zeng looting case, and the Luo robbery case, the first
formal interrogation began quickly, and continued for several hours, with some
interrogations lasting for more than thirteen hours. By contrast, when the period of
time between the arrival and the first interrogation was longer—for more than eleven
hours, as an example— the duration of the first interrogation was much shorter.
Table1: Statistics of Sample Cases in District N
Tang
A

Zhang

Peng

Zeng

Wa

Luo

Luo

Cai

Xu

Xie

Zheng

—

—

—

—

—

—

A

597

120

N/A

170

300

127

95

N/A

B

A

B

A

B

A

B

A

B

111

149

140

100

175

670

580

105

146

76

50

Duration of the first
798
interrogation（minutes）
O: interrogate outside
jurisdiction

499

463
(O:
34)

355
(O:1
5)

110

140

110

215

248

152

114

210

228

106

121

160

141

148

180

101

Is the time in warrant
in accordance with the
time going to case that
listed in facts sheet?

Y

Y

N/A

N/A

Y

Y

N.
3
hrs
late
r

N.
3
hrs
later

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/
A

N/A

N/A

How did the suspect
arrives? (C: caught;
CO: caught outside
jurisdiction; S: wait on
the spot; T: turn self in)

C

C

CO

CO

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

S

C

S

S

T

S

T

T

T

Confess or not in the
first interrogation

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Period between suspect
arrives and the first
formal interrogation
(minutes)

90
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C

Li

B

C

A reasonable explanation is a “psychological attack” (攻心),107 which aims at
demoralizing or persuading the suspects to give up resistance, must exist before the
formal interrogation. Depending on the efficacy of the informal interrogation, most
suspects admitted to committing crimes during the first interrogation and gave a
complete confession. Only three of the twenty people questioned did not confess
during the first interrogation in District N. This is consistent with the existing
statistics provided by other scholars. According to a survey conducted by Yan
Zhaohua in 2011, the confession rate of criminal suspects in China during the first
interrogation “can basically be maintained at more than 70%.” Overall, 90.4% confess
by the end of the investigation.108 Moreover, a survey covering 362 cases in two
police departments found that more than 95% of cases had obtained a
self-incriminating confession at the time of transferring to the prosecutor.109
If the suspect does not give self-incriminating statements immediately, informal
interrogation is more likely to occur, even though the number of formal interrogations
might also significantly increase. In the Zeng robbery case, two suspects, A and B,
arrived at the investigation site at the same time, but B began the first interrogation
one hour and thirty minutes before A. For suspect B, nine hours and forty minutes had
Psychological attack or mental attack (攻心) is a generally accepted notion in China, originated from The Art
of War by Sun Tzu, in which Sun Tzu believed that the principle of fighting a war is to make the enemy surrender
as the best option while using physical force to win is the second best. It was elaborated by Zhuge Liang during the
Three Kingdoms period. Zhuge Liang wrote a famous couplet called “攻心联”: “If a military strategist knows
how to conquer the mind, a revolt can be suppressed accordingly. Since ancient times, people well versed in the art
of war have never been bellicose. A leader can make mistakes if he does not make a correct assessment of the
situation, being either too strict or lenient in implementing policies. Future governors of Sichuan have to take
action after much deliberation.” For discussions in modern time about 攻心 used in the criminal justice system,
see Ji Xiangde (冀祥德), Lun Kougong Huoqu yu Renquan Baozhang (论口供获取与人权保障) [Obtainment of
Confession and Protection of Human Rights], 6 HEBEI FAXUE (河北法学), (2006).
108 See YAN ZHAOHUA (闫召华), KOUGONG ZHONGXIN ZHUYI YANJIU (口供中心主义研究) [Centralism of
Confession], Falv Chubanshe (法律出版社), 139, 141 (2013).
109 Mu Jun (牟军), Jiekai Zhencha Xunwen Gongneng de Miansha (揭开侦查讯问功能的面纱) [Unveil the
Functions of Interrogation], NANJING DAXUE FALV PINGLUN (南京大学法律评论), 211 (Spring 2013).
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passed since he was caught. For A, the length of time was more than eleven hours.
The transcript showed that A did not confess at all, and B confessed partially. A
reasonable speculation is both A and B were not inclined to admit to committing the
crime at first, so the investigative officers did considerable preparatory work before
the first interrogation began. Understandably, they gave the “harder bone” (硬骨头)
more time.
A’s first interrogation lasted 110 minutes, and B’s lasted 215 minutes. The
duration of interrogation for the suspect who refused to confess at all was shorter than
that of the suspect who made a partial confession. In this case, after the suspect was
officially declared to be in police custody, i.e., after the go-to-case phase had ended,
the investigative officers did not immediately send the two suspects to the detention
center. Instead, the investigative officers kept them at the centralized interrogation site.
Three more interrogations were carried out on A (96 minutes, 65 minutes, and 67
minutes, respectively), and two more interrogations were carried out on B (215
minutes and 79 minutes, respectively). During the 215-minute interrogation, B made a
fully confession at last. By that time, B’s person had been put under control for
thirty-four hours.
c. The Facts Sheet Called “Go-To-Case Phase”
Using the “go-to-case phase” facts sheet used as a situational description could
push the problem of non-compliance to the extreme. In some cases, the length of the
go-to-case phase may actually exceed the legitimate 24 hours. If there is no
summoning warrant, the calculation of the time interval between the arrival and the
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beginning of the first interrogation will rely entirely on records in the facts sheet,
which are given by the investigative officers involved in the summoning process.
However, the legal status of such statements (similar to the situation description) has
never been clear. Completely relying on such facts sheet to calculate the time could
easily lead to abuse of power because this “self-talking” description opens the door
for police perjury. Police may provide a false time on the facts sheet in order to avoid
exceeding time limits.
In both District D and Z, the go-to-case phase is a special stage for its actual
operation cannot be seen clearly under the current practices, let alone to be regulated
effectively. One of the investigative officers interviewed as part of this study—who
asked not to be named— revealed, “To tell the truth, informal interrogations do exist
before the formal ones. If the suspect keeps resisting, or the time is not enough, the
time in the facts sheet can only be recorded according to the time limit…I produce
[the facts sheet] after interrogations. Regarding the time interval, I can control what I
want to write."110

C. Deviations in Time and Location
Interrogation time and location constitute the physical factors of an interrogation,
and, in practice, one cannot exist without the other. Deviations in interrogation time or
location show that investigative officers may have taken advantage of rules to
facilitate their own work, and their intentional or unintentional conduct could
potentially undermine the rights of suspects.
110
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This study found that, first, the length of time for interrogations varies greatly in
appearance, but one real interrogation usually takes a long time, and some
interrogations that only lasted for a short amount of time were in name only. Second,
the period of criminal detention set up to facilitate investigation and evidence
collection is rarely used to obtain suspects’ confessions. Instead, it becomes a routine
operation to obtain as much time as possible for case handling. Third, the rule that the
suspects must be interrogated a second time within 24 hours after they officially
entered into the criminal detention procedure leaves room for manipulation of the
interrogation location.
a. The Length of Time
The Public Security Organs Law Enforcement Rules 13-03 specifically limits the
time of interrogation, stating that each summons must not last for more than twelve
hours, and the suspect may not be held in a form of continuous summons. It also
stipulates that detained criminal suspects should be guaranteed the necessary amount
of time to sleep and eat, as well as one to two hours of outdoor activities. This
provision is inconsistent with the CPL when major and complex cases are involved.
The CPL asks the duration not to exceed 24 hours. As described in Section B of this
chapter, 24-hour limit is what police actually follow. Under the 24-hour rule, even a
single interrogation may possibly last for more than twelve hours. For example, the
first interrogation of Suspect Tang in District N lasted for more than thirteen hours.
Statistics on the interrogation transcripts of the two sites show that the length of
time for different interrogations varies greatly. The length of a single interrogation
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transcript recorded in District N was 798 minutes in the longest version and 5 minutes
in the shortest version. The total length of interrogation for each suspect during the
entire investigation period was 1744 minutes in the longest version and 292 minutes
in the shortest. The average length was 620 minutes per person. Most interrogations
with longer average interrogation time happened in the go-to-case phase, in other
words, within 24 hours after suspects’ arrival.
The duration of a single interrogation in District Z was 394 minutes in the
longest version and 11 minutes in the shortest. The total length of interrogation for
each suspect during the entire investigation was 916 minutes in the longest, and 444
minutes in the shortest, with an average of 685.75 minutes. The longest average
interrogation time was also found in the go-to-case phase.
Most short versions are those recorded by the investigative officers for the
purpose of declaration, such as to declare the criminal detention or the arrest officially.
In essence, this kind of simple declaration has nothing to do with interrogation.
However, it is still indiscriminately included in the scope of interrogation and put
under the relevant normative restrictions. Discussions in Chapter 10 will further refer
to how this interrogation in name could flood dossiers, burden investigative officers,
and possibly dilute restrictions on interrogation.
b. The Time Distribution of Interrogations
Interrogations clustered in the go-to-case phase and the 24-hour period after
official declaration of the criminal detention shows that long deprivation of suspects’
freedom has limited significance for investigation and evidence collection, especially
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for interrogation. In theory, as a pre-arrest procedure, the detention authorized and
implemented by the public security organs can effectively compensate for the
problem of insufficient time for the case-handling process and provide convenience
for collection of criminal evidence, especially for obtainment of confessions.111
Article 89 of the CPL states that “under special circumstances, the public
security organ can extend the three days’ criminal detention for another one to four
days. For the major suspects who commit rogue, multiple, and/or gang crimes, the
detention can even be extended to 30 days.” Article 125 of the PHCC has similar
provisions with further clarification of the specific meanings of “rogue” (cross-city,
county jurisdiction), “multiple” (three times) and “gang” (two or more suspects).
Such regulations are both an authorization for the extension of criminal detention
and a guideline of the conditions to which it applies. The intent of the legislation is
not hard to detect since special cases may require more processing time.
However, based on empirical data, this study found that, during the entire period
of the criminal detention phase, little correlation exists between the time extension
and the need to obtain suspects’ confessions. On one side, all sample cases in District
N were extended during the criminal detention phase, and the criteria of initiating
extension were met in form. On the other side, among a total of 145
interrogations/transcripts in District N, only twenty-three interrogations were
conducted during the extended criminal detention period and four of twenty suspects
had no interrogation in that period. In those twenty-three interrogation transcripts,
Chen Ruihua (陈瑞华), Weijue Jiaya Zhidu de Lilun Fansi (未决羁押制度的理论反思) [Theoretical
Reflection on Pre-trial Detention], 5 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究), 62 (2002).
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seven record the procedure of declaring expert opinions on forensic evidence. Eight
record that of declaring expert opinions and asking suspects for clarifications or a few
trivial and supplemental questions. Only six ask questions alone. In addition, one
transcript simply checks one or two points of information and another one does not
display any useful information at all. In sum, only 30% of transcripts provide useful
information or actually collect confessional evidence for building cases, and they are
concentrated in two or three complicated cases.
Therefore, the practice is that an extension is automatically processed as long as
the conditions are met, regardless of whether that particular case requires an extension.
In other words, whether the case is postponed is not dependent on the needs of the
case itself, but whether the case meets the extension conditions in the first place. In
the interview, the DNLA02 in the legal affairs division of District N public security
organ stated that extending the detention period is generally determined according to
the conditions of a case itself. First, check whether conditions for a thirty-day
extension exist, that is, “rogue,” “multiple crimes” and “gang.” Once the conditions
are met, regardless of whether the case is complicated or not or how long the case
actually takes, it will be uniformly extended.
Worse, the conditions for rogue crimes are relatively broad, referring to
continuous crimes across jurisdictions of cities and counties. In the Xie intentional
injury case, the victim died of a heart attack after a push originating from a quarrel.
The suspect stayed at the crime scene without any signs of intending to flee. Such a
simple case was also extended by thirty days on the grounds of “rogue.” If the
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conditions for thirty-day extension do not exist, police usually extend criminal
detention to seven days based on a “special circumstances” clause.
This causal inversion reflects the overall philosophy of the investigative
organ—more time is always better. A reasonable guess could be that investigative
officers often work on more than one case at a time and benefit from additional time
to schedule and distribute cases, especially in cases that require a longer time than
normal while waiting for results, such as gathering expert opinions on forensic
evidence. Thus, the investigative officers tend to always extend the time limit, which
conforms to their practical reason.
This reason even runs through the post-arrest detention period, but generally
appears to be less frequent. Because the post-arrest detention is differentiated from the
criminal detention with internal scrutiny, extension of the former requires at least the
approval of the procuratorate from a higher level. In the administrative bureaucratic
system, this operation is relatively inconvenient.
c. The Location of Interrogation
It is well established that the location of an interrogation has an important impact
on the protection of the suspect’ rights. In 2012, a new clause was added to the CPL,
“[A]fter the criminal suspect is sent to the detention center for custody, any
interrogation should be carried out within the detention center.” This is generally
considered to contribute to the protection of suspects’ rights and reduce the likelihood
of torture. Due to physical isolation of rooms, the monitoring of the entire process,
and the self-interested tendency of the staff in the detention center, the possibility for
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investigative officers to carry out physical torture on suspects could be indirectly
eliminated.112 In other words, the interrogation conducted in the detention center is
considered to be less likely to result in torturing the suspect for a confession than one
within the investigating agency.
However, the current law is vague regarding the location of the interrogation that
is supposed to occur within 24 hours of criminal detention. Article 83 of the CPL
stipulates, “After being announced the criminal detention, the suspect shall be
immediately taken to the detention center for no later than 24 hours.” At the same
time, Article 84 asks public security organs to interrogate suspects within the first 24
hours of their criminal detention. The question is, the law has never clearly stated
whether the interrogation that occurs within the first 24 hours of criminal detention
shall be carried out in the investigating agency or in the detention center.
The premise of the two provisions above lies in that “declaration of criminal
detention” is the watershed between two stages, which can only have one function,
that is, procedural notification and should not have the essence of interrogation.
According to Article 83, the legislation intends to prevent the police from conducting
interrogations in their own agency after declaring the criminal detention. In other
words, the suspects shall be immediately sent to the detention center, and subsequent
interrogations may only happen there.
However, differences between individual interrogation sites can be detected, and

112

See Sunhao (孙皓), Lun Xin Xingshufa zhong Kanshousuo de Yufang Xingxun Gongneng (论新刑诉法中看守

所的预防刑讯功能) [Functions of Preventing Torture for Confession That the Detention Center Has in New CPL],
6 ZHONGGUO XINGSHI ZAZHI (中国刑事杂志), (2012).
75

the analysis of the location of the interrogation can more or less reflect the
investigative officers’ preference for the evidence collection environment beyond the
boundaries clearly defined by the law.
The operation of all cases in District N appears on its face to be in full
compliance with the law, but in fact, the investigative officers took advantage of the
“declaration of criminal detention” and the ambiguity of “within 24 hours” rules.
Interrogations within 24 hours after the declaration of criminal detention were carried
out without exception in the investigating agency, regardless of the number of
interrogations. Of the twenty suspects, sixteen were interrogated at least once during
that special 24 hours. Among them, the two suspects in the Zeng robbery were
interrogated three times and two times, respectively, because they did not plead guilty.
The other four suspects absent from interrogations at that time did not indicate that
they had not completed the statutory requirement for interrogation within 24 hours.
Instead, the investigative officers fit the interrogation into the declaration of criminal
detention and did not make a separate transcript.
Compared with the uniform operation in District N that is compliant in form but
non-formative in substance, the interrogation practice in District Z is relatively
flexible. The declaration of detention and the interrogation within 24 hours are often
combined into a short two-page transcript. Some happened at the detention center and
some at the investigation agency. The investigative officers in District Z have an
entirely different perspective on the function of interrogation within 24 hours after
detention, that is, the role of this interrogation must be carried out at the detention
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center because the suspect has just entered the detention center and has not yet
learned from others or had a second thought. It is the right time to confirm the
confession and to prevent change caused by other factors. “In fear of the suspect’s
change of mind, we may even interrogate right after the suspect is sent to the
detention center.”113 This kind of interrogation is extremely simple, often asking
questions like “Do you know why you are detained?” etc., then recording briefly two
or three sentences from the suspect.
The case of Xing was exceptional. Its interrogation within 24 hours after
detention happened at the investigating agency rather than at the detention center.
Thus, the choice of the location of the interrogation in District Z is flexible and can be
freely chosen according to the needs of the case. In complicated cases, the need for
more evidence led to three interrogations before the suspect was sent to the detention
center. This demand overwhelmed the demand of confirming the confession after the
suspect was sent to the detention center.

D. Deviations in Rights Information and Protection
In an ideal criminal justice system, the investigating agency should properly
inform the criminal suspect of their rights that they enjoy in the proceedings, which is
an important manifestation of the subject status of the suspect. However, the current
criminal laws and regulations in China are insufficient and relatively fragmented in
terms of the agency’s obligation to inform suspects of their rights.
The CPL only stipulates that investigative officers should inform suspects that
113
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truthful confession might lead to lenience114 and that suspects enjoy the right to
counselors when they are taken by compulsory measures.115 However, the CPL has
not mentioned anything as to the procedure of providing this information to suspects.
Article 41 of PHCC has deepened the requirements for supplying information on
suspect’s right to consult a lawyer. When the suspect is interrogated for the first time
or coercive measures are taken, the suspect shall be informed of this right to entrust a
lawyer, or to have a lawyer appointed by the state for free in specific conditions.
Although the provision does not specify operational procedures of information as the
CPL does, it at least makes clear that “the circumstances of the informing process
should be recorded.”
The Law Enforcement Rules (LER), also issued by the MPS, are more detailed
regulations that aim to promote standardization. Rule 5-02 further clarifies two
situations in which the information of suspects’ right to a lawyer shall be recorded: in
the transcript of the first interrogation or the warrant issuing mandatory measures. In
addition, Rule 13-05 refers to the obligation of information in a more comprehensive
tone:
When the first interrogation is conducted, the printed Notification of the Rights and
Obligations of Criminal Suspects must be read out to the suspect or read by the suspect,
informing them what rights and obligations they have, asking if they want to apply for
avoidance of specific persons who are handling their cases or obtaining lawyers. All
needs to be indicated in the interrogation transcript.

As for the timely conveyance of suspects’ need for a lawyer, even if regulations as
specific as the LER have not provided a clear time limit for the investigative officers
to convey suspects’ requests after the first interrogation. Only Article 7 of the
114
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Provisions on Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings (PLACP) in 2013 mentioned:
If the criminal suspect or defendant in custody files an application for legal aid, the
public security organ, the people's procuratorate, and the people's court shall forward
the application to or notify the legal aid agency within 24 hours right after receiving
the application. The legal representative, close relatives or other persons entrusted by
the applicant shall be notified within 3 days to assist in providing relevant documents,
certificates and information to the legal aid agency.

From these regulations, informing the suspects that they have the right to a lawyer
seems at the core of information obligations fulfilled by investigative officers. The
intention of the regulations may lie in that the suspect must be truly aware of the right
to a lawyer, and even the right to designated lawyers under certain conditions at first,
then they may be able to make a decision. However, this study found that although
suspects of fatal cases were finally able to obtain defense lawyers on the premise that
suspects in fatal cases who may face the capital punishment will trigger the allocation
of designated defense automatically, the investigative officers’ information practice
was compliant neither in form nor substance.
First, the “Enforcement Rules” clearly state that investigative officers should
“ask” whether the suspects would like to hire a lawyer, but not all transcripts studied
in this research recorded the investigative officers’ verbal notification. In 40% of the
sample cases in District N and half in District Z, investigative officers did not verbally
inform the suspects of their rights.
Each suspect in either district did sign a notice called the Notification of the
Rights and Obligations of Criminal Suspects, in which the right of entrusting a lawyer
is listed among many other rights and obligations. However, questions about whether
the information has actually been conveyed and whether the suspect understood the
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content of the notice are still pending. Because a suspect’s signature on the notice
does not guarantee that the suspect has been read out in a word-by-word manner, a
way that if questions or confusion occur, they can be answered or explained
immediately. Without fully understanding what their rights are, suspects cannot
provide solid informed consent.
The information practice in District Z shows that only the illiterate suspects get
the notice read to them, and the rest are just asked to read by themselves and sign.116
Due to a condition where statutory designated defense is provided, the investigating
agency in District Z directly informed the legal aid agency in accordance with their
work habits. Under this circumstance, suspects are completely reduced to the object
of case-handling process, and it is difficult to say that their litigation rights are fully
guaranteed.
Second, observing from the dossier, the seemingly complete notifications, either
verbal or written versions, actually obscure the substance of the limited assistance that
the criminal suspect obtains in the investigation stage. Half of the cases examined had
self-entrusted defense lawyers while the other half had the designated lawyers.
However, this self-entrusted or designated procedure is hard to reflect in the
interrogation transcript. After the suspect asked for a lawyer, the transcript did not
show that the investigative officer had responded to this request. Suspects who needed
to entrust a lawyer were also not informed of the specific procedures for completing
the application, and suspects who needed a designated lawyer did not receive any

116

SZDD01.
80

information about how they might proceed.
The study also found that lawyers became involved in cases very late. In District
N, regardless of the types of defense lawyers, the average time length for when a
lawyer first became involved in the case was 9.7 days after the criminal detention.
Designated lawyers were appointed within a time period ranging from 1 day to 19
days, with an average of 8.4 days. Lawyers who are entrusted by the suspects get to
work from 2 days to 30 days after the criminal detention, with an average of 12.5 days.
The time length in District Z varies from 1 day to 56 days.117 Few signs show that the
defense lawyers had any part in the first interrogation or in the entire summons phase
before criminal detention, even in cases with the shortest time interval.
In addition, drawing from the fact that the designated defense also came late, the
investigative officers may not fully implement the timely notification requirement that
is within 24 hours. This could be collaborated by the interviewed investigative
officers. The investigative officers completely control the process of applying for
designated defense lawyers. Even if they do not control it deliberately, they generally
do not place this work in an important or priority position. “Until other things are
done, when I think of it, I will then submit the application for the designated
lawyer.”118

E. Deviations in Production of Transcripts
In the context where the confession and the transcript are put in the center, the
The time statistics here are based on the time indicated in the legal aid or the power of attorney. In fact, there is
still a period of time between when the lawyer accepts the case and when the suspect actually meets the lawyer. In
other words, the time for the lawyer to intervene is actually later.
118 SZDD05.
117
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importance of interrogation transcripts cannot be overemphasized. One good
interrogation transcript shall reflect the whole process of interrogation objectively,
completely, and truthfully. Thus, the production of interrogation transcripts can most
accurately reflect the degree of standardization in a region.
The CPL does not specify requirements for the production of transcripts. Many
of the existing provisions are internal requirements of the police departments.
Article 200 of PHCC stipulates “Investigative officers must truthfully and clearly
record the confession and excuse of suspects.” The production of interrogation
transcripts does not record the original words of suspects’ statements, which may lead
to a loss of the legality of evidence and cannot “objectively, completely, and truthfully
reflect the whole process of interrogation.”119
The LER 13-06 provides guidelines for the production of transcripts in detail,
including the use of recording tools that can help keep the record for a long time, the
ways of expression when asking and answering questions, the content of records, the
rule of recording on the spot, as well as the order of check, signature, and filing. In
pursuit of the accuracy, objectivity, and completeness, the Rules emphasize that “each
question and answer should be recorded as a separate paragraph,” “questions,
confessions, and excuses should all be recorded,” ”the process of presenting and using
evidence should be recorded,” “suspects’ attitude and facial expression should be
recorded,” “keep original intentions, grasp key points with a recognizable and clear
handwriting,” “as to pronoun, argot, jargon, and abbreviation, investigative officers
Hu Zhifeng (胡志风), Zhengcha Xunwen Bilu Zhizuo Guifanhua Shizheng Yanjiu (侦查讯问笔录制作规范化
实证研究) [Empirical Study on Standardization of Interrogation Transcripts Making], 4 GUOJIA JIANCHAGUAN
XUEYUAN XUEBAO (国家检察官学院学报), 140 (2014).
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should ask for clarification and record complete meanings.”
In addition, in the Regulations for Video Recording on Interrogation of Criminal
Suspects by Public Security Organs (RVRICS), the requirements for the production of
interrogation transcripts are also involved. Article 13 stipulates: “In the production of
interrogation transcripts, investigative officers may summarize the confessions, but
key facts of the crime, such as the time, place, means of committing crimes, tools for
committing crimes, the situation of the victim, and the subjective mentality, shall be
consistent with the contents of the audio and video recordings that cassette the whole
process of interrogation.” In other words, summary records in the production of
transcripts are allowed, but when it comes to the key facts of a case, it needs to be
recorded word for word.
Distinct from the common problems in the past, such as missing parts,
inconsistencies in names, lack of signature, etc., 120 under the background of
standardization reforms, the quality of interrogation transcripts has made great
progress in form. In the two sites, a good form of interrogation transcripts is
guaranteed, and there are few cases where common problems in form can be seen.
The problems are transferred into a more substantive and concealed territory.
For instance, as to the rule of producing transcripts on the spot, it is impossible to
tell from the ex post facto textual analysis. Even if the interviewed investigative
officers mentioned that there were some deviations, such as the time was not recorded
in real time or that one of the two investigative officers—who were supposed to
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conduct the interrogation together—conducted the interrogation alone and signed the
transcript for the other, there is no way to find clues in the transcripts.
Apart from that, two main problems can be found in the interrogation transcripts
of fatal cases through textual analysis. The first is the record bias problem, which is
caused by the practice of investigative officers generally or selectively recording
suspects’ or their own statements. The second is the copying and pasting problem,
which can probably fail the effort that using consistency of confession to guarantee
the authenticity of confession.
a. The Record Bias Problem
The bias problem mainly refers to the content of the interrogation that cannot
avoid generalized and selective records in the process of recording due to the
subjective will and ability of the investigative officers.
Selective records obviously violate the requirements of standardization,
specifically, the completeness requirement of transcripts, because investigative
officers could deliberately choose incriminating information and exclude exonerating
evidence. Besides, the selective record is completely concealed. For those who have
not experienced that exact interrogation, information ignored by the investigative
officer seems to have never existed. Although the video recording of the entire
interrogation has been implemented to address this problem, later discussion will
show that the implementation of interrogation recordings in practice is not as good as
expectation, with room left for selective records that remain unknown to the outside
world.
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By contrast, summary records do not violate the requirement of standardization
in appearance, since summary records are not prohibited at all. Objectively speaking,
transcripts can hardly achieve the ideal that statements are recorded word for word.
Thus, the regulation like VRICSWR only asks that the key facts should not be
recorded summarily. However, once summary records go to the extreme, they could
be too brief to conform to the normative requirements substantially.
One example is the Xing case in District Z. The transcript used sentences such as
“about 40 minutes for legal policy education,” “about 10 minutes for legal policy
education” to replace the investigative officers’ talk that happened in that time period.
At this time, the suspect’s answer is simply recorded: “silence” and “silence about
five minutes.” In fact, such a generalization has no way to meet requirements like
“questions, confessions, and excuses should all be recorded,” “the process of
presenting and using evidence should be recorded,” and “suspects’ attitude and facial
expression should be recorded.”(See Table below)
In the so-called “education” process, the investigative officers are likely to refer
the suspects to the evidence already obtained in the investigation. The attitude and
expression of the suspect may also follow, positive and negative changes may occur,
and confessions and excuses may be made. However, as long as the simplest “legal
policy education” is recorded, all participants in the follow-up process, whether
reviewers inside the investigating agency, prosecutors, defense lawyers or judges,
have no means to know the details. If the suspect pleads guilty after the policy
education, one simple sentence cannot reflect the process of how the suspect’s
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conduct changed from resistance to confessing, nor can it reflect whether the
investigative officer obtained the confession by imposing unlawful or coercive
pressure on the suspect.

Partial display of the transcript of Xing case
Q: We hope that you will truthfully explain the details of the event?
A: I am honest about things.
Q: (Legal policy education about 40 minutes)?
A: (silence).
Q: Do you have anything to add?
A: I have nothing to add anymore.
Q: Is it true that you said above?
A: No.
Q: (Legal policy education about 10 minutes)?
A: (Silence about 5 minutes) Do I still have a chance?
Q: You continue to talk.
A: Actually...

b. The Copying and Pasting Problem
This study also found the serious copying and pasting problem at two research
sites. In comparison to the records bias problem that might be not compliant in
substance but in form, the copying and pasting problem represents the status that both
form and substance are far from compliance. In addition, the copying and pasting
problem undermines authenticity of evidence guaranteed by the confession
consistency and collaboration rules （口供印证一致原则）.121
According to Article 80(5) of the Interpretation of the Application of the
The simplest way to detect copy-and-paste behavior is that the entire content or partial content of the second
transcript are identical or substantially the same to the previous transcript in words, punctuation, and paragraphs,
which is inconsistent with the normal memory and expression rules of human beings. Therefore, copying and
pasting the contents of the previous interrogation will inevitably fail to truthfully describe the words spoken by the
suspect. In spite of consistent and stable, the transcripts with copying and pasting contents have been essentially
affected regarding the authenticity and legitimacy of the evidence.
121
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Criminal Procedure Law, whether a defendant’s confession is consistent is under
scrutiny. The current standard of proof in China highlights confession that is often
considered as an adhesive for other evidence, which means the confession is also very
easy to be manipulated or tailored in accordance with other evidence. Therefore, the
main significance of multiple confessions is to facilitate the stability of confession
and minimize the negative impact of confession tailoring. However, if investigative
officers use copy-and-paste in the production of transcripts, the meaning of these
consistency and collaboration rules will be lost. In view of this, Article 438 of the
Detective Notes for Handling Criminal Cases (DNHCC) clearly stipulates that the
interrogation transcript “forbid copying and pasting.”
Despite the small size of the sample, the results of empirical analysis in this
paper are consistent with the results revealed by previous research referring to issues
of the irregularity of interrogation transcripts. One empirical study with coverage of
twenty-six public security organs in more than ten provinces and cities showed that
the ratio of occurrence that electronic transcripts are pasted and copied reached 19%,
and the disposal of this is generally to make corrections or even not to deal with
them.122 This study further found that, due to the computer-based recording method
as well as the more stringent requirements for “routine interrogation,” the District N,
where there was a higher degree of standardization had a more serious copying and
pasting problem than District Z.
(1) The recording method matters.
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The recording method of transcripts affects the extent of copying and pasting
greatly because the computer input transcripts—also called the printed version—have
more possibilities leading to copying and pasting than the handwritten version of
transcripts. In District N, the interrogation transcripts generally adopt the printed
version since there are several benefits including writing legibly and formally
welcomed by the standardization reforms. Only nine out of 145 transcripts were
handwritten, among which two interrogations took place at sites in other cities where
the suspects were caught and four happened at a same in one particular detention
center. DNLA07 said that this scenario probably resulted from power cuts or
equipment malfunction. Another three were taken in the process of notifying suspects
of the outcome of forensic evidence.
To tell whether copying and pasting occurs, two measures may help. The first is
the calculation of time. In the first interrogation，there is probably no possibility of
copying and pasting because no raw material can be pasted. Under this premise, the
average time spent on each page of the first interrogation transcript reflects the time
required to record the interrogation process under normal conditions. Therefore, it can
be used as a benchmark to measure whether a transcript is genuinely recorded.
According to my statistics, the average time spent on each page of the first
interrogation in District N was about twenty-one minutes, of which the longest record
took forty minutes and the shortest was eleven minutes. Therefore, any transcript that
takes less than eleven minutes is suspicious, theoretically. In addition, according to
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further time calculation, less than five minutes average on each page is impossible.123
Thus, the finding that, out of a total of 145 transcripts, forty-six transcripts showing
that officers spent, on average, less than ten minutes per page, some even less than
five minutes per page, speaks for itself.
The statistical analysis above does not mean to conclude anything; instead, it
attempts to provide a perspective of seeing the possible existence of the copying and
pasting problem. Take the Tang case as an example. The transcript that recorded the
process of notifying suspect B of the criminal detention decision only took
twenty-one minutes, while seven pages had been written. Within these twenty-one
minutes, according to the record of the transcript, the whole process included
presenting officers’ I.D., declaring criminal detention, and asking the suspect to sign
and fingerprint. Besides procedures, the suspect talked thoroughly about the whole
criminal event. It is unlikely that all these things happened in such a short amount of
time. Similar to the Tang case, the Xie case merely took fourteen minutes to complete
the whole process.
The second measure is detailed analysis of contents of transcripts, which could
provide some evidence for the same problem from another angle. First, either the
order or the content of statements in some transcripts are identical to the previous
ones. Common sense tells us words cannot be exactly the same when people talk
about one thing twice because it is not how a human being’s memory works. Second,
Since most of the transcripts are input in computer, the standard one-page transcript is from 300 words to 500
words. According to an ordinary person's fast speech rate of 200 words per minute, These words take 2~3 minutes
to finish the reading just from the beginning to the end, leave alone with reasonable questions and thoughts time in
the interrogation. In addition, the typing speed of ordinary people is 50~80 words per minute. Even if the person
who records is skilled in typing, it takes at least 5 minutes to input 300~500 words into the computer. Therefore,
there is a great possibility of copying and pasting when the transcript used less than 5 minutes.
123
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in some transcripts, after they were asked to “describe the case,” suspects kept talking
so much in one breath, with three pages of their words recorded. Neither question nor
guidance given by investigative officers occurs in such a long statement, and the order
of the description is very similar to that recorded in the previous transcripts. It does
not conform to the recognition and memorization laws because the use of short
sentences to answer questions is more in line with daily life.
By contrast, the transcript recording practice in District Z is different, where the
handwritten transcripts take up half of all twenty-four transcripts. The officers
interviewed in District Z said that whether they use the computer or write transcripts
by hand is entirely up to the preference of officers. Although the internal
standardization requirements encourage the printed version, they are not strictly
enforced rules. For instance, the vice deputy of the detective division, Officer Y, likes
writing by hand. He said, “I basically write by hand, because my thoughts are
consistent when I am writing. The typing is not only slow but also influences my
thinking.”124
The handwritten transcript resembles two sides of a coin. On the one side, from
the negative perspective, the transcript may be affected greatly by its writers. Once
the writing is ambiguous or illegible, it will plague the following procedures. The
example about Officer Y is interesting. His writing is famous for its flowing style.
Colleagues in the police department and prosecutors who have had business with Y
smiled mysteriously when they were asked how to evaluate Y’s writing. “We often
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guess what he wrote or call him for more information. Sometimes, he cannot
recognize what he wrote by himself.”125 Another interesting story happened in the
Xing case’s sixth interrogation, and it directly reflects the cons of Y’s writing. Q:
“Please take a look at the record, if it is in line with what you said, sign.” A: “I cannot
recognize your writing.” Q: “Let us read it to you. Is that in line with what you said?”
A: “Yes.” On the other side, the handwritten transcript is not all bad, since it is less
likely to have the copying and pasting problem than the printed ones. Therefore, the
transcripts in District Z appear to be closer to the actual occurrence with few cases
where the length of transcripts were extremely mismatched with the duration of the
interrogation.
(2) Routine interrogation aggravates the problem.
The case of copying and pasting often occurs in routine interrogation, 126 which
is in line with practical reason of investigative officers. Routine interrogation arises
from the provisions of the CPL. Article 84 stipulates “Public security organs shall
interrogate persons detained within 24 hours of criminal detention,” and Article 92
also stipulates, “within 24 hours of arrest.” These two are designed to discover
improper criminal detention and arrest and to facilitate the timely release of suspects.
However, such regulations are not compatible or are too idealistic with regard to
other institutional designs. For example, the interrogation within 24 hours after the

SZLA03.
Interrogation within 24 hours after criminal detention, interrogation within 24 hours after arrest, and
interrogation before transfer to prosecution are “routine interrogations” that must be completed in accordance with
the Criminal Procedure Law or the internal management regulations of the local public security department. See
Ma Jinghua (马静华), Zhencha Daoan: Chazheng Gongneng yu Qixian Peizhi (侦查到案: 查证功能与期限配置)
[Dao’an: Investigation Functions and Time Limits], 5 ZHONGGUO XINGSHIFA ZAZHI (中国刑事法杂志), 114
(2009).
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criminal detention and the interrogation at the arrival stage are just separated by a
declaration procedure. The time interval between these two interrogations is too short
to cause any substantial change of conditions. Therefore, it is hard to imagine that
re-interrogation in such a short interval of time will offer any substantial help in
finding improper detention. This arrangement is equivalent to asking investigative
officers and the investigating organs to immediately smack their faces and admit that
they made a mistake after the review of the previous decision.
This regulation is obviously contrary to the practical reason held by investigative
officers. Since routine interrogation can occur in any type of case, I have conducted
an analysis of misdemeanor cases in the same investigating agency in District N to
collaborate, or even better understand, the situation in fatal cases. There are at least
six interrogation transcripts in each misdemeanor case, including the first one in the
go-to-case phase, the declaration of criminal detention, the interrogation within 24
hours after criminal detention, the declaration of arrest, the interrogation within 24
hours after arrest, and the pre-trial transcript before transfer to the prosecution.127 In
the face of so many “routine interrogations” that are impractical but time-consuming,
and labor-intensive, investigative officers often simply ask whether the suspects have
any opinions on the criminal detention after they have simply announced the criminal
detention decision and ask the suspects to briefly talk about the case. Then in the
transcript, the investigative officers copy and paste the core contents of the previous

127

See Zhang Lianhan (张潋瀚), Lun Quanli Yujing xia de Zhencha Chengxu Jianhua (论权利语境下的侦查程

序简化) [Simplification of Investigation Procedure in the Context of Rights Discourse], 6 XIBU FAXUE PINGLUN
(西部法学评论), 2016.
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interrogation into the current one. Conditions in fatal cases may vary, but troubles
brought by routine interrogations and the resulting practical reason and conduct of
investigative officers could remain.

F. Deviation in Video Recordings on Interrogation
Article 121 of the CPL stipulates “Investigative officers may audio or video
record the interrogation process when interrogating criminal suspects; for cases that
the defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment, death penalty or other major
criminal cases, the interrogation process should be recorded. Recording should be
carried out throughout the process to maintain completeness.” Article 203 of the
PHCC further clarifies the specific scope of the applicable case types and the meaning
of the whole process recording. “Every interrogation should be carried out
continuously and maintains completeness. Recording cannot be selected, edited or
deleted.”
In 2014, the MPS issued separate regulations for video recording. RVRICS
expands the scope of the case types that must be recorded from the cases with
potential life imprisonment or death penalty to intentional cases with the potential for
imprisonment of ten or more years. RVRICS also sets specific requirements for the
recording process. First, the recording device can be a separate video tape recorder or
a monitoring system. Second, the recording time should start from the beginning of
the interrogation to the time after the suspect checks the transcript and signs, and the
postscript should be the same as the start and end time recorded in the interrogation

93

transcript. Third, the personnel, scenes, timing devices and other information should
be fully recorded, and the image should show the face of the suspect. Fourth, the
process of presenting and identifying evidence, checking the transcript, and signing
and fingerprinting should be recorded. Fifth, the suspect’s image should be clear and
stable, and the suspect’s voice should be clearly identifiable.128
The study finds that only fifty-six of the 145 interrogation transcripts in District
N clearly stated, “The entire process will be recorded.” Whether the video recording
actually happened, at least in the description of the transcript, the requirements are not
strictly enforced in District N. Take the Zeng case as an example. The case is
undoubtedly complicated both regarding the complexity of the case and the number of
transcripts. However, none of the transcripts mentioned the video recording, which is
unreasonable because such a case without any video recordings would be a serious
mistake. Thus, the most likely scenario is there are video recordings, but investigative
officers did not indicate them in the transcript. Another non-compliant performance in
District N is whether an interrogation is recorded or whether the video recording is
indicated in the transcript depends on investigative officers’ own habits. In the same
case, interrogations of one suspect were all recorded, while interrogations of the other
suspect were only recorded for the first interrogation.
Instance where the interrogation is actually recorded but not indicated in the
transcript will also bring troubles to the follow-up process in the context of the
dossier-centralism. Even if each interrogation is recorded, given the carrier of the
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audio and video material is an optical disc, it is usually placed separately during the
transfer of the dossier. If the transcript does not clearly indicate that the recording
occurred, the people in the subsequent review process would have no way to know the
disc existed, and, even if they were to discover the existence of the disc, it would be
very difficult to find.
This confusion in practice also reflects the lack of follow-up review of audio and
video materials from another angle. Even if it is impossible to locate the recording
disc, subsequent internal reviews and prosecution seem worriless. DNLA03, who is in
charge of reviewing fatal cases in the legal affairs department of District N explained,
“Where to find so much time to watch all the audio and video materials? I only have
an average of a day or two to review a case, all is read selectively. Generally, I only
look at the recording of the first interrogation.”
The video recording status reflected in interrogation transcripts in District Z is
similar to those in District N, and even more non-compliant. Only two of the
twenty-four transcripts explicitly mentioned that they would be video recorded. The
investigative officers who were interviewed said that interrogations were not recorded
every time. Generally, video tape recorders are set up in the investigation room within
the investigation agency. After the suspects are sent to the detention center, there is no
need to use a separate recording device because the detention center is covered with
automatic monitoring and recording equipment.
When asked why they still needed to set up recorders separately when the
investigation room is covered with an automatic monitoring system, the investigative
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officers in District Z answered, “The picture and the voice is clearer by using a
separate recorder. The image and sound quality of automatic recordings system in the
interrogation room is not good.” 129 However, in private, investigative officers
confessed that sometimes it is not possible to have two investigative officers in the
interrogation, so it is more convenient to use the recorder that is mobile. Once started
and two investigative officers have been shown on the video, then the camera could
be fixed on the suspect. It would not matter if there were only one investigative
officer left in the interrogation room.
The legal reviewers in District Z are even less concerned about video recordings.
They will not check the video during the initial decision on approval of the criminal
detention or application for the arrest warrant from the prosecutor. Most of the time,
the investigative officer is just required to send the recording disc directly to the
prosecutor130 and situation where the disc must be transferred are limited to instances
where the suspect’s confession is inconsistent.131
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Chapter 7 Witness Inquiry
Despite ongoing criticism of the reliance on written testimony, witness’
out-of-court statements are accepted as evidence with credibility (admissibility) in
current Chinese judicial practice.132 As one form of evidence defined by statute, the
written testimony must have relevancy, authenticity, and legitimacy. Meanwhile, as
one of the traditional “arbitrary investigative measures,” as opposed to “mandatory
investigative measures,” the inquiry of witnesses gives investigative officers more
discretion than the interrogation of suspects does. The laws and regulations on the
procedure of testimony collection are relatively simple. Aside from asking the inquiry
process to comply with the statutory subject, place, and notification, etc., they merely
prohibit the use of illegal methods, such as violence and threats to obtain evidence
from witnesses.133
This chapter describes patterns of the written testimony in sample cases in an
environment virtually devoid of norms, searches for hidden rules or habits followed
by officers who conduct witness inquiry, and discusses relevancy, authenticity, and
legitimacy problems that some inquiry transcripts may have, even though their forms
appear normative.

A. Overview of Inquiry Transcripts
In general, investigative officers or other officers not in charge of handling cases
See Chen Ruiha (陈瑞华), Xin Jianjie Shenli Zhuyi Tingsheng Zhongxin Zhuyi Gaige de Zhuayao Zhang’ai (新
间接审理主义 ‘庭审中心主义改革’的主要障碍) [The Main Obstacles to the New ‘Trial-centeralism Reform’],
4 ZHONGWAI FAXUE (中外法学), (2016).
133
See Criminal Procedural Law, article 120, 122, 123, and the Procedures for Handling Criminal Cases by Public
Security Organs, article 205-207.
132
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generate transcripts when they interview people who may or may not know about a
criminal event. Although not required, interviews can be audio or video recorded.
Most of the time, investigative officers draft what they hear on the spot and ask some
of the interviewees to come to an investigation agency to provide testimony if needed.
In a place called “the inquiry room” within the agency, these witnesses chosen by
police would tell what they know with their words recorded, ideally word for word,
but actually in a summarized form.
Numbers of witnesses and transcripts
In 12 sample cases in District N, investigative officers questioned a total of 152
witnesses, with an average of 13 witnesses per case. Among them, the number of
witnesses in the Tang case reached as many as 45; meanwhile simple cases such as Li
and Xu had 6 witnesses. The inquiry of one witness usually results in one transcript,
but a small number of witnesses are interviewed two or three times. Therefore, 182
inquiry transcripts were generated from 152 witnesses, with an average of 15 per case.
In District Z, investigative officers questioned 47 witnesses in 4 sample cases.
This number does not include accomplices, who are often treated questionably as
witnesses in China. The Huang intentional homicide case is an example of a
complicated murder that happened in an enclosed space without any eyewitnesses.
The number of witnesses in the Huang case was the highest, reaching 21witnesses. In
contrast, the Zheng intentional homicide case happened in public places with three
eyewitnesses seeing the event. Thus it includes only six witnesses, observing from
transcripts. In total, 47 witnesses produced 54 inquiry transcripts in District Z, with an
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average of 14 inquiry transcripts in each case.
Despite differences in categories of fatal cases and vastly varied contents of
cases between the two districts, the average number of witnesses and transcripts in the
two districts are almost the same. This likely is not a coincidence, which suggests that
investigators believe a minimum number of witnesses might be needed. In fact, every
fatal case in the two districts at least has six witnesses’ testimonies included in the
dossier, even in simplest cases such as Li, where the suspect did not leave the crime
scene, waited for police and turned himself in.
Duration of Inquiry
In-depth statistics of this study show those 182 transcripts in District N range
from the longest transcript of 9 pages to the shortest transcript of 1 page, with an
average of 3.4 pages. Time spent on writing a single transcript ranges from a
maximum of 219 minutes to a minimum of 12 minutes. The average duration of
inquiry is 64 minutes and the median is 52 minutes. Data in District Z shows similar
results. A single transcript takes an average of 59 minutes.
Timing of Inquiry
In view of distribution, the single stage in which District N has the highest
proportion of witness inquiries is from the criminal detention of the suspects until the
announcement of arrest. During this period, the number of witnesses interviewed
accounted for nearly 40% of the total number of inquiries in the district. The stage in
which District Z questioned the most witnesses—nearly 40%—was during the
detention after the arrest (see Table below).
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Table 1: Timing and frequency of inquiry
Before the case
is filed
District N

District Z

Tang
Zhang
Peng
Zeng
Li
Wa
Luo
Luo
Cai
Xu
Xie
Zheng
Number of
witnesses in
the phase
Rate（％）
Huang
Su
Xing
Zheng
Numbers of
witnesses in
the phase
Rate（％）

Before the
criminal
detention
11
0
2
4
3
0
0
6
6
1
4
2
39

Before the
arrest

Detention

8
0
4
2
0
5
4
0
0
4
0
3
30

Before the
suspect is under
custody
8
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
12

After
prosecuted

4
3
4
6
3
3
0
1
1
1
0
2
28

Extensio
n of
detention
1
0
0
1

23
5
1
9
1
10
2
6
0
1
4
9
71

16.5
0
0
0
0
0

6.6
7
3
0
5
15

21.4
5
3
0
0
8

39
0
0
10
0
10

15.4
15
3
2
1
21

0.5
*
*
*

0.5
0
0
0
0
0

0

27.8

14.8

18.5

38.9

*

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1

Production Methods and Locations of Inquiry
In view of production methods, 121 copies in the inquiry transcripts in District N
were printed and 61 handwritten. In the view of locations where inquiries occurred,
129 copies of the transcripts were produced inside the investigation agency (including
the centralized case-handling site, the police station, the detention center, etc.) and 53
copies were produced outside the investigation agency (including the crime scene,
witnesses’ location, etc.). A rough browsing of this data reveals a correlation between
production methods of inquiry transcripts and locations of inquiry. Inside the
investigation agency, 118 printed transcripts were recorded (including 2 telephone
records). Outside the investigation agency, and 50 transcripts were recorded by hand.
In contrast, the analysis of sample cases in District Z shows that there is a
noticeable difference between the two districts in making transcripts. In the 54 inquiry
transcripts of District Z, the proportion of handwritten records is quite high, reaching
two-thirds of the total. All 10 transcripts recorded outside the investigation agency
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were handwritten. Of the remaining 44 inquiries recorded in the investigation agency
(including local and remote public security agencies), 18 were printed, and 26 were
handwritten.

B. Large Numbers of Inquiry Transcripts and the
Selective Mechanism of Making Dossiers
An analysis of the inquiry transcripts seems impossible unless the following
notions are clarified in advance: the definition of a witness, the relationship between
the interviewee recorded in the inquiry transcript and the witness, and the range of
inquiry transcripts included in criminal dossiers.
According to Article 60 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), “anyone who
knows the circumstances of the case” is a witness, except for those who are
“physiologically, mentally deficient or young, unable to distinguish between right and
wrong, cannot be correctly expressed.” The Law Enforcement Rules （LER） further
specifies that investigative officers, forensic experts, translators and the agencies that
deal with the case cannot be witnesses. Therefore, the relevance standard with
exceptions, is adopted as the rule of defining witness. The premise for questioning a
witness is that he or she knows the circumstances of that “particular” case.
However, the existing laws and regulations fail to clarify whether the inquiry
transcript is used exclusively to record the testimony of witnesses and not the
testimony of others. Article 70 (6) of the Crime Scene Investigation Procedures of
Public Security Organs (CSIP) stipulates, “When inquiring an interviewee, a
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transcript of the inquiry should be made,” which means that once investigative
officers contact people, any inquiry should be recorded. Article 50 of the Procedures
for Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs (PHCC) also mentions an
“interviewee,” but no regulation has provided a clear answer on whether or not an
interviewee is a witness needed to construct a case, and whether or not the transcript
recording what an interviewee says is the written witness testimony.
As to the question of which inquiry transcript should be included in the dossier,
the existing regulations also remain silent. In general, no explicit provision in China
has mentioned that every step taken by the police in the investigation should be
recorded and included in the dossier.134 From the perspective that investigative files
are not open to the follow-up procedure, a selective mechanism in dossier production
emerges. Only records of the investigation activity that may be used as evidence are
selected for inclusion in the dossier. For those reasons, it is fair to speculate that,
although comprehensively recorded, witnesses’ testimony is selectively attached.
In the context of muddy regulations, this dissertation reveals certain trends of
noncompliance in substance in inquiry transcripts. First, the mixed use of the witness
and the interviewee leads to a flood of inquiry transcripts, some of which are
irrelevant or even prejudicial as evidence. Although it is understandable that the
number of witnesses in a fatal case is higher than ordinary cases, a detailed analysis
casts doubt on whether those so-called “witnesses” are real witnesses under the
The range of recordings is different from one country to another. For example, police in Germany and in the
U.S. both use reports and others to record police activities, but in Germany, the file is much more comprehensive
than in the U.S. See FLOYD FEENEY, ET AL., YIGE ANLI LIANGZHONG ZHIDU (一个案例 两种制度—美德刑事司法
比较) [One Case, Two Systems: a Comparative View of American and Germany Criminal Justice], Zhongguo
Fazhi Chubanshe (中国法制出版社), 309 (2006).
134
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relevancy, authenticity, and legitimacy rules.
Take the Huang case in District N as an example. Among 21 people that were
interviewed and recorded in inquiry transcripts, 4 offered statements that were
prejudicial or misleading. Two men said there was a sexual relationship between them
and the victim more than a decade ago. One woman said the suspect peeked at her
showering more than a decade ago. Another woman said the suspect attempted to rape
her several years ago. These statements can be used to either exclude the possibility of
other people committing the crime or prove the character of the suspect, but their
admissibility as character evidence would be doubtful in the U.S. Without
corresponding provisions that can restrict the use of character evidence in China,
those questionable testimonies unfold in front of the judge through the carrier of
inquiry transcripts.
Despite these prejudice problems, due to the high standard of proof in applying
for an arrest warrant, those four transcripts collected during the post-arrest detention
period were of little substantive meaning to build a case, when all crucial evidence is
supposed to be well prepared. However, these prejudicial transcripts were not used to
obtain the arrest warrant. Instead, they were used to convince judges that the suspect
was guilty. As one investigative officer who handled this case explained: “Adding
those into the dossier is on the basis of the importance of the case. For fatal cases,
more evidence is always better. It is mainly used to exclude the possibility of other
people committing the crime.”
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If evidence is not prejudicial, apart from making the dossier more burdensome,
the practical reason about “more is always better” seems harmless at first glance.
Except the large number of “harmless” inquiry transcripts would not only flood the
dossier but would also blur the fact that the process of obtaining the written witness
testimony is selective.
Being observed from the surface, selective mechanism is normal and inevitable.
Investigative officers take a “two-step” strategy for witness interviews. W, the
instructor of the Detective Division in District Z, recounted to the author that in the
early stage of the investigation, just clues of the case were recorded in the earliest
visit. If the importance of statements can be perceived on the spot, the inquiry
transcript will be made there, but important witnesses will still be notified to report to
the investigation agency for further inquiry. “Definitely a screening process exists”136
between these two steps. Choices about what can be seen in the dossier must be
deliberately made by the investigative officers and included “selectively” according to
the needs of the case construction, rather than inserting all the procedural materials
into the dossier.
The real problem is that selectiveness is covered by the illusion of completeness.
Since a huge number of interviewees’ inquiry transcripts had already been placed in
the dossier, it gave the illusion of a complete and comprehensive dossier. Outside
observers may not realize first, that not all witnesses who have been interviewed
during the visit will eventually be included in the dossier (a completeness issue).
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Second, not all of the inquiry transcripts presented in the final dossier are from the
materials produced by the investigative officers at the first time on the spot when they
asked people questions (a simultaneousness issue). Third, many inquiry transcripts
may be deliberately excluded because they include pro-defendant content or seem
meaningless to construct a case in the eyes of investigative officers (a bias issue).

C. Periodic Functions of Inquiry Transcripts and Less
Substantive Content
Neither laws nor regulations nor normative requirements within the investigation
agency restrict the exact phase when the inquiry transcript should be produced. The
timing of the questioning of witnesses may impact the function of the inquiry, which
is entirely different before or after a threshold called “case is cracked”(破案).
The concept of “cracking a case” is not a statutory term, but it is used frequently
in practice. To put it simply, it refers to the situation when basic facts of a case are
found and suspects are arrested and brought into custody.137 Unquestionably, this
concept is important as a time node in analysis between the case filing at the
beginning and end of an investigation. On the one hand, it represents investigative
officers’ subjective understanding or confidence about the facts and suspects after
they comprehensively comb through a case. Before “the case is cracked”,

According to the "Notice of the Ministry of Public Security on Amending the Standards for Cracking Criminal
Cases" (Gongtongzi [1998] No. 1), the arrest of the main suspect is one of the necessary standards for cracking the
case. Although after the new Criminal Procedure Law promulgated in 2012, the official discourse of the MPS has
put more emphasis on evidence, the impact of this case cracking habit is still very far-reaching. See Ruan Guoping
(阮国平), Po’an Gainian de Shenshi yu Chonggou (‘破案’概念的审视与重构) [Examining and Reconstructing
the Concept of Cracking Cases], 4 ZHONGGUO RENMIN GONG’AN DAXUE XUEBAO (中国人民公安大学学报),
(2004).
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investigative officers themselves use clues to speculate criminal events and do not
have confidence in the case; but afterwards, investigative officers believe that they
have solved the most difficult part of the case and they only need to further collect
and refine evidence. In many places, after a major case is cracked, there will be an
immediate celebration to award investigative officers who have displayed meritorious
performance.138Analysis in the following chapters will discuss effects of subjective
changes on the behavior of investigative officers. On the other hand, the concept is a
watershed of objective outcomes, although there are evidence collection behaviors
before the case is cracked, many evidence collection activities clustered after.
Regarding the witness inquiry, before the threshold, witnesses are helpful in
providing leads or clues to investigative officers and identifying suspects; but after
that, witnesses may retreat to a corroborative position while defendants’ confessions
play a dominant role. In the absence of normative requirements in the field of witness
inquiry, discussing normativeness of officers’ practice-related behaviors is difficult.
However, observing the substantive impact of choices and operations made by
investigative officers from records of witness inquiries is still possible and it is helpful
for filling in the blanks.
Analysis of the sample cases shows that more than half of inquiry transcripts in
District N were made after the suspect was put into criminal detention. The proportion
in District Z reached 57.4%. In comparison with this high rate, the inquiry transcripts
made before suspects were summoned made up just 23.1% of all inquiry transcripts in
See He Jiahong (何家弘), Dangjin Woguo Xingshi Sifa de Shida Wuqu (当今我国刑事司法的十大误区) [Ten
Misunderstandings of Criminal Justice in China Today], 2 QINGHUA FAXUE (清华法学), (2014).
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District N and only 27.8% in District Z. In the period after summons, but before
criminal detention, 11% of inquiries transcripts were made in District N and 14.8% in
District Z.139
Due to high standards of proof, investigative officers are supposed to collect
most evidence before they decide on whether to take a mandatory criminal measure
on the suspect is made. Empirical data of this study reveals otherwise. More than half
of inquiry transcripts were produced after the critical decision of criminal detention
was made. A reasonable speculation leads us in the direction about allocation of time.
Summons last only 24 hours. During this time, investigative officers must spend most
of their time interrogating suspects with barely any time left to question witnesses or
officially produce transcripts in cases where witnesses statements had been recorded
as clues in earlier visits. Therefore, whether or not to include witness transcripts in
evidence materials that are used to apply for a criminal detention warrant relies on a
balance of workload and resources, as well as work habits in each police department.
Another possible explanation may be that written witness testimony is not as
important as a suspect’s confession. Since the suspect has been brought to the
investigation agency, usually it means the case is cracked. At that time, the testimony
is mainly used to support or corroborate the suspect’s confession; preparation of
witness testimonies becomes an auxiliary job. It can be readily postponed until the
suspect is arrested, when more time for case handling is available.
Further cross-analysis of the time needed to make an inquiry transcript and the

The reason that the total proportion cannot add up to 100% is some transcripts were produced even before the
case was officially filed.
139
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stage when the transcript is made reveals that, before a suspect goes to case (whether
caught by police or surrendering voluntarily), the average time spent on questioning
witnesses is much longer than after the suspect goes to case. The Huang case in
District N is a good example. Before Huang went to case, investigative officers
interviewed seven people and each interview lasted for an average of 87 minutes. By
contrast, after Huang was taken into custody, 20 people were interviewed for an
average of 44 minutes, nearly half of the former. A possible inference is that what
investigative officers need from a witness is different before and after a suspect goes
to case. Before a suspect is identified, investigative officers are in desperate need of
leads and clues, which they draw from witnesses’ statements. Thus, inquiries at this
time are as complete and detailed as possible. After the suspect is found and subdued,
the situation changes. What investigative officers need then is to use testimonies to
evaluate, corroborate, or confirm facts given by the suspect. At that point, inquiries
become very specific and most of them are used to clarify one or two questions.
Therefore, each one requires much less time.
An inference can be extrapolated from the analysis above, i.e., the inquiry
transcript made before a suspect goes to case has more substance than after a suspect
is apprehended. Because investigation at that time is still in the stage of “from
evidence to the person,” the content of an inquiry is so abundant that its vividness can
be easily preserved in the transcript. Second, inquiry transcripts produced before a
suspect goes to case tend to be more essential, because, among the large number of
visits police pay to people who might know the case, only if those that may contribute
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to the case will have their statements recorded immediately by investigative officers
on the spot.
In addition, inquiry transcripts produced before a suspect goes to case have a
greater probability of authentically reflecting the evidence collection process. The
transcript recording witnesses’ initial statements at the time of the incident is less
likely to be contaminated or tampered with by investigative officers or others.

D. Locations of Inquiry and Coercive Atmosphere
Among the few, if any, normative requirements on witnesses, the rule of inquiry
location is the clearest. Article 205 of the CPL stipulates, “Inquiring witnesses or
victims may be carried out on the spot, at the unit, residence of the witness or victim,
or other places offered by the witness or victim. If necessary, the witness or victim
may be notified to go to the public security organ to provide testimony.” The LER
14-03 specifically stipulates that if “inquiring witnesses or victims in public security
organs or other places,” regulations for the location of inquiry must be determined by
reference to the location of interrogation. In other words, once an inquiry is made in
an investigative organ, coercive atmosphere faced by a witness is not fundamentally
different from a suspect.
According to these regulations, they apparently aim to minimize the possible
influence of authorities when inquiring witnesses, as well to guarantee objectivity and
authenticity of witness statements. An inquiry outside investigative organs is a
principle, while witnesses are only notified to go to public security organs to provide

110

testimony when it is necessary. However, regulations have not provided clear
explanation as to what situation could be defined as necessary. In this context, most
inquiry transcripts reviewed in this research were produced inside investigation
agencies, i.e. 129 out of 182 inquiry transcripts in District N, and 44 out of 54 in
District Z.
The location inside an investigation agency is nothing like ordinary places.
Instead, it is an isolated site built within the agency designed to handle both
interrogation of suspects and inquiry of witnesses. The author has visited several
case-handling sites in the two districts and another district adjacent to District N. Sites
are isolated from the outside world by iron gates and fences, etc., and covered by a
24-hour monitoring system. To enter the case-handling site, one must first go through
a security inspection area. The process of a personal safety inspection includes:
changing slippers, walking through a metal detector, having a body search (women’s
body search area is shaded by curtains, to avoid monitoring cameras in the room),
storing personal belongings, getting body surface marks, scars checked, and biometric
and biographical information recorded. Among them, the personal information is
collected by urine (poison) detection, fingerprint collection and collection of saliva to
collect DNA information. Although the process for collecting witnesses’ information
is not necessarily as aggressive as suspects’ are, the entire process of entering the area
may exert great psychological pressure on any one, including but not limited to
witnesses.
Inquiring in the investigating agency may raise potential voluntariness issues,
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which may affect the authenticity and objectivity of statements given by the witness
under certain conditions. Long Zongzhi has long pointed out that the coercive power
in hands of the police can become a real one through many channels. This power is so
strong that it makes citizens feel a deterrent effect, and few witnesses dare to refuse
police to testify. Professor Long implied that this deterrent effect might be one of the
reasons why the number of out-of-court testimonies are far more frequent than
testimonies in court. However, the lack of judicial warrants to approve coercive
evidence collection, no matter its concept or system, is questionable.140 Although the
textual analysis of inquiry transcripts has not provided causation evidence of this
coerciveness, it has at least indicated that it is reasonable to be skeptical of the
voluntariness of witnesses in the coercive environment of the case-handling site.

E. Randomness of Inquiry Transcripts Production and
Potential Possibility of Tampering
The LER 14-06 requires that production of inquiry transcripts shall be carried
out in accordance with production of interrogation transcripts. This means that the
rules of accuracy, objectivity and completeness, as well as recording on the spot also
apply in making inquiry transcripts. Generally, questioning witnesses involves the
following basic process: at least two investigative officers present I.D., they record
the witness’ basic biographic information, inform the witness of the litigation rights
and obligations, then ask questions and record questions and answers in real time.
See Long Zongzhi (龙宗智), Zhongguo Zuozheng Zhidu zhi Sanda Guai Xianzhuang Pingxi (中国作证制度之
三大怪现状评析) [An Analysis of the Three Strange Situations of China's Witness System], 1 ZHONGGUO LVSHI
(中国律师), (2001).
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Afterwards, the witness checks the transcript and signs it. Nevertheless, this section
provides some evidence indicating a considerable degree of randomness in the
producing process of transcripts, as reflected in time consumption and recording
methods.
Time Consumption
The randomness in inquiry transcript production is seen in the fact that the time
consumption of each page varies greatly. Theoretically, a page of recording should
remain in a range of time consumption if the recording is in accordance with what
actually occurred. It is certain that time spent on each page cannot be exactly the same
due to factors such as one witness needing more time than another to recall events, or
the witness or the investigative officers being interrupted by other things. There are
even more vicious factors, such as the witness being questioned again and again in
order to get close to the expectation of investigative officers. However, when an
average amount of time spent on one page is 18.6 minutes in District N, one transcript
with 48 minutes per page and another with 4 minutes per page are obvious deviants.
When specifically analyzing the most time-consuming transcript, Tang Mou, the
eyewitness in the Xie intentional injury case, told a story that the criminal suspect had
a fight with the defendant at the time of the incident. This four-page transcript started
at 2:07 p.m. and ended at 5:20 p.m. on the same day and did not provide any materials
to record the circumstances and explanations, which show the inherent flaws of the
transcript.
On the contrary, a detailed analysis of the transcript that takes only four minutes
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per page reveals a more serious problem that evidence without legal status is
intentionally converted into a legal form. For example, 110 (equivalent to 911 in the
U.S.) records in China are not routinely included in litigation evidence. Thus
investigative officers have to convert 110 records into inquiry transcripts if their
operational rules forbid inclusion of 110 records directly. They ask the same witness
simple questions again in the investigation agency to convert the 110 records that
have vague legal status into an inquiry transcript qualified for subsequent
proceedings.
The Zeng robbery case in District N falls into this category. The witness and the
victim, Tu Mou, spoke to officers at the police station three hours after the incident.
He said two men in another motorcycle took his wife’s bag when he was riding with
his wife at the rear of his motorcycle, and that his wife was dragged off the
motorcycle. His words were recorded in a three-page inquiry transcript that only took
12 minutes. It is hard to imagine the whole process was done in such a short period of
time. However, 10 days later, when Tu Mou made a similar statement to investigative
officers, this time, a four-page transcript took 105 minutes. The second inquiry
transcript recorded that Tu Mou called 110 at the first time after the incident. The
content recorded in the first inquiry transcript was actually made during that 110 call
and the following registration process. From this perspective, that each page only took
4 minutes becomes understandable. This conversion practice varies in different
departments. District Z does not have such practice; instead, it directly attaches the
110 records or criminal case registration form into the dossier.
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Recording Methods
The randomness is also reflected in recording methods. Whether the transcript is
printed or handwritten does matter with regard to the authenticity of evidence.
Although standardization advocate for the printed version of transcripts, investigative
officers do not take it seriously. Besides, no explanation in the transcript tells why a
recording method is chosen.
Like interrogation transcripts, the recording method of inquiry transcripts may
correlate with the location of the inquiry. According to practice in District N, when
the inquiry takes place within the investigation agency, the transcript is printed
because the inputting and printing device is available. Otherwise, when the inquiry is
done outside the agency, the transcript is usually written by hand because of
inconvenience to carry printing device around. Thus it seems not worth getting
witnesses to sign a printed version.
Eleven internal-made transcripts are still written by hand and three
external-made transcripts printed. For such anomalies, one possible explanation for
the former is a malfunctioning device, inadequate rooms, or a lack of computer skills
by investigative officers, so the transcript can only be produced by handwriting. A
detailed examination of the printed external-made transcripts may even dig out the
possibility of evidence tampering. One transcript appeared to be very suspicious. The
inquiry was made in an underground parking lot. The witness was an illiterate elderly
man who watched motorcycles and bicycles in the parking lot. Obviously, there was
no possible equipment available for printing at the location. The investigative officers
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had two options to produce a printed transcript. The first option was for the
investigative officer to bring the printing device with him. The other 181 transcripts
did not provide one single example of this, so it is not likely to happen. The second
option was for the investigative officer to return to the office to print a copy after
handwriting records on the spot, and then take it back to the parking lot to get the
elderly man’s signature. The second option violates the requirements for recording
simultaneously. Besides, the elderly man was illiterate, which may leave more room
for evidence tampering by the investigative officers.141
In contrast, transcripts produced in District Z are different from those produced
in District N. Nearly 60% of the internal-made transcripts were written by hand. This
means investigative officers in District Z are still able to choose recording methods
according to their own preferences.
The classification analysis made in this study has nothing to do with the debate
of which recording method is better, handwriting or printing. Instead, it intends to
show that, when making inquiry transcripts, investigative officers often follow certain
habitual actions under the guidance of practical reason. They print the transcripts
when conditions are met to achieve clear and legible specifications. When printing
conditions are missing, transcripts can be readily recorded by hand. Sometimes, even
though a printing device is available, investigative officers can still randomly select
the method according to their own preference, without it being subject to internal
review by the investigation agency or evidence capability scrutiny in subsequent
Of course, the author does not infer that the transcript simultaneous recorded, which following usual operation
of external handwriting or internal printing, is impossible for the investigative officer to distort or tamper with the
contents of the witness statement.
141
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litigations.
This arbitrariness or randomness makes the inquiry transcript become a form of
material that can be easily tampered with or replaced. If the previous evidence stated
by a witness is inconsistent with the follow-up findings conducted by the investigative
officer, such as the suspect’s confession or physical evidence, the investigative officer
may ask the witness again and guide the witness to the desired direction in a
suggestive or even threatening manner. The previous records can simply be destroyed,
and then it could have never existed. Therefore, if investigative officers are
maliciously violating the rules, it is even more difficult to be discovered by the quality
control department within the investigation agency because of the secrecy of the
investigation, not to mention the lawyers who intervene much later and rely heavily
on already well-produced and written materials.
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Chapter 8 Identification
In the criminal justice system in China, identification is not explicitly treated as
an independent investigative measure. In 2012, the revised Criminal Procedure Law
first listed the transcript of identification as a legitimate form of evidence without
saying anything about identification. The Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation of
the Criminal Procedure Law (SPCICPL) has mentioned identification, but still aims
at the use of identification transcripts. In the absence of concrete instructions in law
and judicial interpretation for routine operation, when officers produce and review
transcripts in the identification process, there are few rules with which they must
strictly comply in arranging identification.
Internal normative documents, the Procedures for Handling Criminal Cases by
Public Security Organs (PHCC) and Law Enforcement Rules (LER) guide police
operations in the identification process. The PHCC remains relatively simple and
rough, though it does offer a little clarification, such as determining the subject and
object of identification, the rule of a mixture of foils,142 the principles of prohibiting
hints and preventing exposure of witnesses, etc. In contrast, the third edition of LER,
published in 2017, dedicates an entire chapter to setting rules for identification,
including the following key aspects:
1. The subject of identification is a victim, a criminal suspect, or a witness.143
2. The objects of identification are crime-related things, documents, corpses,
places, or suspects.
142
143

Foils are used in the mixture of persons or items as a basis for comparison.
Through the whole research, it is called an identifier.
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3.

Initiation of identification needs approval from the leader in charge of the
case-handling department. If a suspect is held in the detention center,
identification outside the center needs approval at or above the county level.

4. Identifying a suspect, foils must look similar to the object of identification.
Less than seven foils in lineup are forbidden, and foils must not be chosen
from the case-handling personnel and other personnel working in the public
security organs. Less than ten mug shots for photo identification is also
forbidden.
5. Identifying an object, there must not be less than five similar foils.
6. The identification site should be arranged under conditions similar to those of
the case.
7. Before identification, a person who makes an identification (called an
identifier in this study) is not allowed to see the identification object, and
multiple identifications have to be carried out separately. The identification
transcript should specify whether the identifier is capable of identifying and
record the specific description about the object provided by the identifier.
8. During the process, the presiding investigative officers shall not be less than
two, and a disinterested citizen as an authenticating witness shall be present.
Making lineup identification, pictures of the identified person shall be taken
on the spot, then numbered and attached to the dossier. Alternatively, the
whole process may be video recorded. When making photographic
identification, notes and numbers should be added with the photos. For any
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identifying documents, bodies, and/or places, pictures should be taken and
attached to the dossier, and then confirmed and signed by the identifier.
Alternatively, the whole process may be video recorded instead.
9. A transcript shall be produced after identification. It must include the start
and end time, the location, the investigative officers, the identifier, the
authenticating witness, the basic features of the object, and the purpose of
identification. The content of the transcript must accurately reflect the
process and draw a proper conclusion. The content includes but is not limited
to the actual conditions for identifying, the method of identification, the
attitude of the identifier in the process, the reason for the conclusion and
whether it can be confirmed, as well as any doubts or requests raised by the
identifier. The transcript must be signed and confirmed by the identifier, the
authenticating witness, the investigative officers who preside over the
identification, and the recorder. The attached paper and photos must be
included in the dossier.
The analysis of sample cases reveals that investigative officers in both counties
comply with key requirements in the LER. An inquiry transcript goes with an
identification transcript, the number of foils is correct, the principle of separate
identification is followed, and signatures are complete. Identification usually lasts
from 15 minutes to 30 minutes according to recordings in transcripts. Although these
transcripts have good appearance, careful text analysis can still find some forms of
non-compliance, such as problematic selection of foils, failure to check physical
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objects while identifying objects, and abuse of on-site identification and identity
confirmation regulations. Further analysis can touch on the issue of non-compliance
disguised by the good shape of the transcripts, such as inherent defects of photo
identification and time lag of identification.

A. Identifying Persons

a. Volume Issue

Both suspects and witnesses can identify other persons. Suspects are able to
identify victims, accomplices and other related persons, and witnesses are able to
identify suspects and victims. When asked to make an identification, witnesses in
District N have to follow normative requirements set by the local police department.
Once a witness is being questioned, and there is a condition for identification, the
identification will be automatically arranged immediately after the inquiry. Among the
153 witnesses in District N, 111 participated in identification at least once. Among the
participants, 103 made photo identification of suspects, and 287 arrays of photos were
identified (according to law, an array is no less than ten photos with the suspect and
foils included), which means one witness had identified an average of three arrays.
Eight witnesses made identification of victims. Nonetheless, the corresponding
practice in District Z is different. There is no requirement that all witnesses with
identification conditions have to go through this process, as there is in District N.
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Only 14 of the 47 witnesses participated in identification, and they identified 11
arrays of suspects and 4 arrays of victims.
In terms of suspects who are asked to make identification, despite no overt rules
being drawn from first-hand documents in District N, operational rules can also be
distilled through text analysis. As long as more than two suspects appear in a case,
they will be forced to make identification of accomplices. Almost every suspect has to
identify the victim. In 12 cases, 20 suspects conducted a total of 32 times/50 arrays of
identification, including 21 arrays about accomplices, 23 arrays about victims, and 6
arrays about other parties. Most identification was carried out immediately after the
first interrogation. The identification was mostly made at a centralized case-handling
site. Only 5 of the 32 identifications occurred at a detention center or hospital.
A comparison between practice in District N and Z leads to an interesting finding.
With the continuous development of standardization in District N, practice of
identification in N looks more advanced than that in Z, which is more primitive. From
the perspective of transcript production, practice in Z is very extensive. In the notes
going with photos, only the photo that was pointed out by the identifier has personal
information attached; the information of foils is not listed. This apparently contradicts
the requirement of LER. Time conflicts can also be found. One inquiry transcript
recorded a datum different from that recorded in the matching identification transcript.
For instance, in the Zheng intentional homicide case, the investigative officers
questioned two witnesses shortly after the case occurred and produced a transcript.
The transcript has a statement: “Q: If let you see the above person, can you recognize?
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A: I can recognize him.” However, according to the identification transcript, these
two witnesses did not return to the office until five days later, and the photo
identification was done then.
Beneath the good shape of transcripts in District N, there are still some windows
from which the real, maybe less pretty situation behind those materials may be seen.
In the Zeng robbery case, the fifth interrogation of Zeng took place from 1:23 p.m. to
2:31 p.m. on April 3, but the interrogation transcript did not mention anything about
identification in the process. In the identification transcript, it showed that on April
3rd from 1:20 p.m. to 1:50 p.m., Zeng made identification of the accomplice Chen. A
reasonable guess for the cause of this time conflict is that either the interrogation
transcript missed the part of identification due to carelessness, or the identification
was actually made at another time and the investigative officers filled in the form
randomly without double-checking that it matched other forms. In either case, neither
of them could be called compliance with norms.
In addition, amounts of normative practice in District N are unnecessary,
especially the mutual identification. Mutual identification is organized between
suspects in the same case, but asking them to point out each other in a mixture of
photos in a formally organized identification is apparently gilding the lily because the
suspects in the same case are very familiar with each other and can tell the specific
identity and address of one another.
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b. Photograph Instead of Lineup

In terms of identifying persons, two approaches are widely accepted in policing.
One is a real person lineup and the other is photographic identification. In the two
surveyed districts, witnesses conducted identification all by selecting from an array of
photos where a mug shot of the suspect is mixed in with the foils. A lineup was never
conducted. Furthermore, the rule of mixture was poorly enforced in photo
identification because the selected photos were not in accordance with relevant norms
either in form or substance.
First and foremost, using photo identification rather than a real person lineup
makes the identification of a person more error-prone, but the status quo can barely be
changed. Both investigative officers and legal reviewers in studied areas know the
error-prone tendency of photo identification well. In District Z, errors of identification
occurred in two cases over the past two years. Fortunately, those errors were
discovered in time and did not lead to greater unfair consequences; however, they
were adequate to display some inherent flaws of photo identification.
One good example is a theft case that manifests what will happen when the
photo identification encounters limitations of recognition of human beings. The
suspect in the name of Chen repeatedly stole things from women who came for one
nightstand. The photo of Chen retrieved from the population information system and
the mug shot taken after he was caught were passed on to the victims to identify.
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Answers in both cases were positive. Chen defended himself during interrogations
that he had never been to the city during the period of time or ever, let alone
committed crimes. When the investigative officers were about to increase the intensity
of interrogation, a victim saw the real person, she yelled out, “Wrong! This is not the
person who stole my things. The thief is shorter.” After the real suspect Zhang, was
caught, he confessed that he had met Chen and he knew some personal information
about Chen. Because they looked alike, he committed crimes under Chen’s name.
The other case shows the dubious nature of photos in the population information
system. The daughter’s boyfriend hurt her and her mother with a passerby as an
eyewitness at the scene. In the identification, one identity photo with the same name
of the boyfriend was retrieved from the population information system. The daughter
and the eyewitness confirmed that the man in this photo was the suspect. Therefore,
this person was pursued online. A man was arrested thousands of kilometers away, but
evidence proved that he had been working there for a long time. The mug shot of this
man was taken during the interrogation and provided to the daughter for a second
identification. It turned out he was not the suspect. Until the current study, the real
suspect was still at large.
This awareness in officers’ mind does not help improve the practice.
Investigative officers hold permissive attitude towards the possibility of change. “It’s
really easy to make a wrong judgment when you look at photos, especially when
identity information is used, since many of them were collected long time ago.”144
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“Indeed, there are a lot of problems related with photos identification, but what should
we do? Real person lineup can avoid these problems, but how can a grassroots station
have those conditions? Where can we find so many people looking similar to each
other, according to the regulation, foils should be the same gender as the suspect, as
well as similar age, temperament and height? If we have to do it in every case, the
cost of case handling is too high to bear.”145
Second, even though photo identification is accepted as the only available option,
the selection of photos can also raise concerns. The LER 11-03, 1(2) stipulates,
“Photos chosen for identification should reflect people as same gender, similar age
and hair style as the suspect.” This clause is not fully enforced in both of the counties
studied. On one hand, investigative officers tend to select photos of foils randomly.
“Generally, they are from a pool of suspects’ photos collected in various police
stations or household registration.”146 Many of them do not meet the requirement of
similarity. These photos may even be set in a background that has a color different
from the photo of the suspect. A case in District N is illustrative. According to the
inquiry transcript, a witness mentioned that the suspect wore a red dress. In the array
of photos attached as identification materials, only one showed a person wearing red.
In order to restrict the randomness of this selection, the legal reviewers in
District N browse photos when they review a dossier. If some photos are found
overtly out of the requirements, they will be screened out. Then the investigative
officers who handled the case will be asked to re-organize identification. As to what
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the criterion of overtness is, the interviewed officers gave an example: “if we know
that it is the elderly committing crimes, and the photos of the foils are all young
people, it is obvious that this identification did not meet the requirement.” 147
Apparently, due to calculable room left to interpret the overtness, this standard seems
too vague for investigative officers to deal with identification.
In addition to the randomness of the selection of foils, on the other hand, even
the selection of the suspect’s photo is worrisome. The same suspect could have a
couple of photos taken at different times that are then all used for identification. For
example, in the Zhang kidnapping case in District N, the suspects fled many years ago
and were recently brought to justice. Among the photos, through which several
witnesses identified Zhang, some were Zhang’s I.D. photo taken many years ago (a
young man) and some were photos taken after Zhang was caught (an old man).

B. Identifying Objects

a. Picture Instead of Real Object

According to Article 11-03-1(3) of the LER, when identifying an object, less
than four foils for one object that awaits identification is not allowed. The item, along
with the foils, should be numbered sequentially with the name, number, and order
indicated in the identification transcript. In the two studied counties, the practice of
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identifying objects is different. In District N, investigative officers tend to use it more.
Nearly 14% of witnesses in sample cases identified a total of 56 arrays of items, and
50% suspects identified 43 arrays of items. Those identifications are in full
compliance with the quantity requirement of foils, and the production of materials like
transcripts appears standardized. The categories of identified objects include crime
tools, clothing of suspects, and booty/proceeds of crime. In District Z, identifying
objects rarely occurs. There was only one case (Huang intentional homicide) where
four witnesses identified one object (a mobile phone that was salvaged from the septic
tank). None of the four identifications used a mixed identification method. Instead,
the witnesses were provided a photo of the mobile phone taken at the time of the
crime scene inspection and then asked to sign on the photo to confirm that it was the
mobile phone used by the victim on the day of the incident.
In addition, the identification of objects made by suspects in District Z did not
follow the mixture rule and identification transcripts were not always produced. For
example, in the Huang intentional homicide case, the criminal suspect did not
formally identify the relevant objects involved in the case. Instead, the investigative
officers included photos of objects in the interrogation transcript. In the sixth
interrogation conducted in the detention center, Huang was given a photo of the
victim’s bathroom and was asked to indicate the location of objects mentioned in his
statement, as well as the status of these objects at the time of the incident. In the
Zheng intentional homicide case, when the investigative officers conducted the fourth
interrogation at the detention center, as it put in the transcript, “Q: Now the
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investigative officers show you photos from 1 to 8 according to law. You must look at
the photos carefully and explain to us the origin of photos?” The eight photos
displayed by the investigative officers did not indicate the shooting time, the
photographer, or other relevant information. Zheng wrote on the photos, “This is the
pants I wore during the crime,” and then signed and fingerprinted the photo. These
two informal identifications were conducted very late, two months and four days after
the incident in the Huang case and two months after the incident in the Zheng case.
The 11-03-1(3) of the LER does not set a rule on whether the identification of
objects should check an item in physical form or in a picture. However, if embedded
in the context of the LER, one can read between the lines to find the requirement for
item identification. Paragraph (1) is about lineup and paragraph (2) is about
photographs. The expression of paragraph (3) is closer to the expression of paragraph
(1) regarding lineups. Additionally, the 11-04-5(3) states, “identification of objects,
bodies, and places shall be recorded by photographs, and both the photographs and
their introduction shall be confirmed by fingerprints and signatures of the identifier,”
which further indicates that the photos are supposed to be used as an attachment in the
dossier after the object is identified in physical form.
Nonetheless, the empirical data in both counties shows a general ignorance of the
requirement for identifying objects in physical form. Even in District N where the
dossiers are produced under more standardized regulations, all objects were identified
through the pictures rather than in physical form.
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b. Authentication Issue

Even under relatively strict normative requirements, identification of objects in
District N raises certain authentication issues due to the inherent defects of
identification through pictures. Displaying an item in a picture is not sufficient to
reflect authenticity of that physical evidence, which is one of the most important
attributes of credibility. Authenticity requires that the object, as physical evidence,
truly derives from the case, and the object presented in the court is required to be
identical to that collected by the investigative officers. The authenticity of the
physical evidence can be easily challenged from three aspects: first, evidence may be
deliberately designed to mislead others; second, errors may occur in the process of
recording, transmitting or processing evidence; and third, the witness may misidentify
or lie about the object.148
Therefore, for the purpose of identification, if only the picture of the physical
evidence is displayed to the witness, the possibility of misidentification may increase.
For instance, six pictures listed in identification reflect different phone brands, models
and colors. The victim who was robbed of an Apple iPhone conducted the
identification. However, only one picture showed an Apple iPhone with the screen
turned off. Under such conditions, even an honest and serious witness unrelated to the

TERENCE ANDERSON (特伦斯.安德森) ET AL. ZHENGJU FENXI (证据分析) [Analysis of Evidence (Second
Edition), Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (中国人民大学出版社), 85 (2012).
148
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case can make mistakes, how can we expect the victim, who was robbed and eager to
retrieve their property, to confirm that this is the iPhone with only one possible option
available?
Furthermore, if the gap between the foil and the item identified has already
been too large to reflect its particular characteristics, identification through pictures
can make it worse. The iPhone example can also reflect the absurdity of using
pictures in identification of objects from another angle. If foils are pictures of iPhones
with the same color and the same model, how can ordinary people make a correct
judgment from six pictures? It is common sense that people’s perception about the
difference between this item and that item comes from a particular imprint or dent on
the object, or even the distinctive touch or feeling after long-term contact. What can
we expect from the identification result after such subtle and fine identification
activities are flattened into a two-dimensional picture? Even if there is not an error,
such recording and processing of evidence is an extremely rude reduction that is far
from the actual identification.
In terms of suspects who can also identify objects, substantial doubts may be
raised, among which the most prominent is a time lag. A suspect’s identification of
objects is often distinguished from other identification. Unlike suspect's identification
of an accomplice, victim, or other party, the identification of objects is not carried out
immediately after the interrogation. It is much later. As a comparison, identification
made by a witness is subject to an inquiry procedure that often occurs only once.
Therefore, the time of identification is consistent with the time of inquiry. Meanwhile,
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since identification made by the suspect is not subject to a specific interrogation, there
can be a considerable degree of flexibility. Investigative officers are not eager to let
the suspect identify objects, but arrange identification according to the priority of
matters in their own hands. A complete set of identification transcripts is only needed
before the dossier is transferred for prosecution. The table below shows that the
identification of objects could even happen 126 days after the first interrogation, and
these identifications have no way of being used as evidence in the process of applying
for the approval of arrest.
Table 2: Description of Identification on Objects in District N
Case

A

3

Bat，Shoes，Closing

Time of identification
(days later than the 1st
interrogation)
126

B

3

Bat，Shoes，Closing

126

A

2

Phone

7

A

1

Motorbike

7

A

4

Clothing

7

A

3

Helmet

7

B

4

Clothing

7

B

1

Motorbike

7

B

2

Phone

7

B

1

Clothing

7

B

1

Motorbike

7

B

3

Helmet

7

B

2

Phone

14

B

1

Clothing

14

C

4

Phone

11

Li injury

A

1

Knife

3

Wa homicide

A

1

Knife

20

Luo robbery

A

1

Wire

21

A

2

Phone

21

Tang homicide
Zeng robbery

Suspect

Groups of items

Contents

A

1

Knife

73

Luo homicide

A

1

Knife

Same day

Xu robbery

A

1

Knife

Same day

C. Identifying Crime Scene
Identification of a crime scene, also called on-site identification, is widely
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conducted in the process of criminal investigation, but is rarely mentioned in the
legislation. A similar, but generally broader concept is the identification of places,
which can be found in Article 249 of PHCC. It states, “To ascertain facts, when
necessary, the investigative officers may allow the victim, witness or the criminal
suspect to identify objects, documents, bodies, places or criminal suspects that are
relevant to the crime.” In the absence of nationwide regulation on the procedure of
crime scene identification, only the requirements proposed by the local police
departments are available for routine operation. Without relevant formal documents
regarding the local requirements in hand, we can just draw an inference through text
analysis.
In District N, a set of on-site identification materials includes an identification
transcript, which records the reason of identification as “a scene where the suspect
XXX identifies his/her participation in the XXX case,” and a number of photos taken
on the spot. The content or introduction of photos (time, location, who, and what is
being done, etc.) is indicated under each photo. The signature and fingerprint are on
the corner of the photo, and the production unit, producer and production time of the
photo are listed on the bottom. After combing through all on-site identifications in
District N, the standard practice begins with all suspects being required to identify the
crime scene that they mentioned in their confession. Next, the number of photos taken
on the spot seemingly has no minimum or maximum limits, ranging from 3 to 19.
Finally, no rule is set for when the on-site identification should be taken.
In 4 of the 12 cases, the on-site identification occurred on the day of the first
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interrogation, and 2 occurred on the next day of the first interrogation. The suspects in
these six cases were still at the stage of “go to case” before the criminal detention, and
they could be taken directly to the crime scene from the case-handling site. In the
other six cases, identifications occurred much later. Some were at the criminal
detention stage. Some were even at the detention stage after the arrest. The
investigative officers in those cases had to bring the suspects from the detention
center to the crime scenes for identification.
The prominent problem in identifying a crime scene is that most of them are
done as a mere formality. According to the LER, “identification of places should be
arranged under temporal and spatial conditions alike those of the case,” and
“identification can be conducted repeatedly to eliminate contingency.” However,
dossiers in District N reveal that most on-site identifications made by suspects were
routinely conducted once and only once and they did not strictly conform to the rule
of approximate conditions. Identifications were usually conducted shortly after the
suspect’s first interrogation at randomly selected time. Many cases that incidents
occurred at night made an on-site identification during the daytime, or vice versa.
Two exceptions involving multiple on-site identifications were found in the study.
The first exception is that suspects might identify crime scenes of other cases that
they had committed. For example, in the Zeng robbery cases, although two suspects
had two on-site identifications respectively, given that Zeng had never admitted to
robbing the victim and causing her death that he was caught for, the first and second
on-site identifications he made were just about other robbery cases to which he had
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confessed.
The second exception is genuine repeated identification of crime scene. Only one
case, the Luo homicide case, was found in the study. It is too special to be
representative because more than one site was involved in this case, given that Luo
robbed and killed a taxi driver in the vehicle. The exact time when Luo was caught
cannot be found in the fact sheet, which only stated that the case happened on
September 18. According to the first identification transcript, as early as September
18th, from 1:05 a.m. to 4:39 a.m., Luo took the investigative officers to conduct an
on-site identification for the first time. He identified the driving route after the vehicle
was robbed the night before, as well as the place where he abandoned the car. The
first interrogation was on September 18 from 9:57 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. After this
interrogation, from 2:05 p.m. to 5:05 p.m., Luo led the investigative officers to
conduct an on-site identification again. This time he identified the places where he
purchased and prepared tools, murdered the victim. Since one of identifications was
conducted during daytime and the other at night, at least one must have not met the
approximate conditions requirement.
Furthermore, a phenomenon called “recurrent authenticating witness” was found
in on-site identification, which exemplifies non-compliance in both form and
substance. In the on-site identification transcript, the authenticating witness’s
signature is required as it is in other identification transcripts. In theory, authenticating
witnesses are citizens (neighbors or passers-by mostly) who happened to be present at
the right place and time and who have no connection with the investigation agency,
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agent, or case. They are supposed to help validate the process and supervise the
investigative officers. The recurrent authenticating witness phenomenon may
completely erase the possible supervisory effect of the design, since investigative
officers handpick the authenticating witnesses who cooperate with the police or even
work for them in some capacity. In 12 sample cases in District N, several
authenticating witnesses appeared repeatedly, in a variety of cases that took place at
different times and places (see table below). For example, a person by the name of
MCL signed four identification transcripts in three different cases as an authenticating
witness, and a person by the name of ZXQ signed three transcripts.
While being most prominent in the on-site identification, the phenomenon of
“recurrent authenticating witness” is not limited to this procedure. Instead, it appears
wherever an authenticating witness is required to be present and sign a transcript.
There are profound institutional roots for its occurrence. Among them, a lack of viable
external supervision in general may be the background calling for some kind of
control, regardless of its effectiveness. However, the practical difficulties in
implementing the authenticating witness system and its limited substantive
significance irritate law enforcement. The interviewed investigative officers just
expressed their dislike of this system. “We have to find someone to sign it. In fact,
how can anybody check when it is signed?”149 “Some crime scenes are in remote
places, and identifications sometimes happened at late night. Where can we find a
suitable authenticating witness?”

149
150

150

“Moreover, according to the normative

DNLA04.
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requirements, we have to record the I.D. number and other information of the
authenticating witness, which make people less likely to accept the request of being
an authenticating witness. We cannot force them to be, right?”151 “If the authority
does not trust us, then do not make us do our job. Is it necessary that an authenticating
witness is sent to supervise us?”152
Table 3: Statistics of On-site Identification in Sample Cases in District N
Case

Suspect

Numbers of photos
taken on the spot

Time of identification (days later
than the 1st interrogation)

Tang homicide

A

19

B

9

1

YYS

Zhang kidnap

A

4

11

MCL

B

4

12

YYS

Peng robbery

A

10

Same day

MCL

Zeng robbery

B
A

8
3

Same day
1

MCL
LY

A

5

103

HYY

B

7

1

ZXQ

B

6

37

ZX

Li injury

A

-

3

DXL

Wa homicide

A

5

15

TTP

Luo robbery

A

6

JJL

A

14

Luo homicide

A

7

Same day (before 1st
)
Same day (after 1st
)
30

Cai homicide

A

6

25

-

Xu robbery

A

6

Same day

MCL

Xie injury

A

4

Same day

LRA

Zheng injury

A

5

16

LKC

B

5

16

ZXQ

C

6

13

YL

1

Initials of
authenticating
witness
ZXQ

JJL
PT

D. Identity Confirmation
One kind of identification practice in District N that cannot be found in District
Z is confirmation of the suspect’s identity. Despite being used as an approach in
investigating cases and collecting evidence, confirmation of the suspect’s identity is
not mentioned in any regulations, and its legal status is vague. On one hand, the
151
152
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identity confirmation does not follow the mixture rule that must be followed by
ordinary identification. It only provides a printed facial photo and asks identifiers to
state the person’s identity who the person is and what the relationship is between the
identifier and the identified. On the other hand, substantively, the identity
confirmation is a witness testimony since the witness gives a statement about the
suspect’s identity, but it is not recorded in a transcript. In short, as a local action that
lies outside law and norms, identity confirmation can only be understood by reference
to the nature of the on-site identification.
However, there is an apparent distinction between identity confirmation and
on-site identification. First, on-site identification often involves a unique place and an
in-depth visit to that place. It is not easy to cause confusion. However, the identity
confirmation is weak based on a single photo, from which the identifier has to point
out the identified person. Additionally, the identifier in an on-site identification is the
suspect in the case, who is very likely to know about the incident, and probably is
able to make an identification. The identifier in an identity confirmation may not
know the case or even the identified person, which means that some of them cannot
correctly verify the suspect’s identity.
The statistics of the sample cases in District N show that 13 of 20 suspects have
gone through the process of identity confirmation. Except, there was neither the
condition nor the need for identification.153 The requirement seems clear, that is, to
identify each suspect as accurately as possible. The identifiers are generally the close

Those not identified include: the suspect is not prosecuted; suspects involved ethnic minorities; and the case is
an old case, in which a suspect just went to the case after many years of the incident.
153
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relatives of the suspect or the director of the village committee to which the suspect
belongs. If the former can verify the suspect because they have a close relationship,
the same logic cannot apply to the latter. In a highly mobile society, the director of the
village committee may not know everyone in his or her village. Even if the director
knows everyone, he or she may be unable to make an accurate judgment if, for
example, the suspect had left the village many years ago.
As a “self-selected” requirement, identity confirmation derives primarily from
accidental cases. One interviewee told the author that this kind of identification was
caused by a mistake in identifying a suspect in the past. “There was a ‘civet cat
exchanged for crown prince’154 case. Some police officers were punished after the
mistake exposed. Since then such request has been added.”155 Undoubtedly, this kind
of mistake cannot be common, but in administrative bureaucracy, only one event that
led to punitive results may stimulate a response, which is identity confirmation in the
current case.
Due to factors in the implementation process, identity confirmation has no
substantive effect on strengthening the quality of evidence. First, the intended
function of identity confirmation is undermined when the identification is made. Two
primary functions of identity confirmation are to give investigative officers
confidence that the suspect is not wrongly caught in the process of investigation, and
to prove to prosecutors and judges during subsequent proceedings that the
investigative officers did not catch the wrong person. However, the identification is

154
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狸猫换太子 is a well-known Chinese idiom. It means exchange something slinkingly.
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made entirely at the discretion of investigative officers. Some occur on the day when
the suspect is put under criminal detention, which means, in the early stages of
investigation, while others occur in the later stages of investigation—up to 58 days
after the announcement of the criminal detention. The identification in the late stage
has little effect to establish the confidence of investigative officers. Instead, it can be
only be used as supplementary evidence in the subsequent proceedings.
Second, arbitrariness of identification is not helpful for standardizing the process.
The arbitrariness can be seen from a case in which two suspects were identified at
different times, with a gap of three weeks. The legal reviewer interviewed said that
investigative officers sometimes might forget identity confirmation; they only think of
adding it to the dossier after the legal reviewer asks for it. From another perspective,
this identification is purely a unilateral normative act within the investigating agency,
not an operation performed at the request of the defense. In many cases, the
investigating agency had automatically done the identity confirmation before lawyers
intervened in the case.
Not only does this requirement limit the positive effect on the substance of
evidence, it also negatively affects efficiency and effectiveness. For each suspect,
regardless of whether his or her identity is clear, or whether identification is necessary,
investigative officers in District N are mandatorily required to attach the suspect’s
identity confirmation materials to the dossier. Even when the identity card and
resident population information did not seem suspicious, the identity confirmation had
to also be taken. “In fact, if it is convenient for us to find close relatives, it is still ok.
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But in some cases we cannot find close relatives. To complete such requirement, the
investigative officers need to spend several days to get to the village where the
suspect registered as residence, and find the village director for identification. To be
honest, the meaning of such identification is not great. The suspect went out working
in urban cities many, many years ago. The village director did not even know the
person, but was forced to sign the paper because of the duty."156 If the identifier
makes an incorrect identification, which is very likely to happen under the current
requirement, this mistake will likely direct subsequent proceedings down the wrong
path where it is even harder to know the real identity of the suspect.

156
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Chapter 9 Physical Evidence Collection
To obtain physical evidence, investigative officers in China take certain
investigative measures, such as search, seizure, crimes scene investigation (CSI), and
a measure, which requests evidence to be submitted by third parties, called “evidence
acquisition.” The standardization reform regarding the investigation and evidence
collection procedure aims at protecting the rights of criminal suspects and other
relevant parties and ensuring the legality of evidence obtained. In general, the law
requires pre-approval of these coercive measures, and the legality of evidence is
maintained through complete written recordings of the evidence collection process.
If only being observed from the perspective of the materials in dossiers relevant
to search, seizure, CSI, and evidence acquisition, the sample cases in the two districts
are in line with the law and relevant regulatory requirements. Nonetheless, this
in-depth study found that, under the appearance of well-formed and well-displayed
documents and evidence materials, the practice of physical evidence collection is
situated in an environment filled with contradictory regulations, compromises of
various parties’ interests, abuse or avoidance of certain measures, meaningless
approvals, and symbolic gestures of rights protection.

A. Search
Articles 134 through 138 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) are provisions
that stipulate the purpose, subject, and object of a search and that set up a system
where a warranted search is differentiated from a warrantless search, which is only
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permissible in exigencies when making criminal detention or arrest and requires that
the search be recorded into a transcript. Articles 217 through 221 of the Procedures
for Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs (PHCC) further elaborate
that the chief of the public security organ at or above the county level shall issue the
warrant for search and that at least two investigative officers shall perform the search.
The PHCC also lists the situations of a mandatory search and exigencies when a
warrantless search is permissible.
In contrast, the Law Enforcement Rules (LER) provides a series of operational
rules for search. First, a petition for a search warrant shall include a case brief and the
purpose, scope, and legal basis for the search. Second, the exigent situation when a
warrantless search applies shall be clearly recorded in the search transcript. Third,
specific procedures are set up for indoor, outdoor, and person searches. Fourth,
evidence and the location of where it is found shall be photographed on the spot first,
then evidence shall be seized after, and the photos attached with an introduction shall
be put into the dossier. Fifth, apart from procedural elements, the content of a search
transcript shall include the scope of the search, the name, specification, quantity and
location of the evidentiary items, and any potential damages the search may cause, as
well as the degree of cooperation of the person searched and family members, etc. If
investigative officers have taken photos or videos on some evidence during the search,
it should be indicated in the transcript. Lastly, the situation of handing over “Seized
Objects and Documents List” should always be indicated. In sum, a search should be
reflected in the dossier in a series of supporting materials, including a search warrant,
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all search transcripts, the “Seized Objects and Documents List,” photos, and
audio-visual materials.
This study found that, at least from the appearance of dossiers, the search
materials are relatively comprehensive and complete, in line with the requirements of
the LER, and the system regarding search with a warrant runs well. Whenever there is
a search transcript in the dossier, there is a warrant as its companion. This is an
improvement given that previous research by Zuo Weimin has revealed that “a
warranted search without a warrant”157 was fairly common before 2012.
This study also found that formal searches are not used frequently. The use of the
search procedure appeared in 4 out of the 12 fatal cases in District N and in 1 out of 4
cases in District Z. Given that the search procedure cannot only be used in fatal cases
but also in any other criminal cases, the low frequency of the search procedure being
used in other criminal cases can collaborate the trend in fatal cases. In the provincial
police comprehensive platform (database) that has been running since 2014, the
Public Security Bureau (PSB) in District N had only 44 search warrants issued in
2015，accounting for only 4.2% of 1,036 criminal detention cases. In the same year,
PSB in District Z had only 88 search warrants issued, accounting for 16.4% of 537
criminal detention cases in 2015. No essential changes have ever emerged since Zuo
Weimin’s research. Investigative officers still appear to have been circumventing the
search as an investigative measure.158

Zuo Weimin (左卫民), Guibi yu Tidai: Soucha Yunxing Jizhi de Shizheng Kaocha (规避与替代: 搜查运行机
制的实证考察) [Evasion and Substitution: an Empirical Investigation on Operational Mechanism of Search], 3
ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学), 117 (2007).
158 See Id.
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Despite that “the PSB tends to take advantage of measures that are not in name
of the search but are indeed a search procedure substantially, such as safety inquest
and on-site inquest, to circumvent or substitute search,”159 the practice still leaves a
narrow window for application of the real search under certain conditions.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Cases regarding Search
Dist
rict

Case

Location

Search
?

When

Why

Range

Z

Huang homicide

Indoor

yes

Before
suspect went
to case

Unstated

Apt.of
Suspect

Su homicide
Xing injury
Zheng Homicide
Tang homicide
Zhang kidnap
Peng robbery

Outdoor
Outdoor
Outdoor
Indoor
Outdoor
Outdoor

no
no
no
no
no
yes

-----After suspect
went to case

Zeng robbery

Outdoor

yes

After suspect
went to case

Li injury
Wa homicide

Outdoor
Indoor

no
yes

-Before
suspect was
caught

Luo robery

Outdoor

yes

On suspect
was caught

Luo homicide
Cai homicide
Xu robbery
Xie injury
Zheng injury

Outdoor
Indoor
Indoor
Outdoor
Outdoor
no

no
no
no
no

------

-----Suspect
stated the
clothing
was there
Look for
relevant
objects
-Look for
evidence
at
residence
Look for
evidence
at hideout
------

N

Same
place with
CSI?
no

Duration

Warrant
read to

Seized
objects

26 min

Not
suspect

-----Rent apt.

-----no

-----24 min

-----Not
suspect

phone、 3
pairs of
shoes 、
cup
、
tissues
-----Clothing,
shoes

--

--

47 min

Not
suspect

-Hotel

-no

-35 min

-Suspect

Apt. of
suspect

no

43 min

Suspect

------

------

------

------

Clothings,
phone and
SIM
-Knife,
clothing,
shoes
Phone,
clothing,
shoes
------

First, the use of the search procedure is obviously clustered in certain categories
of cases. It is commonly used in robbery. Every robbery (including looting) case
involves at least one search. The purpose of the search procedure is often to look for
objects that the suspects mentioned in their confession. These objects usually include,
but are not limited to, clothing the criminal suspects wore when they were committing
crimes and the communication tools they were using, especially phones. In contrast,
the homicide or injury cases do not often ask for searches except in two cases, the Wa
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injury case and the Huang homicide case. In Wa, the place was searched immediately
after the suspect was arrested, and the reason recorded in the transcript was very
general: “to find evidence of crime.” In Huang, the situation was more special and
thus more illustrative. Despite no statement regarding the purpose of the search found
in the warrant or transcripts, it is possible to infer the purpose by analyzing available
recordings. Because the suspect was still at large at the time of the search, no
confession was guiding the search; the investigative officers must have used it to
verify their thoughts concerning the potential suspect. The investigative officers
seized all three pairs of shoes in the search. Given that some footprints were found at
the crime scene, the purpose of this search and the seizure of the shoes becomes clear.
The investigative officers tried to compare the footprints with the shoes of the
potential suspect.
Second, the search procedure tends to focus on residential places because the
function of searches is limited, and investigative officers conducted searches
inattentively. Although the relevant provisions of the CPL indicate a wide coverage of
the search, including places, objects, bodies, etc., this study found that all searches in
sample cases limited themselves to only one kind, the search of a suspect’s residence
(including homes and temporary hiding places). The function of cracking cases that
the search is supposed to perform was rarely displayed. In four out of five cases with
a search, the search was conducted either immediately after the suspect was caught or
based on the suspect’s confession that gave a statement as to where the physical
evidence could be found. Thereafter, a search warrant was issued for obtaining the
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evidence in the residence. This practice is called “from confession to evidence,”
which is well known in the Chinese criminal justice system.160 The Huang case was
the only exception. The search was made before Huang was brought to the case.
However, it is not exceptional because Huang was caught shortly after the search,
which means there was no time for investigative officers to compare the footprints.
Thus, the evidence collected in the search did not have much effect on cracking the
case. In general, searches in sample cases usually lasted half an hour, with no case
exceeding 50 minutes, regardless of whether it was conducted in a hotel room or in an
entire house. It is a relatively short time given that the search warrant is temporally
and spatially open-ended, which is supposed to allow officers to conduct the search
thoroughly. However, officers seemed not to appreciate it. The objects found and
seized in the search are always within the same range: clothing, shoes, mobile phones,
and, occasionally, some obvious contraband items, such as knives.
Third, under certain conditions, investigative officers prefer other measures to a
search measure in order to achieve the same goal of collecting evidential items. In the
sample cases, most searches were not conducted at the place where the crime had
occurred because once the crime scene is also the suspect’s home, the effect of
processing the crime scene is equivalent to that of a search. That is why the search is
used less often in indoor murder cases. Unlike the warrant requirement in the U.S.,
where a murder crime scene is not an exception to the 4th Amendment,

161

no warrant

The investigation mode of “from confession to evidence” refers to the practice that investigation authority
searches for and obtains other evidences other than the confession according to the case clues reflected in the
confession of the criminal suspect to complete the proof process of the crime.
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is needed if investigative officers in China want to enter into a location where a
homicide recently occurred in order to process the crime scene because the CSI and
the search are stipulated in the CPL as entirely different measures. In Tang case in
District N, the crime scene was where the suspect lived. Thus, three rounds of crime
scene investigation were carried out with a large number of items seized. No search
warrant was found in the dossier.
In the Zheng case in District Z, using CSI to replace the search is more obvious.
Around midnight on September 17, 2015, investigative officers processed the crime
scene (a restaurant) where the body was found. After nine hours, at 9:55 a.m. on
September 17, the investigative officers conducted another CSI at the suspect’s home
and in his vehicle. The purpose of this investigation was recorded in the transcript:
“the suspect fled the scene by driving, and escaped after returning home, please send
an officer to investigate the suspect's residence and vehicles.” We may draw an
inference from this statement that the suspect’s home and car became extended crime
scenes because he was still at large and a threat to public security. Although this
condition, which is similar to the hot pursuit principle in the U.S., is not overtly
expressed in CSI regulations in China, officers still apply it in practice according to
their own understandings. However, the officers in the Zheng case exploited this
application. According to the facts sheet, Zheng turned himself in at 9:40 a.m. on
September 18, 15 minutes before the second CSI. Therefore, the condition for a hot
pursuit argument did not exist, and the suspect’s home and car should have been
searched instead of investigated as an extended crime scene. In the second CSI,
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almost all the physical evidence required for the prosecution was found: the suspect’s
jacket, underwear, jeans, and suspicious blood on the steering wheel, inner door,
gearshift lever, and driver’s seat of the vehicle, as well as an axe placed in the car.
These items are listed in “Trace Extraction and Objects Registration Form.”
In general, the use non-use of the search are in the form of operations that
entirely comply with current laws and regulations, but some substantial irregularities
can still be found in the production of search warrants and transcripts. The main
manifestation is that the purpose and scope of the search are not subject to
well-designed regulations. In practice, the purpose of the search listed in the warrant
is a template “for investigating crimes.” Although the purpose and reason of search is
also recorded in the attached search transcripts, it is too general and insufficient to
reflect the necessity of the search or to judge the specific scope of the search based on
the principle of proportionality. In practice, once the search is conducted, the coverage
of time and place is quite extensive. Investigative officers can search all the items in
the house. There is no distinction between a third person and the suspect, or between
the suspect’s rental place and other households. There is no specific time allowed for
a search to be carried out. For example, the search time for the Luo robbery case
occurred from 12:04 a.m. to 12:47 a.m.
Due to a two-fold factor concerning the search warrant, the function of a search
as rights protection tends to be undermined. First, the internal approval on a search
warrant can be problematic. The provisions of the LER seemingly have gone through
careful consideration and were deliberately designed for the interests of police. In the
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internal approval process, the petition for approval is required to indicate the case
brief, the scope of the search, the purpose of the search, the legal basis for the search,
etc. In contrast, for the search warrant and the search transcript, there is no
requirement to indicate the scope of the search. The petition is only an internal
document, though, and is included in the separate investigative dossier after the
investigation is completed. In subsequent proceedings, prosecutors, defense lawyers,
and judges will not be able to see it. That is to say, the LER, as the internal
standardization requirements, intends to limit the discretion of investigative officers
when they initiate a search and determine the scope of it to some degree, but this
restriction is a kind of internal requirement that deliberately excludes external
observation. As such, it can easily be distorted or ignored in practice.
Second, it is possible that search warrants are issued after the fact. An outside
reviewer has no way to tell from the dossiers whether search warrants were issued
before the search or if they were made up after the search. Interviews in this study
have provided some clues. The police officers showed some contempt when asked
about the search procedure. “I don’t know what is the value of doing research on the
search procedure, the warrant and other materials can be made up afterwards. The
investigative officers are not at all concerned of search.”162 “Sometimes issuing a
search warrant is just a matter of perfecting the appearance of a dossier afterwards,
making it look more standardized. For the reviewer, we just need to see a set of
materials when the residence is involved.”163 Thus, the post hoc warrant could further
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complicate the procedure, for the function of restricted discretion through the
approval process is basically lost.

B. CSI
Article 126 of the CPL specifies the crime scene investigation, which reads
“investigative officers shall conduct inquest or examination regarding the place of
crime, objects, persons and bodies. When necessary, persons with special expertise
may be appointed or retained to conduct inquest or examination at the direction of
investigative officers.” Article 208 of the PHCC slightly extends this CPL provision,
“investigative officers shall conduct… and promptly extract and collect trace evidence,
physical evidence, and biological samples, etc. in a timely manner. When necessary,
persons...” Lastly, the Crime Scene Investigation Procedures of Public Security
Organs (CSIP) proposed by MPS specifically includes a clause to clarify that
“discovering, fixing, and extracting crime-related trace evidence, physical evidence
and other information is one of the tasks of the crime scene investigation.” And in the
seventh chapter “extraction and seizure of on-site trace evidence and physical
evidence,” 11 articles (52 through 62) are enacted to specify the extraction and seizure
of trace evidence, objects, and documents in the CSI process.
Generally, the series of laws and regulations for the CSI differ from the
procedural requirements for interrogation, inquiry, identification, and search (see table
below) as discussed in previous chapters.
Table 5: Distinction between Search and CSI
Search protocol

CSI
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Subject

Investigative officers

Technicians

Location

Suspect’s residence

Crime scene

Object

Physical evidence

Trace evidence, physical evidence,
biological samples

Means to process

Search (all objects except person)/
Examination (person)

Inquest (all objects except person)/
Examination (person)

Means to collect

Seizure

Extraction (all) / Seizure (physical evidence
need to be used as evidence later)

First, the regulations on the CSI have to deal with two separate but concomitant
concepts: inquest and examination. For example, the expression in Article 126 of the
CPL is “to conduct an inquest or examination.” Furthermore, when referenced in
theory, the inquest transcript and the examination transcript are always treated under
the same category. However, scholars have long agreed that inquest and examination
are different investigative measures. The inquest is to investigate “all objects except
persons, including the specific three-dimensional space where the criminal behavior
exists or occurs. And the changes that criminal behavior causes to the objective
material environment, or changes in the structure and position of the object, or the
increase or decrease of material.”164 By contrast, the examination is designed to
check the person of a victim or a suspect. According to Article 130 of the CPL, “To
ascertain certain features, conditions of injuries, or physical conditions of a victim or
a criminal suspect, a physical examination may be conducted, and fingerprints, blood,
urine and other biological samples may be collected.”
Second, along with the top-down process of rules elaboration, the police
gradually self-authorized a new approach called “extracting” to collect evidence. The
word “extraction” does not appear in the CPL, but it has obtained its position in the
Chen Gang (陈刚), Xingshi Kanyan, Jiancha Bilu de Kexue Dingyi ji Fenlei (刑事勘验、检查笔录的科学定义
及分类) [Scientific Definition and Classification of Criminal Inquest and Inspection Transcripts], 1 ZHONGGUO
RENMIN GONG’AN DAXUE XUEBAO (中国人民公安大学学报), 73-74 (2006).
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normative requirement in the CSIP and has become a norm guiding daily work. This
prominent expansion of self-authorization is not seen in other measures. According to
an official reply given by the MPS, the scope of extraction is greater than the seizure
in the process of the CSI. Everything related to the crime should be extracted, and if
the extracted items need to be used as evidence in subsequent procedures or kept for
further use, it should be seized.165
In practice, this study found that the materials regarding the CSI in two districts
look complete in the dossiers. For example, as the most complicated case in District N,
the Tang intentional homicide case produced three sets of materials for the CSI,
including the site where the corpse was found, the place where the crime occurred,
and the place where the bodies of the victims were burnt and abandoned. In the
Huang case in District Z, a 16-page transcript, 2 on-site drawings, 96 photos, and a
registration form of 47 traces of physical evidence extracted constituted the set of the
CSI materials. In the past, some on-site mapping was hand-painted, especially
low-level cases handled within police station. But investigative officers in District Z
said this kind of hand-painted mapping has not been seen for several years, at least
not in important cases.
Nonetheless, beneath the standard forms, there is also non-compliance in
substance that exists in the field of the CSI due to the traits of relevant regulations. On
one hand, the conceptual difference between inquest and examination may create a
vague space in which investigative officers can take advantage if they try to
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manipulate the system. Normally, the boundary between inquest and examination is
well kept in practice. The on-site inquest transcript is produced after technicians
process the crime scene, and the examination transcript is formed after victims or
suspects are checked. This practice cannot completely bridge the gap between the two
concepts, though, because special situations emerge, investigative officers can
maneuver the distinction at their own will.
In the Huang case, the victim’s body and a cell phone were found in a septic tank
in the backyard of the victim’s house. The investigative officers made an examination
transcript recording the process of checking the identification number and SIM card
of this refloated phone. At the same time, video recorded this eight minutes and seven
seconds process. Obviously, this examination was inconsistent with the general use of
the examination for inspection of persons. This misuse could not be called wrong,
though, at least not from the angle of existing norms. Since Article 126 of the CPL
can be read in isolation, investigative officers can surely “inspect or examine” any
“objects” related to the crime.
In addition, the investigative officers chose to use examination rather than
inquest, even though they apparently knew the usage of examination. This action
projects the lack of options in the current rigid system. The on-site inquest has been
rigidly fixed and limited to three vital tasks: trace and physical evidence extracted
from the scene, sketches made of the scene, and photographs taken of the scene.
Therefore, once conducted outside the real-time process of crime scene investigation,
inquest of objects cannot be included in the inquest transcript nor any other kinds of
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transcripts and, thus, cannot be used as evidence in subsequent proceedings. The
mobile phone in Huang’s case was checked one month later after the on-site inquest.
At that time the phone as evidence could not fit in the existing transcripts but it had to
be fixed. A discerning person may easily figure out that in order to get work done the
investigative officers exploited the loophole. They intentionally “misused” the
examination procedure to achieve their goal.
On the other hand, that “extraction” out of thin air overlaps and conflicts with
“seizure” can result in confusion in practice. In the CSIP that provide the most
detailed and operable norm guiding the routine work, extraction and seizure are used
interchangeably. The most prominent example is the latter part of Article 54, which
requires that “objects and documents that may become carriers of trace should be
extracted or seized for further inquest." So, should the trace carrier be handled,
extracted or seized?
The CSIP itself failed to draw a clear line between when extraction and seizure
shall be used. According to Article 52 of the CSIP, “traces and objects related to crime”
“should be fixed and extracted,” while according to Article 54, “all objects and
documents that can prove the guilty or innocence of the suspect should be seized.”
There is no controversy that trace evidence can only be extracted due to its
uniqueness. However, these two provisions attempt to distinguish between “objects
related to crime” and “objects that can prove the guilty of innocence of the suspect,”
because the former should be extracted and the latter should be seized. This dividing
line is problematic given that many “objects related to crime” are also “objects that
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can prove the guilty of innocence of the suspect.”
Officer L, the deputy commander of the legal division in the police department in
District Z, told the author that these two are confusing in practice. According to
general understandings, he said, the extraction can be used only during the crime
scene inquest and examination process. The object of extraction must the ownerless,
while the seizure can be used in all investigative activities,166 and the object of
seizure must be a good owned by someone. This perception not only represents a
simple feeling of case-handling personnel, but also reflects how front-line officers
apply extraction and seizure, at least to a certain degree.
To distinguish between extraction and seizure is vital because the MPS indicated
that the scope of extraction is bigger than the scope of seizure, which gives
investigative officers incentive to simply “extract” everything on the spot and bring
them back instead of arduously screening out things that need to be seized, the
extraction is less regulated than the seizure. The process of extraction is merely
recorded on a form called “Trace Extraction and Objects Registration Form,” which
cannot be found in the CPL or relevant regulations. The practice in District Z shows
that the registration form is not required to be shown on the spot, no higher authorities
need to approve it, and the person from whose possession the objects or documents
are taken (holder) does not sign it. By contrast, seizure is clearly regulated by the CPL
and the CSIP. Once something is seized, investigative officers must include in the
dossier a file of internal decision concerning seizure, a seizure transcript, and a list of

Article 139 of the 2012 CPL extended the scope of seizure from can only occur in “inquest and search” that
was stipulated in the 1996 CPL to “all investigative activities.”
166
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seized objects. A signature from the holder is also needed. As an investigative officer
in District Z stated: “The extraction does not have a legal status, I know it is supposed
to be stipulated by law indeed. But honestly, we need to take advantage of the means
of extraction, especially at the crime scene of murder. You see, where can we find the
holder at the crime scene in a murder case? What can we do when we need to bring
those items back? To seize is not useful at this time, instead, to directly extract is
better.”167

C. Seizure
With regard to seizure, current laws, regulations and normative documents
mainly involve several rules. The first is the relevance rule. As set forth in the CPL,
the PHCC, or the CSIP, seizure is always subject to the relevance rule. That is, all
kinds of property, including documents that can be used to prove the criminal
suspect’s guilt or innocence, shall be seized, while those irrelevant to the case are
prohibited to be seized. Unrelated items should be released promptly even if they are
seized.168
The second is the preemptive approval rule. According to Article 223 of the
PHCC, “To seize property or documents during investigation, approval must be
obtained from the chief of the investigation department and a seizure decision must be
issued. To seize property or documents during an investigation of the crime scene or a
search, the team leader at the scene shall make the decision. However, when property
167
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or documents are of high value or a seizure may seriously affect normal business
operations, approval shall be obtained from the chief of a public security organ above
the county level and a seizure decision must be issued.” The provisions regarding the
seizure decision show that the protection of the property rights of parties is the aim of
the approval procedure. The public security organs need to get the approval of the
superiors before they take property away from the owners, meaning, the seizure
cannot be conducted arbitrarily.
The third is the rule that a transcript and a list shall be generated on the spot with
at least one authenticating witness. Both Article 140 of the CPL and Article 224 of the
PHCC mention that the seizure shall be conducted in the presence of a witness and the
holder of the property and documents. A seizure transcript and a list shall be
generated and get signed by investigative officers, the holder, and the authenticating
witness. The list shall be made in duplicate with one copy given to the holder and the
other attached to the dossier for future reference.
This study reveals that the most prominent problem in the seizure procedure is
the formality of the approval of a seizure decision. Before 2012, neither
corresponding approval procedures for seizure nor requirements of recording the
seizure process existed. Later, with standardization reform unfolding, efforts to
improve the quality of dossiers gradually emerged. Nevertheless, the improvement in
form has not changed much of the substantive situation. First, the internal review and
approval procedure can be skewed by the post hoc practice, time can be recorded
according to the will of investigative officers, and even the computer system used for
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process control can be circumvented. Thus, a degree of compliance displayed in the
dossier may have little to do with actual operations. Moreover, although the seizure
decision and the list of seized items can always be found in the dossier, the seizure
transcript cannot. A reasonable speculation is that the seizure often accompanies the
search or the CSI, which also produce transcripts. Therefore, investigative officers
may consider the seizure transcript cumbersome or meaningless or both.
Even setting aside distinction between “extraction” and “seizure,” as well as
situation when evidence is deliberately obtained through “extraction” to circumvent
“seizure,” and focusing on sample cases in which the seizure measure was taken,
prominent formality problems can still be found in the seizure procedure.
The first manifestation is that the computer-based process control is eroded or
circumvented by a range of practical techniques. In District Z, a petition for a seizure
decision must go through the online approval system, which is designed for the
purpose of process control. Once contents have been input in the system for three
days or more, operators are no longer able to change them. Theoretically, it may help
prevent the situation where officers alter materials afterwards. However,
case-handling officers have a chance to obtain a paper version of the seizure decision
from the legal affairs department if they make errors during the online process. In
2015, decisions issued in paper version in District Z included 5 filing decisions, 3
search warrants, 41 notices of assets freezing, 125 notices of evidence submission,
and 77 notices of a record search. As an observer who was sitting in one office of the
legal affairs department in District Z, the author often heard legal reviewers, who
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were having telephone conversations with case-handling officers, saying things like,
“The seizure decision in your case is not correct, those items were seized yesterday,
but the time you filled in the seizure decision was today. Hurry up, withdraw it back
on the computer system, modify it to the correct date and then resubmit it.”169
The second is that the post hoc practice is widespread. According to a new
requirement put forward by the procuratorate in District Z, all property and
documents that need to be seized during the CSI or search procedure must also
receive a seizure decision in advance. Apparently, this requirement differentiates from
the internal regulations of the public security organs. Despite being unconvinced, the
leader of the legal affairs department admitted that, “We will try our best to meet the
requirements set by the procuratorate, whenever post added-on materials are
allowed.”170 Therefore, operations in the process of CSI or search have changed
accordingly. After the officer in charge at the scene has decided to seize items, a
seizure decision is made afterwards to meet the procuratorate’s requirement.
This requirement projects that the procuratorate needs the seizure procedure to
reflect the will of the public security organ rather than the will of individual officers,
so that the responsibility of the procuratorate could be relieved. Once the seizure
decision is attached in the dossier, it represents that the seizure procedure has been
approved by the public security organ, no matter when it was obtained. As a result,
the property rights of parties cannot be protected through the pre-approval system
designed by the law. Investigative officers usually tend to seize everything at the

169
170

SZLA02.
SZLA03.
160

scene, which surely cannot be justified by a seizure decision transferred to the
procuratorate if the seizure decision is made up afterwards. The impression that the
procuratorate holds with regard to the organizational behavior of the public security
organ is an illusion, because the case-handling officers themselves complete the
production of the seizure decision, with the personal stamp of the chief in their hands
to approve the decision.
The third manifestation of the formality issue is that the rule of relevance has
been abandoned to some degree. The fuzzy limits of the relevance criteria and the
seizure decision being easy to justify after the fact, substantively reverse the
operational process. Investigative officers tend to seize all items on the spot, both
useful and useless, then they make the list or the “Trace Extraction and Objects
Registration Form” according to the needs of the final production of the dossiers.
Materials useful for the case in subsequent proceedings are listed in the list or
registration form; otherwise, they are not recorded, as if they had not been seized
from the beginning. “Sometimes, I have to extract more than one hundred items. Who
knows which one is useful and which one is useless? It is too cumbersome to list all
items in the registration form.”171
If items unrelated to the case are seized, at least observing from the sample cases,
it is unknown if they will be released promptly. Documents for releasing the seized
items is rarely found in the dossiers. According to Xiang Yan’s research in 2015,
among 98 interviewed police officers, 60.5% of them acknowledged that they had
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seldom or never initiatively released seized property that irrelevant to the case.172

D. Evidence Acquisition
According to the Ministry of Public Security, “evidence acquisition” means that,
when third party units or individuals hold evidence related to a case in the course of
investigation, after a certain approval procedure, the investigative officers can
produce credentials at the scene to use evidence acquisition as an investigative
measure in order to require evidence submission from the holder.173 This measure is
analogous to a subpoena, but without judicial review. Ai Ming’s research has argued
that evidence acquisition should not have been treated as an independent investigative
measure, since it is just a measure created by the public security organ itself on the
basis of misinterpretation of Article 52 of the CPL. In fact, its legal status is
questionable and should be integrated into seizure.174
Article 52 stipulates that “The People’s Courts, the People’s Procuratorates and
the Public Security Organ shall have the authority to collect or obtain evidence from
units and individuals concerned. The units and individuals concerned shall provide
truthful evidence.” Based on the system explanation, Ai Ming believes that Article 52
in the fifth chapter “Evidence” in the first part of the CPL should be substantively

Xiang Yan (向燕), Xingshi She’an Caiwu Chuzhi de Shizheng Kaocha (刑事涉案财物处置的实证考察)
[Empirical Study on Dealing with Properties in Criminal Cases], 6 JIANGSU XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO (江苏
行政学院学报), (2015).
173 SUN MAOLI ED., GONG’AN JIGUAN BANLI XINGSHI ANJIAN CHENGXU GUIDING SHIYI HE SHIWU ZHINAN (公安机
关办理刑事案件程序规定释义和实务指南) [Interpretation and Practice Guide for Procedures of Handling
Criminal Cases], Zhongguo Renmin Gong’an Daxue Chubanshe (中国人民公安大学出版社), 152 (2013).
174 See Ai Ming (艾明), Diaoqu Zhengju Yinggai Chengwei Yixiang Duli de Zhencha Quzheng Cuoshi ma (调取证
据应该成为一项独立的侦查取证措施吗) [Should the Evidence Acquisition become an independent investigative
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distinguished from investigative measures that are listed in the second chapter
“Investigation” in the second part. The collection and acquisition of evidence
mentioned in Article 52 should be interpreted as an authorization clause. The concrete
measures that investigation authorities use to collect and obtain evidence is still
subject to specific procedures and specifications of the “Investigation” section. In
practice, according to Article 52, evidence acquisition is developed into an
independent investigation and evidence-collection measure. Both the PHCC and the
LER formulated by the MPS dictate specific provisions on this measure.175
The practice in the studied districts is mostly consistent with Ai Ming’s research,
that is, the measure of evidence acquisition is widely used, with only a few exceptions.
Evidence acquisition is rarely used to obtain physical evidence176 and it has nearly
evolved into a method of obtaining evidence for specific documentary and
audiovisual materials. A set of conventions in practice has been formed, but is barely
affected by its awkward situation in theory.
Practice regarding evidence acquisition in both districts does seemingly comply
with the relevant norms. A complete set of materials required by related requirements
of the PHCC and the LER—namely, the evidence acquisition notice, the list of
obtained evidence, and the documentary evidence—were arranged in a good manner.
The sample cases also show a pattern that the measure of evidence acquisition is
primarily used for documentary evidence with audio-visual recordings, and electronic
data being the main target, including but being not limited to hospital records, mobile
Id.
“In practice, investigative agency used to take evidence acquisition measure to collect physical evidence from
victims or related third parties.” Id. at 157.
175
176
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phone call metadata, surveillance video footage, contracts, payment transaction
vouchers, etc.
Hospital records and mobile phone call metadata are must-have materials as long
as cases are engaged in such scenarios. Among 16 cases in the 2 districts, hospital
records were found in 10 cases; lists of phone calls were found in 7 cases. Hospital
records were retrieved quickly, usually on the day of the suspect’s criminal detention
or a few days later. When investigative officers went to the hospital at the early stage,
records were collected at that time, which is a good example of when investigation
practice and evidence production are temporally and spatially unified. Regarding
phone calls, it is worth mentioning that relevant regulations are not standardized or
detailed. The scope of calls is at the investigative officers’ discretion. Some lists are
only the records of a mobile phone number within one day, while some may show the
call history for up to two months. The most extensive list is the Xing case, where
more than 240 pages of calls were attached in the dossier.
Video surveillance footage is also commonly obtained as evidence. Among 16
cases, 9 pieces of footage were retrieved for 5 of the cases. Several patterns were
found by combing through these cases. First, the timing of obtainment is bipolar. Four
pieces of footage in two cases were obtained at the early stage of the investigation,
that is, on the day of criminal detention or the day after. While 5 surveillance tapes in
3 cases were obtained more than 20 days after criminal detention or even 20 days
after arrest. The time difference is consistent with the practical reason found in the
obtainment of calls metadata, which is that investigative officers have no time to
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complete formality requirements before the suspect goes to case. Previous research
has discovered that investigative officers tend to look at Skynet or social video
materials first, and then obtain footage as evidence after the case is cracked. Lastly,
they make a set of materials including relevant approval documents and recordings.177
Second, the practice in District N reaches a higher degree of formal compliance.
Detailed explanations of situations were added to an evidence acquisition notice and a
list of obtained evidence. In the Wa case, the situation description of footage included
fighting, the exact time when specific behaviors occurred, information of persons
shown in the video, and location where the footage stored. Third, the means taken by
the officers to obtain evidence depend on the owners/holders of the evidence. If it is
for monitoring equipment held by a third-party, only the video footage is retrieved. If
the suspect or his/her related parties own monitoring equipment, the device is directly
seized.
Why is evidence acquisition chosen rather than seizure? In the past, seizure as an
investigative measure could only be applied in “investigations and searches.” If an
item in other investigation activities needs to be obtained, investigative officers can
only use or “develop,” as Ai Ming called it,178 the measure of evidence acquisition to
collect it. After the CPL changed the scope of seizure to “in all investigation activity”
in 2012, the practical reason has spontaneously adjusted itself. Space for the
application of evidence acquisition has been compressed. Currently, both District N
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and District Z limit the use of evidence acquisition to documentary evidence,
audio-visual recordings, and electronic evidence. As long as physical evidence is
involved, seizure is applied, but evidence acquisition remains an important technique
because of long-term working inertia.
Furthermore, once evidence acquisition was developed, the effect of a series of
discourses associated with it could not be eliminated in a short period of time. Both
investigative officers and case reviewers believe that seizure is a compulsory
investigative measure, mainly applied for criminal suspects; evidence acquisition is an
optional investigative measure with weak coerciveness, suitable for third parties. This
misleading discourse has been refuted by theory179 and contradicts the norm that
evidence acquisition has stricter approval than seizure,180 but its influence still plays
a role in practice.
In addition, convenience is considered to be crucial. Despite the apparent
differences in strictness between the approval of evidence acquisition and seizure, in
fact, difficulty in getting approval from the chief in charge of the case-handling
department is not much different from that of the chief in charge of the public security
organ at or above the county level. Therefore, investigative officers consider
convenience rather than whether they can get permission. Unlike seizure, evidence
acquisition can be completed without the need to attach a decision and a transcript to
the dossier, which is much more convenient.
In his study, Ai Ming proved that acquiring evidence is a coercive investigative measure. See Ai Ming (艾明),
supra note 174.
180 According to PHCC, article 59, Notice of Evidence Acquisition needs approval from the chief of county-level
police department, while article 223 makes it clear that seizure needs approval from leaders of case handling
division.
179
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Lastly, due to the limitation of discourse, retrieval of specific items is logically
more difficult than others to use the concept “seizure.” For example, “seizing” video
surveillance footage is physically impossible. By contrast, it is not difficult for
investigative officers to “seize” video surveillance equipment.
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Chapter 10 Summaries of Empirical Findings
The empirical analysis in Chapters 6 through 9 describes a wide range of
settings in which investigative officers are compliant or non-compliant with the
relevant requirements set by the law and norms, specifically in the context of the
standardization of law enforcement reform in order to improve the quality of criminal
cases. Although the preceding chapters are organized according to different categories
of investigative measures, in fact, the various findings in these chapters have
uncovered many common features. This Chapter summarizes and synthesizes the
study’s findings, as shown in the logic map (see diagram below).
First, the prerequisite of the assumption that investigative officers comply with
requirements is that such requirements are available and reasonably clear. If no
requirements exist or the requirements set by different laws and norms are too vague
or contradictory to follow consistently, compliance is out of the question and
discretion takes over. Therefore, in those areas, the key question becomes whether
investigative officers use their own discretion, reasonably, to collect evidence or
whether they maneuver the spacious grey territory to serve their own or their
organization’s demands.
Second, if relevant requirements exist and are clear enough for application, in
the context of the standardization reform, investigative officers are supposed to
comply fully with them, at least in form. If not, those behaviors might have already
been discovered and addressed by the reform. Nonetheless, exceptions of formal
compliance still exist in practice. It is worth exploring.
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Third, if officers do formally comply, as most findings of this study have
revealed, the key question evolves to substantive concerns: do those formally
compliant evidence collection behaviors also serve substantive ends? If the answer is
yes, does that mean everything is always satisfactory? If the answer is no, then there
are several situations in which evidence is collected by seemingly following the letter
of the law, but substantively violate its spirit that should be discussed.
This chapter focuses on manifestations of the negative answer at each level of
the logic map, primarily on the issue of evidence that has the appearance of formal
compliance.
Diagram 1: Abridged general view of the logic

A. Areas in Need of Regulations
As this study discussed in previous chapters, the standardization reform under
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the ideologically uncontentious rhetoric of the rule of law endeavors to generate
limitations governing actions of law enforcement. However, when normative
guidance at an operational level is absent, the question of whether investigative
officers comply with the law and norms serves no value. The evidence collection
behavior is either at an individual officer’s discretion or dependent on working habits
shared within that particular group, which, in a sense, is another form of police
discretion.
Although discretion is necessary for police work, certainty police discretion,
especially that is applied during the evidence collection process, is supposed to be
diminished or at least standardized, given the strict requirement in theory that the
police must act in accordance with laws and norms for the evidence they collect
against the accused to be admitted at trial. Even if not as impersonal as machine, the
investigative officers are expected to follow rules step by step in constructing a
dossier rather than to make discretionary judgements like their colleagues on the
street.
This study found that where law says nothing, in other words, specific
evidence collection measures have not yet been confirmed or clarified by the law,
norms created by the public security organ itself or working habits fill in the blanks as
guidance for daily evidence collection work. Without relevant laws as sources, these
so-called norms are deficient because they may be just indiscriminate actions
normalizing working habits, which have loosely formed under historical conditions in
the absence of regulations. They may also have been created based on
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misinterpretation of laws or according to institutional interests of public security
organs, which makes the motive of the norms suspicious. In addition to the suspicious
status, these rootless norms are not treated by the police as seriously as those
elaborate laws, which means a considerable space of discretion exists. In the
meantime, the nominal norms hide the trail of discretion, which provides illusion of
legality even though the police act like interest-oriented workers disregarding the rule
of law.
Some of their discretionary conducts are harmless indeed, but most are
potentially problematic if paid close attention to. For example, regarding discretion at
an individual level that is rarely seen, officers are allowed to freely choose pens or
computers to record words and sentences when are producing a variety of transcripts
(see Chapter 6, E); they can choose the time for transferring suspects’ application for
a designated lawyer and they usually ignore it until other works are almost done (see
Chapter 6, D); and they are free to draw the line of evidence scope when obtaining
telecommunications metadata (see Chapter 9, D). Those discretionary actions may
provide opportunity for transcript manipulation, postpone or substantively decline
suspects’ right to counsel, and erode privacy.
Other examples, primarily discretion in the form of working habits, can be
found from the beginning to the end of the investigation stage. Some discretion comes
out of where laws are silent. As for treating the suspect, the investigative officers can
first use the “go-to-case phase” facts sheet, which has no legal status, to describe how
and when the suspect is brought to the investigative agency. Since the time indicated
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in the facts sheet is used as the starting point for calculating the duration of the
go-to-case phase, when officers fill in the sheet deliberately to avoid exceeding time
limits, it may undermine the institutional design to restrict the duration of the
go-to-case phase (see Chapter 6, B). Then, because the location of the interrogation
within 24 hours after declaration of criminal detention is not clarified by the CPL,
officers can take advantage of this vagueness to keep stubborn suspects in the
investigative agency until they confess (see Chapter 6, C). Lastly, although the
suspect should be informed of his/her right to counsel, due to the silence that the CPL
has regarding a procedure of informing and the failure that the LER has in clarifying
whether a suspect must be informed verbally, suspects in nearly half of the sample
cases were not verbally informed of their rights; instead, they were asked to sign a
notice of general rights. Signing the notice is insufficient to guarantee actual
awareness of the right to a lawyer or to a designated lawyer under certain conditions,
which is the basis of this fundamental right. In the absence of transcripts recording the
verbal information process, outside reviewers cannot tell if the suspect understood the
content of the notice and made an informed decision (see Chapter 6, D).
Some discretion derives from existing laws and norms’ inclusive feature. With
regard to witness testimony, existing laws and norms fail to draw a dividing line
between a witness and an interviewee and fail to clarify whether the inquiry transcript
is used to exclusively record the witness testimony out of court. Therefore, a selective
mechanism of written testimonies formed in practice. Investigative officers do not
automatically include all inquiry transcripts (of witnesses or of interviewees) in
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dossiers; they include those they think will be helpful for case construction and put
the rest in investigative files, which are not open to the following proceedings (see
Chapter 7, B).
Existing law and norms allow both the use of photo identification and line-ups
without differentiating conditions of application. Only photo identification has been
used in practice accompanied with its error-prone features. Errors may be caused by
inherent defects of photos such as the photo is old, the gap between the suspect and
foils is too large and information of height, posture, and motion cannot be reflected.
Once the identification process goes wrong due to certain factors, regardless of the
quantities of evidence, the problem persists (see Chapter 8, A).
Some discretion occurs as police departments’ creation to facilitate work.
On-site identification widely used in practice actually makes up out of whole cloth.
The particularity of on-site identification lies in its combination of features of CSI,
interrogation, and ordinary identification procedures. As its legal status is in a state of
ambiguity, the LER simply defines it as one type of identification without applying
some principles of identification, such as the principle of separate identification and
the principle of ensuring a mixture of foils (see Chapter 8, C).
Another example is evidence acquisition measures. As a non-legislative
regulation created by the public security organ itself, evidence acquisition is still
widely used for evidence collection in the context of standardization reform. Although
in practice investigative officers have limited this measure to collect only specific
documentary evidence and audio-visual evidence, given its potential for rights
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violation that is as serious as seizure to some degree, it is still a problem that has not
been fundamentally addressed (see Chapter 9, D).

B. Non-compliance in Form
In the context of standardization reform, evidence collection behaviors in the
studied districts that formally violate relevant laws and norms have almost been
eliminated. Two exceptions remain however: the copying and pasting problem and
video surveillance on interrogation.
The copying and pasting problem is found in interrogation transcripts. In a
series of transcripts, statements in prior interrogations (mostly the first interrogation)
are copied and pasted into subsequent interrogation transcripts. It is a serious problem,
which reveals that both form and substance are far from compliance and undermines
the authenticity of evidence guaranteed by consistency and corroboration rules for
confession. The use of a computer for recording and more stringent requirements for
“routine interrogation” may exacerbate this tendency (see Chapter 6, E).
A complete series of regulations regarding video surveillance on interrogation
were in place when I conducted the study in 2015, in which the primary requirement
was to record every interrogation process continuously and to maintain the complete
recording without it being selected, edited, or deleted. However, practice in both
districts failed to meet the requirement that every interrogation should be recorded.
First, transcripts missed important information; most did not clearly indicate whether
a recording occurred. People in the subsequent review process had no way to know of

174

the existence of footage, let alone watch it. Usually, only the first interrogation of a
case was video recorded and other interrogations were not, or at least they were not
put into dossiers. Furthermore, the supervisory system malfunctioned. Legal
reviewers, who were supposed to supervise every interrogation to ensure they were
recorded, had too little time to watch all the footage, so only the first interrogation
was skimmed or even none at all. Not all footage was transferred either. Only in the
case of some inconsistency in the suspect’s confession would prosecutors ask to
transfer footage.
There is reason for concern that the requirement of completeness is, in some
cases, undermined by deliberate manipulation. Investigative officers in District Z still
set up recorders separately when an investigation room had been covered with an
automatic monitoring system designed to guarantee completeness because they did
not want it to be discovered that, sometimes, only one officer sat in the interrogation
room (see Chapter 6, F).
Under standardization reform, the explicit violation of the law and norms are
so rare that these instances of formal non-compliance stand out. This phenomenon
may derive from the fact that standardization of law enforcement has been promoted
to a different degree in different districts, or that, in some areas, the consequence for
non-compliance with laws and norms is not an adequate deterrent. An in-depth
explanation will be discussed in Chapter 12.
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C. Formality
The prominent findings in the last four chapters and the highest stake of
concerns of this study are formality issues, meaning investigative behaviors that
follow norms in form, but that are not actually compliant with them in substance or
where substantive compliance serves no value. The outcome of these behaviors (i.e.,
the evidence collected) is like an empty shell, which looks reasonable and ostensibly
meets requirements, but does not necessarily reflect what occurs in reality and offers
little possibility of reaching the original purpose of the laws and norms. In other
words, formality represents behaviors that follow the letter of the law rather than its
spirit. Further, because formality issues hide under the surface of good appearance,
supervisory systems have difficulty detecting them and research is likely to ignore
them. This section reveals that formality issues are not trivial. Unlike problems such
as corruption or overt violation of laws whose severity is well known, formality
problems undermine the criminal justice system in a more subtle and covert way.

a. Non-compliance in Substance

In many situations, investigative officers do not formally violate the law and
norms; they instead act within grey territory, slightly bend rules, or deploy deceptive
tactics. There are abundant examples in the empirical findings.
According to the law and norms, a summoning warrant is usually needed to
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bring a suspect to the investigative agency, but, in fact, suspects are most frequently
subdued before warrants are issued. Retrospective filling of time of arrival in the
“go-to-case phase” facts sheet can ensure that time recorded is consistent among
transcripts. Therefore, actual duration of the go-to-case phase is unknown to the
outside world, and the time limit designed to regulate this phase fails to complete its
mission (see Chapter 6, B).
Video surveillance is designed to bring transparency to an interrogation room,
but widespread informal interrogation has undermined this mechanism. Video
recordings of interrogations are only statements made by suspects in a very
“cooperating” situation. This may prove that no illegal behavior has occurred at the
time of recording but cannot prove whether suspects were previously put under
physical or mental coercion. Suspects can be made to confess first, and then the
monitoring system or a separate recorder is set up to record a “rehearsed”
interrogating process (see Chapter 6, B).
During the CSI procedure, investigative officers take advantage of the blurred
line between inquest and examination so they can manipulate the system to seize their
own interests in circumventing rigid rules. They also exploit the “extraction”
procedure without solid legal status to take place of seizure, so they can conveniently
bring items back from the crime scene as many times as they want (see Chapter 9, B).
The system of an authenticating witness is designed to help validate the
evidence collection process and to supervise investigative officers, but it turns out that
the authenticating witness is handpicked by the police and tends to cooperate with
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police on a long-term basis. “Recurrent authenticating witnesses” appear in many
transcripts where an authenticating witness is required to be present and sign the
transcript. One witness who was present in a case could also be found in many other
cases (see Chapter 9, C).
Internal review and approval procedures are critical in keeping evidence
collection behavior on the right path but post hoc warrants and after-the-fact
approvals can skew this since the time can be recorded according to the will of
investigative officers. The computer system used for process control can also be
circumvented by withdrawing or modifying documents. Even if the time window is
closed, investigative officers are still able to get a warrant or a decision in paper form
(see Chapter 9, C).

b. Cumbersome or Irrelevant Materials

At the same time, this study reveals a different kind of formality problem with
evidence collection behavior and compliance with norms, both in form and substance.
In some areas, due to inherently deficient rules, there are unwelcome behaviors that
collect cumbersome or irrelevant materials in this ideal category. They provide little
real value, which is a problem also covered by the concept of formality in this study.
When hundreds of thousands of pages of materials are placed in the front of a
dossier, especially with a detailed, well-defined catalogue, reviewers or observers can
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easily have a good impression of the investigative work. However, careful analyses
reveal that these materials are roughly composed of only a few categories of materials,
including interrogation transcripts, inquiry transcripts, identification transcripts,
on-site inquest materials, and documentary evidence obtained by evidence acquisition.
As the core of a dossier, interrogation transcripts are in huge volume. The duration of
interrogations per person has reached more than 10 hours distributed, on average,
over 7 interrogations, and more than 30 pages of transcripts have been produced. The
number of inquiry transcripts is even more. The average number of witnesses in each
case was 12 to 13, and in some complex cases the number even reached 45 (see
Chapter 7, A). Moreover, a large number of identification transcripts have flooded
dossiers; among 153 witnesses in District N, 73% of them had participated in the
identification process (see Chapter 8, A).
There is no proportional relationship between the huge amount of materials
and their utility. Some transcripts that should not be attributed to interrogation or
inquiry transcripts are mixed into these two types of transcripts. For example, nearly
half interrogation transcripts are actually just recordings of notification. Some
evidence is questionable regarding its relevance. Testimonies regarding old sexual
anecdotes were put in dossiers. A total of 240 pages of call data for a two months
period were included in a dossier to prove that one particular call had occurred. Apart
from those, identity confirmation, which consumes many investigative resources, has
no substantive effect on strengthening the quality of evidence.
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C. Adverse effects of formality

In general, the formality issues do not merely involve evidentiary materials
that are too comprehensive to be of meaning, they also have some potentially crucial
nodes that still require more materials to justify the process. This tension provides a
background to understand the adverse effects of formality.
First, formality has few effects on safeguarding the relevance, authenticity,
and legitimacy of evidence, but may instead drain investigative resources. A large
number of meaningless materials are stuffed in the dossier. In an ideal state, where
investigative resources were infinite, irrelevant and cumbersome materials may not
cause too much harm. In reality, investigative resources are limited and should be
allocated efficiently. If more investigative resources are invested in the production of
meaningless materials, fewer resources can be invested in other investigations. As one
interviewed officer directly pointed out, “Many times we felt that we were
shorthanded because perfecting the ‘form’ of evidence took too much time.”181
Second, formality makes behavior in violation of laws and norms harder to
detect. Although dossiers in the past are riddled with overt problems, this “realistic”
style has at least one advantage: contradiction between materials can be detected from
the outside. Once investigative officers in the evidence collection process or legal
reviewers polish these materials in a timely manner, behaviors reflected in the dossier
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seem to be compliant with relevant laws and norms, and deviations in investigation
and evidence collection will be hidden more deeply.
Informal interrogation and identity confirmation are two examples. If used as
proof of legality of interrogation, video recordings on the rehearsed first interrogation
can actually bleach the informal interrogation and be used as proof against the
allegations of illegal interrogation. N District's unique identity confirmation procedure
can more clearly reveal the hidden effect. It will prove the identity of the suspect on
the surface, avoiding impersonation, wrongly misjudged, and so on. However,
connection between the identifier and the identified may be weak, calling into
question the reliability of the identification. If errors occur in the identification
process, they are more difficult to discover or correct at the trial stage.
Third, requirements that may lead to formality could potentially erode
investigative officers’ enthusiasm for handling cases, weaken the vigilance of their
professional ethics, and distort strict enforcement of regulations. In both districts, the
interviewed officers are uncomfortable with static rules, which involve procedures
that are meaningless for the acquisition of evidence or final proof of a case, but that
they must still follow. The prominent example is the requirement regarding
identification and an authenticating witness. Each witness with an identification
condition is required to identify the suspect, regardless of need. In a simple case, the
suspect was found waiting at the scene and he fully confessed; eight witnesses were
asked to identify him.
Apart from presiding the process, officers who organize one time of
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identification have to produce a complete set of written materials, such as transcripts,
photos, and photo descriptions, and every identification process needs an
authenticating witness’ presence. In such high frequency, “it is impossible to find a
witness, it is impossible to complete the task.”182 Therefore, the irritated officers find
the same particular persons to play the role of authenticating witnesses over and over
again.
Finally, officers become indifferent to whether evidence can help a case in the
subsequent proceedings; they only care about whether the relevant requirements are
satisfied. “Formalities of documents must be fulfilled. Only under this way, will legal
reviewers and prosecutors let the case pass.”183 Officers also do not care about
deviations during the whole process because there is no other option.
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Chapter 11 IAD Framework and Elements of Evidence
Collection Situation
The noncompliance and formality issues revealed by the empirical study have not
been eradicated or reduced by the standardization reform of law enforcement; on the
contrary, some have even been aggravated to an extent. The behaviors of Chinese
police, legal reviewers, etc. in facing new regulations may look familiar to some
American scholars who were interested in the “hydraulic” theory of criminal justice.
For example, William Stuntz, in his article “The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,” 184 argued that the Warren Court
“revolution” in constitutional criminal procedure was, in the end, largely
counterproductive because it assumed that when the Court announced new rules, the
police, prosecutors, and judges would do as they told. In fact, “Criminal procedure’s
rules and remedies are embedded in a larger system, a system that can adjust to those
rules in ways other than obeying them.”185 And Elizabeth E. Joh explained how
“hydraulic pressure” exerted from tighter regulations prompted the police to switch to
use some less regulated methods.186
Therefore, in order to interpret the roots of formality, and to explain why some
standardization efforts missed the original goals, the theoretical part of this study has
to delve into the system that can self-adjust and be rife with mechanisms in operation
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and factors that may affect officers’ behaviors. Institutional analysis approach
focusing on how institutions behave and function in accordance with rules fits well as
a theoretical tool.
Since the 1990s, the institutional analysis approach has been widely used by
western scholars in policing studies. The police department is considered more
institutionalized compared to business organizations (e.g., manufacturing firms),
which exist in environments where effective and efficient performance is rewarded,
because the police department is an organization operating in complicated
institutional environments with certain social values.187 Three elements are identified
by John P. Crank for an institutionalized organization, which is, “The organization, in
its behavior and structure, reflects the values in its institutional environment…To
preserve their positive relations with their constituencies, institutionalized
organizations loosely couple formal practices with actual behavior…A logic of good
faith

pervades

organizational

practices,

impeding

critical

evaluation

and

supervision.”188 Crank, along with Robert Langworthy, also indicated that police
reforms usually fail because reform-minded policymakers neglect factors that
institutional environment limits or mobilizes police organizations.189
As Jerome H. Skolnick has pointed out, if efficiency dominates in an
institutionalized organization like the police department, “unintended consequences”
may emerge during implementation of internal management requirements in pursuit
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of promoting efficiency. From a sociological perspective, individuals in an
organization tend to cope with the most current and pressing demands at work or
perform to specifically meet requirements of intermediate supervisors, rather than to
achieve ultimate goals of the entire work. They may break minor rules or reshape,
reinterpret, or even ignore formal rules to make the best possible appearance of the
tasks at hand. Consequently, techniques used creatively by participants for
self-interests often linger in the grey area of legality, which may lead to unintended
consequences. For example, Skolnick found that clearance rate—widely used for
internal efficiency control—ended up with an unintended consequence, namely, the
police manipulated data presentation and destroyed the hierarchy of criminal penalties.
Investigative officers created a category called “suspicious incident” that was
intentionally excluded from “crime” in order to make the final clearance rate look
higher. They exchanged criminality (no increase or even decrease in sentence) in
return for defendants’ cooperation in confessing to crimes they never committed in
order to “clear” more crimes.
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For one who needs to consider elements and relationships among elements for
institutional analysis, Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
framework provides an excellent tool. As Ostrom put it, “For policymakers and
scholars interested in issues related to how different governance systems enable
individuals to solve problems democratically, the IAD framework helps to organize
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diagnostic, analytical, and prescriptive capabilities.”191 Thus, in Chapters 11 through
13, this dissertation applies the IAD framework as a conceptual framework to
organize a variety of theoretical exploration in order to better understand action
situations faced by police officers in obtaining and producing evidence and the
choices they made in a context fraught with changes after the standardization reform
was introduced as external variables.

A. Brief Introduction of IAD
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (see Diagram
below) was developed as a conceptual approach in social sciences to analyze how
institutions affect the incentives for individuals and their resultant behavior. It shows
that developing a multilevel classification of the underlying components of the
situations human actors face is useful.192 Key variables are identified to undertake “a
systematic analysis of the structure of the situations that individuals faced and how
rules, the nature of the events involved, and community affected these situations over
time.” 193 The term “institution” in the IAD framework does not refer to an
organizational entity, instead, to “shared concepts used by humans in repetitive
situations organized by rules, norms and strategies.”194 An action arena is the focal
unit of analysis, in which participants and an action situation “interact as they are
affected by exogenous variables (at least at the time of analysis at this level) and
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produce outcomes that in turn affect the participants and the action situation.”195
Diagram 2: The IAD Framework
Source: E. Ostrom (2005, p.15, fig.1.2)

An action situation can be characterized by seven variables: participants,
positions, potential outcomes, allowable actions, the control that participants exercise,
information generated, and the costs and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes
(see Diagram below).196 These components of an action situation are elements related
and directly affected by rules, especially rules-in-use rather than rules-in-form. Based
on their immediate impact on the elements of an action situation, the rules are sorted
into basic types: position rules, boundary rules, choice rules, information rules,
aggregation rules, scope rules, and payoff rules.197
Three clusters of variables are classified as exogenous factors, which all jointly
affect the structure of an action arena, namely, rules, the biophysical and material
world, and the attributes of the community.198 “The rules that humans can use as tools
to fashion the action situations they engage in repeatedly. The biophysical world and
the attributes of a community work together with rules to constitute action situations
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that enhance or reduce the likelihood of individuals reaching better outcomes.”199
Diagram 3: The action situation of the IAD Framework
Source: E. Ostrom (2005, p.33, fig.2.1)

In addition to the core analytical unit of the IAD framework—the action
situation—multiple levels of analysis exist due to the nesting of rules within rules,
meaning a set of rules are nested in another set of rules that decide how the first set of
rules can be changed. Ostrom assumed three levels of rules: (1) operational rules that
affect participants’ day-to-day decisions, (2) collective-choice rules that affect
operational situations by determining who is eligible to be a participant and the rules
to be used in changing operational rules, and (3) constitutional-choice rules that affect
collective-choice situations.200

When a situation at any particular level is analyzed,

it is assumed that the structure of the situation and institutional rules at that level are
fixed in the short term for the purpose of analysis.201
Before the official launch of the IAD framework, in the 1970s, Ostrom applied
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its core elements and ideas in the empirical study of the Police Service in
Metropolitan Areas. In this research—that lasted for 15 years—the IAD framework
has gradually developed. Ostrom used an approach called “industry approach,” which
uses concepts of producers and consumers of police service than a traditional
organizational approach to explore the different patterns of organization of police
services delivery and “interorganizational” arrangements. Police service, instead of
police agencies, was put on center stage as an analysis unit. The latter is merely
treated as the producer of the former. Several direct services are examined, such as
general area patrol, traffic control, and criminal investigation, as well as four auxiliary
services, namely, radio communications, adult pretrial detention, entry-level training,
and criminal laboratory analysis.
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The police service study helps to generally illustrate the function of the IAD
framework that has been created to help identify relevant elements and the
relationships between these elements in institutional analysis. For researchers, the
IAD framework provides a list of the most common variables for analyzing all
institutional arrangements and a systematic structure for organizing and arranging
their own research.

B. Elements of Evidence Collection Situation
Drawing upon Ostrom’s framework, this study focuses on the action arena of
criminal investigation and evidence collection rather than the investigative agency.
The temporal span of this situation is limited to the entire investigation stage where
202
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most investigation and evidence collection activities occur, despite the fact that the
investigation stage, in practice, can be divided into the case detection stage and the
evidence collection stage with a watershed called the “case cracking” moment.
In the action arena of investigation and evidence collection, investigative officers,
as primary participants, carry out activities in the action situation—such as
investigating and collecting evidence—in order to propel the case to the litigation
stage where the investigative officers and other participants are not robots that
mechanically enforce the law. Their behavior in opposition to robotic ones must be
the result of the individual’s tendency to make choices after measuring the
requirements and interests of the relevant parties, including themselves. Therefore, the
actions, interactions, and perceptions of the organization between the individual and
the group the individual belongs to should be the primary focus with regard to
questioning concerning behavioral choices.
From the perspective using the IAD framework, the standardization law
enforcement reform—as a set of comprehensive rules—can be viewed as exogenous
variables brought into the investigation and evidence collection situation. Before
turning to the discussion of formality issues affected by the exogenous variables, the
following sections provide an overview of the elements of the evidence collection
situation itself to build up a basic understanding of the structure of this action
situation at the beginning of the theoretical analysis.
Participants
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Participants are “decision-making entities assigned to a position and capable of
selecting actions from a set of alternatives made available at nodes in a decision
process.” 203 Individual, composite, and corporate actors can all be participants.
Relevant attributes of participants include the number of participants, their status as
individual, composite, or corporate actors, and individual attributes, such as age,
education, gender, and experience.204
In the investigation and evidence collection situation regarding fatal cases in the
frontline public security organs, there are a variety of participants, including
investigative officers, legal reviewers, technicians, beat officers in police stations, and
leaders in charge of the department as direct participants within investigation agencies,
and witnesses, suspects, prosecutors and defense lawyers as indirect participants
outside investigation agencies. The number of participants affects many other
components of the evidence collection situation. For example, the working
environment is frequently understaffed, which may affect officers’ working
performance and further lead to outcomes with formality problems due to heavy
workloads. Second, influence of the status as individual or team varies. An
investigative group composed of many individuals depends on the working habits
rather than private preferences of officers, while the internal decision-making
mechanism in a legal reviewing process on a case is more dependent on an individual
as the legal reviewer. Third, individual attributes, like competence of the participants,
matter. A young, inexperienced investigative officer may make more errors in
203
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producing a piece of evidence that needs to be modified in subsequent proceedings.
Positions
In an action situation, positions and participants are two separate elements.
Positions are “anonymous slots” into and out of which participants move. A position
frequently involves more than one participant, and a participant may simultaneously
occupy more than one position. Participants and actions are connected through
positions because the nature of a position defines the “standing” of the participant
who holds the position. The standing authorizes and limits actions that the holder of
the position can take.205
According to the role and importance of the participants in the evidence
collection situation, four categories of positions can be roughly sorted out: (1)
investigative officers as actors; (2) legal reviewers as the first-level internal
supervisors; (3) leaders as the second-level internal supervisors; (4) prosecutors,
judges and defense lawyers as external supervisors.206 The investigative officers and
legal reviewers play a key role, and a highly interactive dual-center structure is
thereby formed between the detective division and the legal affairs division.
Investigative officers and beat officers form a hierarchical relationship to take on
investigation tasks. A special position is the leader(s) —usually the deputy chief—sin
charge of the detective division or the legal affairs division or both, who plays an
important role in the evidence collection situation as the de facto authoritative source.
Id. at 41.
Parties involved in cases, namely, witnesses, victims, suspects and the third-party sometimes hold positions in
evidence collection situations as supervisors. But most of the time, they are just “objects” affected by investigative
actions.
205
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Potential Outcomes
Each action or a set of actions is taken by participants to achieve particular
outcomes. Three components make up those that individuals value as outcomes: the
physical results produced by a chain of actions; the material rewards or costs assigned
by payoff rules; and the valuation that participants place on the physical results and
the material rewards. The participants are frequently assumed to make self-conscious
decisions on whether to affect a particular result.207
In the investigation and evidence collection situation, the common desired
outcome of key participants, namely, the investigative officers and the legal reviewers,
is to collect evidence and produce qualified dossiers accepted by prosecutors.
However, the outcomes desired by the investigative officers are slightly different
from those desired by the legal reviewers. The former anticipate the result of a chain
of their actions to be qualified as acceptable materials by the legal reviewers, and the
latter expect the materials accepted by prosecutors. In addition to the physical results,
the net level of benefits or costs will be assigned to participants in the process, such as
time, efforts, funding, bonus, promotion, and honors. Moreover, the investigative
officers or the legal reviewers have internal valuation into the quality of dossiers and
the corresponding benefits or costs.
Actions
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In an action situation, participants have to choose from a set of actions that will
produce a particular outcome at any stage in a decision process. The specific action
selected is called a choice. Both overt acts and the choice not to act are included in the
term “action.”208 There is a linkage of an action to outcome(s) because when a human
actor takes a positive action to change control variables, a result of some physical
process (state variables) may also be changed. The linkages of actions to outcomes
have three types: certainty, risk, and uncertainty. A certain linkage refers to every
action being linked with one and only one outcome. A risky linkage refers to the
probabilities of actions that lead to known outcomes (e.g. a roulette wheel). Lastly,
uncertain linkage refers to that the probabilities of actions that lead to unknown
outcomes (e.g. the Nash equilibrium).209
The types of actions that investigative officers and legal reviewers can take in the
evidence collection situation are vast. For instance, an investigative officer can decide
whether to add a piece of evidentiary material into the dossier. A legal reviewer can
choose to transfer a dossier that appears acceptable to sequent proceedings, ask
investigative officers to get a post hoc warrant, or modify the language in the
documents and resubmit the dossier lest loopholes in the dossier are discovered by
others in sequent proceedings.
Although the number of single acts seems endless in the evidence collection
situation, this study classifies the actions into three basic categories according to the
level of compliance: actions non-compliant with laws and norms, actions compliant
208
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formally with laws and norms, and actions compliant both formally and substantively
with laws and norms. Based on the extent of discretion, the actions can also be
divided into actions with full discretion, collective strategy, or the rigid enforcement
of regulations.
In general—the actions regardless of the level of compliance or the degree of
discretion—in the evidence collection situation will likely lead to certain outcomes, no
matter which are pursued or not pursued by the laws and norms. Nonetheless,
exceptions to certainty exist. The investigative officers sometimes make their
decisions based on whether or how to produce a piece of evidentiary material by
taking into account of the decisions of “strategic others,” 210 usually the legal
reviewers. Consequently, the probabilities of investigative officers’ actions leading to
particular outcomes are unknowable.
Control
A participant has control over the linkage, but the extent of this control can vary
from absolute to almost zero. At the same time, the conditional probability of a
change (chance of affecting an outcome) is greater than zero and less than one.
Therefore, the “power” of an individual in a situation is the value of the opportunity
times the extent of control. “Consequently, individuals may differ in the amount of
power they have in the situation.”211
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The public security organs assign different decision-making authority to different
positions in the evidence collection situation, which represents the official version of
control. However, if the authority were reassigned—as this study reveals—for
example, the legal reviewers kept the personal stamp of the chief and used it to
approve decisions, the power of the legal reviewers affecting the outcomes in the
situation is extended (See detailed discussion in Chapter 12, A. d.).
Information
Participants in an action situation may have access to information about the
action. The information may be complete or incomplete. If participants could know
the full structure of an action situation, namely, the number of other participants, the
outcomes, the actions available, the linkage of actions to outcomes, the information
available to other participants, and the payoffs, they would have access to complete
information. When information is incomplete, the question of who knows what at
what nodes becomes crucial. Usually how much one participant contributes to a joint
undertaking is difficult for other participants to judge with incomplete information,
which may stimulate the emergence of opportunism. Opportunism further compounds
the problem of incomplete information. Both complete information and incomplete
information are assumptions by analysts.212
The investigative officers and the legal reviewers, as key actors in the evidence
collection situation, are assumed to know the full structure of the situation in a formal
manner; in other words, laws and norms are built on the assumption that the key
212
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actors have access to complete information. However, the empirical findings of this
study (as analysis in a less formal manner) already revealed that the participants have
access to incomplete information. The channels of communication between the key
actors and other participants (prosecutors and defense lawyers, etc.), and between the
investigative officers and the legal reviewers, are a little disorganized. Furthermore,
due to the limitations of human cognitive abilities, the complexity of rules, and the
ambiguity of norms, key actors have impaired access to certain kinds of regulations or,
at least, have obstacles to understanding them clearly.
Costs and Benefits
As to the physical actions and outcomes discussed in the section of outcomes and
actions, in theoretical models, it is assumed that acts are costly and outcomes are
beneficial. Apart from the physical actions and outcomes, external rewards (financial
returns) and/or sanctions (taxes or fines) may be distributed among participants for
the achievement of an outcome. “Extrinsic benefits and costs are frequently assigned
through the operation of a rule system and thus do not rely on biophysical
processes.” 213 In addition, individuals may assign a subjective intrinsic value to
actions or outcomes. The intrinsic value may be positive or negative, with forms such
as joy, shame, regret, and guilt. Different participants in the same situation may not
hold the same internal valuation to an outcome.
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Costs and benefits specific to the evidence collection situation include, but are
not limited to, time and efforts spent on work (since acts are costly), the extrinsic
evaluation on the working performance that is related to bonus and promotion, and
the internal valuation investigative officers and legal reviewers assign to their own
actions. A problem worth noticing in costs and benefits is that a formality outcome is
not commonly considered as a severe violation of regulations in the key participants’
internal valuation system.
In sum, the discussion of the elements has depicted the basic structure of the
evidence collection situation. To identify this conceptual unit “that can be utilized to
analyze, predict, and explain behavior within institutional arrangements”215 is the
first step in analyzing a problem. “Then one asks how boundedly rational, fallible but
adaptive individuals would interact in that situation over time.”216 Therefore, Chapter
11 has paved the way to further exploration of the extrinsic variables affecting the
evidence collection situation, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 12 Rules
Action arenas in the IAD framework are subject to underlying variables that
affect the structure of the arenas themselves, such as rules used by the participants to
order their relationships, states of the world and their transformations, and the nature
of the community within which any particular arena is placed.217 A rule configuration
affects all of the elements of an action situation, the biophysical and material world
affects some of the elements,218 and the attributes of the community, including the
values of behavior, the level of common understanding, the extent of homogeneity in
the preferences of those living in a community, etc., affect the structure of
situations.219
The focus of this chapter is the rules that shape incentives in the evidence
collection situation. The standardization law enforcement reform represents changes
in rules, and the effects of these changes on the structure of a situation are the central
concern of institutional analysis. For the reformers who want to change negative
outcomes in the evidence collection situation, changes in the rules may be easier or
more stable than changes in the biophysical world or attributes of the community.220
Due to the vast scope of the biophysical and material world, for simplicity, this study
does not plan to discuss it in detail. However, attributes of the community are worth
mentioning. The attributes of the police community, for example, have strong effects
on the evidence collection situation due to particularity and homogeneity of police
217
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culture.221 This study addresses a few of the crucial police community attributes in
Chapter 13.
As to the rules that are “the result of implicit or explicit efforts to achieve order
and predictability among humans by creating classes of persons (positions) that are
then required, permitted, or forbidden to take classes of actions in relation to required,
permitted, or forbidden states of the world,” 222 the IAD framework stresses
rules-in-use rather than rules-in-form. According to Ostrom, participants generally
apply the rules-in-use, also called the working rules, in the decision-making
process. 223 The rules-in-form, if unknown to participants, do not affect their
behavior.224 By contrast, “working rules are the set of rules to which participants
would make reference if asked to explain and justify their actions to fellow
participants.”225 Based on their cumulative effect on the seven elements of an action
situation, the working rules can be classified into seven basic types.
This chapter concentrates in on rules used in the investigation and evidence
collection situation. It starts with an overview of each of the seven types of concrete
rules and related problems, and delves into some problems relating to the entirety of
the rules.
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A. Seven Rules

1. Position Rules

As the connecting link between participants and authorized actions, the set of
positions is an initial building block of an action situation created by position rules.
Position rules create positions for participants to enter and assign authority to those
positions, which offer the specification of actions that participants can take at specific
nodes in a process.226 The position rules in the evidence collection situation include at
least two categories: (1) the rules that define different positions and the number of
them in the situation, such as how many posts are established for investigative officers,
legal reviewers, line officers, leaders, etc.; and (2) the rules that define the standing of
those posts respectively.
Limited posts
It turns out that the rules setting limits on budgeted posts have aggravated
overloaded police work in the evidence collection situation. Generally, as one of the
sources leading to police pressure, overloaded police work is a worldwide
phenomenon. 227 Nonetheless, it has been more prominent in China during the
transition period. One the one side, it is the budgeted posts in public security organs
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that have long been directly restricted by the central government, so the number of
personnel could hardly increase, and Chinese police are “situated on the bottom of one
of the smaller (per capita) forces in the world.” 228 On the other side, it is the
workloads of police that increase exponentially,229 along with drastic economic and
social development and a more mobile population. The tension between workloads
and resources can be observed in surveyed districts. Most of the police officers there,
either in the detective division, the legal affairs division, or the police stations, work
more than 40 hours a week. Around half of them work 40 to 80 hours; and one-fifth
work more than 80-100 hours. In Section 2 of this chapter, labor shortage and heavy
workloads are discussed in detail, which, in combination, create harsh situations for
participants.
Hierarchical relationship
Authority assigned to different positions has molded hierarchical relationships
among participants in each position. For example, a cooperative and equal relationship
is supposed to be established between investigative officers and legal reviewers.
However, the detective division, conventionally, has a higher ranking on the
hierarchical ladder than the legal affairs division.230 This has made it difficult for
legal reviewers to obtain support and cooperation from investigative officers since the
first day of the standardization reform, which is supposed to be led by legal affairs
divisions. The legal reviewers in District Z criticized investigative officers who
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appeared to be self-righteous and did not take the legal affairs division seriously.
Meanwhile, one of the “self-righteous” investigative officers said to the author “What
do the people in the legal affairs division know? They have only dealt with a few cases
of paperwork.”231
The relationship between legal reviewers and line officers in the investigation
and evidence collection situation is contrary to the relationship between legal
reviewers and investigative officers. It is closer to an ideal relationship between the
supervisor and the supervisee. Although police stations are located at the same
administrative level as the legal affairs division, police stations are generally treated as
the grass-root units in the system of bureaucracy, which makes them more easily
subject to guidance and evaluation from the legal affairs division.
Between investigative officers and line officers responsible for conducting
investigation and evidence collection, a de facto hierarchical relationship has been
formed. The investigative officers with more skills and experience usually guide and
supervise the line officers for investigation and evidence collection either in a formal
or informal way. In addition, the captain of the investigative officers simultaneously
commands the technicians who process crime scenes and do scientific analysis of
physical evidence from a crime scene because the group of technicians is affiliated
with the detective division.
Deputy chief
The most notable position that one of the core participants has is the deputy
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chief in charge of criminal investigation or legal affairs, or both. Unlike the chief,
whose management of overall situations rarely engages one specific situation in detail,
the deputy chief in charge of several divisions often participates directly in the
investigation situation as part of their daily work. He or she needs to sign approval
documents and assume leadership responsibility for the quality of the case.
According to Peter Manning, the style and preference of the leader in the
paternalistic bureaucracy will greatly affect the performance of an organization.232
This is true in the investigation and evidence collection situation. If the leader, namely,
the particular deputy chief, does not understand the criminal investigation or the legal
profession, does not pay attention to standardization requirements, or lacks enough
strength in the micro-power field of the entire organization, the standardization reform
cannot be carried out smoothly. Concerning the phenomenon called the layman guides
the insider, one interviewed officer provided an insightful view: “leaders without
professional knowledge inclined to be bolder. They were ambitious to make political
achievements and ignored the rest. Generally, as long as the suspect was caught, this
kind of leaders was busy in doing nothing but getting publicity.”233 An illustration of
the fact that attention and power of a leader matter is the legal affairs division in
District N, a relatively strong department thanks to the comparatively stronger power
of the deputy chief in charge of the legal affairs division.234
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Whether there are two separate positions of leadership in investigation and legal
affairs also matters. If one deputy is in charge of the detective division and another in
charge of the legal affairs division, there may be mutual supervision and control, but
communication cost is higher. If one deputy is in charge of both divisions, the
communication cost may decrease, but the mutual-constraint strength may
correspondingly drop. The deputy chief in District Z falls into the latter scenario. Once
a dispute occurs between the legal affairs division and the detective division, the
deputy chief in charge of both divisions is often called to coordinate. “Sometimes we
found problems in dossiers and asked them (investigative officers) to change. The
leader was informed immediately, he called and asked us to be more considerate about
the criminal investigation work.”235 Despite the subtle tone and implicit words the
deputy chief used, the legal reviewers begrudgingly let the dossiers pass to avoid
confrontation with their boss. However, since they did not act officially at the behest
of the deputy chief, the legal reviewers had concerns that it would ultimately be
them—rather than the deputy chief—who would be responsible for the quality of the
dossiers.

2. Boundary Rules

Boundary rules are also known as entry and exit rules. The entry rules frequently
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use certain criteria to determine who is eligible to fill a position through a particular
process, and the exit rules determine how an individual may or must leave a
position. 236 One category of boundary rules in the evidence collection situation
defines the eligibility of individuals to be a police officer (Eligibility boundary rules).
Another category of boundary rules defines those define how a police officer can be
qualified as an investigative officer, a technician, or a legal reviewer given that
professionalism has long required investigative officers, technicians, and legal
reviewers to obtain sufficient professional training before taking any of these
positions (Professionalism boundary rules).
Professionalism boundary rules
This study first reveals that the blurring of professionalism boundary rules in the
evidence collection situation contributes to formality-related problems. As shown in
Section 1, most staff work overtime, so many tasks regarding investigation and
evidence collection have to be assigned to both investigative officers and line officers
with inadequate professional training.
The tension specific to the investigative officers is talent loss. The total number
of officers in the detective division in District Z was 42 when surveyed, which had
shrunk from above 60 while the number of criminal cases had remained constant for
many years. Among the 42 officers, there are only 4 full-time investigative officers
with 8 or 9 other officers who temporarily handle cases. The full-time officers have to
deal with more than 180 criminal cases a year, including the severest fatal cases and
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others, such as theft and robbery cases. The inherent stress as an investigative officer
and heavy workloads kept driving talented officers away, and the remaining officers
are too busy and exhausted to add any new steps in the process if they think this step
is unnecessary. The legal reviewer ZXY, who is responsible for fatal cases
investigation in District N, said:
The fatal cases are actually in the best situation, because the configuration of police force is at
least guaranteed due to severity of cases. However, there are still some fatal cases jointly
handled by the investigation division and the police stations. For example, if two fatal cases
occur simultaneously within a month, officers are more likely to be drawn from police stations
to help. Due to already tense workloads at the grassroots level, the officers drawn have
insufficient hours devoted to the investigation. Besides, they have not received adequate
professional training. Therefore, the evidence collected by them is more likely to be
problematic.

To the line officers in police stations, a lack of training may be the last problem
they consider as they have other worries. Taking the on-site inquest as an example,
officers often started it after only a simple half-day training. What concerned them
most was whether they could even get this work done, not whether they could get the
work done correctly. The tension between workload and resources that the line
officers face is much more prominent than that in the detective division, even though
they were handling relatively simple criminal cases. Of the 30 to 40 officers in each
police station in District N, fewer than 10 of them can investigate criminal cases,
even though there are 100 to 200 criminal cases annually. They have to take a series
of other tasks, such as maintaining stability, household registration, public security
management and mediation, and security inspection and supervision, which further
dilutes the already strained resources. Previous research has found that line officers
“are saddled with heavy workloads and reporting requirements that make it difficult
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to focus on tasks they find worthwhile.”237 This setback will reduce morale and
create a lot of perfunctory work.
The police officers in the legal affairs division who review cases also face
insufficient work force. In District N, 8 officers are responsible for reviewing cases
full-time and another 6 officers are responsible for reviewing cases while doing other
tasks concurrently. Those officers together were responsible for more than 2,000
criminal cases and 2,000 administrative cases per year.238 A case in need of being
approved at night is reviewed by only one officer on-duty who usually approves an
average of 20 to 30 cases (including administrative cases) overnight. The number
may reach 100 under extreme circumstances.
In addition to the large number of cases, another factor aggravates the situation
of labor shortage, that is, the public security organ often mobilizes legal personnel to
support in matters such as street patrols, rapid response, and stability maintenance.
Among 10 officers in the legal affairs division in District Z, 7 can participate in case
review, but, according to the author’s observation, there was a week when only the
leader and the deputy of the division were left to review cases while other personnel
were temporarily occupied by jobs in other divisions.
Eligibility boundary rules
This study further reveals that low criteria set by the eligibility boundary rules
lead to recruitment of officers who are incapable of responding to higher normative
requirements. According to an existing empirical study with 670 samples from a
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variety of regions, around just 30% of police officers have a bachelor's degree or
above, and some of them have only been in the law enforcement for a short amount
of time. In the absence of a systematic legal study, most law enforcement officers
rely solely on self-exploration and self-summarization of experience in the process,
which is far from enough in the context of standardization reform. This study pointed
out that, if politicized thinking were used to deal with legal issues, law enforcement
officers without systematic training for legal thinking would inevitably harm the
ability of law enforcement.239
Even in District N, where the standardization performance is eye-catching,
investigative officers lack adequate professionalism to some extent. One
manifestation is that some of them conduct evidence collection in an inflexible
manner. Once they make judgmental errors, their actions will likely result in
problems with the validity of the evidence collected or miss the best collection
opportunity. For instance, in the context of emphasizing the importance of a trial that
asks for persuasive evidence, legal reviewers require investigators to pay attention to
collecting physical evidence such as video recordings. This request means that
investigative officers have to complete a series of normative requirements, which are
burdensome and badly designed on the one side and not under strict scrutiny on the
other side. Therefore, investigative officers often simply ignore the collection of
objective evidence when collecting evidence.
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From a reciprocity perspective, the requirements set for participants frequently
succumb to the pressure of human resources. Due to labor shortage, the practice
tends to lower the standard of eligibility or professionalism boundary rules to include
more participants. Less-qualified participants, nonetheless, cannot substantively
change the situation of labor shortage; rather, they may bring problems to evidence
quality due to their incapacity or inexperience. One technician in District D showed
his helplessness by saying:
We surely know that on-site inquest is formally conducted without any
practical effect. But what should we do under current circumstances? The
on-site inquest rate regarding burglary has to reach 100% by the normative
requirement, and the rate for other cases is set to 80%. Where on earth can
we find so many officers to appear in the field? So the on-site inquest has to
turn out perfunctory.240

3. Choice Rules

Choice rules specify the actions that participants occupying a position must,
must not, or may do at a point in a decision process.241 “By widening or narrowing
the range of actions assigned to participants, choice rules affect the basic rights,
duties, liberties, and exposures of members and the related distribution of these to
all.”242 Choice rules in the investigation and evidence collection situation define
what core participants, namely, investigative officers (line officers and technicians
who have similar tasks included) and legal reviewers must, must not, and may do.
240
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Examples seem endless, including: the investigative officers must bring suspects
back to the monitored interrogation room and question the suspects there; during the
interrogation, questions and answers must be recorded by one of the two
investigative officers present; the legal reviewers must review all evidence at hand
before approving243 the decision of criminal detention or arrest or for a variety of
warrants; and they must complete the review within certain time limits; and so on.
Discretion
The choice rules in the studied situation basically succeed in assigning positions
with suitable control over the selection of an action, and issues in the field of choice
rules relating to formality are mostly associated with what participants “may” do.
The police generally enjoy extensive discretion within the scope of authorization.
Many of the non-compliance issues emerge from discretionary territories where core
participants, especially investigative officers, operate. In each specific situation, the
investigative officers have multiple options from which they can freely choose. For
example, the investigative officer must obtain a confession from the suspect, but they
can choose to formally interrogate the suspect promptly after the suspect is caught or
to wait for a short period of time in order to conduct an informal interrogation. For
obtaining physical evidence from the suspect, the investigative officer can choose to
use either personal inspection or a search method. Materials owned by a third party
may be either “acquired” or “detained.” When the suspect requests a lawyer, the
investigative officers can either send the notice immediately or temporize.
The procedure is supposed to be that legal reviewers sign on the petition for approval to show they have agreed
to submit the petition to the leader who has authority to decide. In practice, given that the legal reviewers have the
leader’s stamp, it is the legal reviewers who actually decide the approval.
243
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Discretion opens the gate of noncompliance in substance. Despite being a
common and inevitable practice in the decision-making process of administration,
discretion is salient in the field of policing. A concept called “commonsense theory
of policing” provides an insight that all decisions are made situationally based on
common sense and discretion, instead of an abstract theory of policing, the law or
internal police regulations. 244 Furthermore, discretion in the investigation and
evidence collection situation is contrary to the situation in most other administrative
bureaucracies because it increases as one moves down the hierarchy due to the low
visibility-information control nexus.
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That means that the participants’

discretionary decisions remain unknown to outside reviewers or even other
organizational members. Consequently, as Richard Ericson has pointed out, in order
to “meet their interests with minimal strain,”246 detectives constantly search for and
employ rules—both substantive law and procedural law—that allow them to rule and
control their working environment, such as simplifying complex situations and
routinizing potentially unusual situations.247 The corresponding manifestations of
Ericson’s theory in the evidence collection situation are the informal interrogation
practice, the abuse of investigative measures, such as personal inspection and
evidence acquisition, and the delay of notifying defense.
Collective strategies
Discretion only depicts a partial picture because it takes a back seat whenever
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strategies take over. Relatively fixed behavioral patterns almost always form within a
collective group. Ostrom calls this “complete specification of the moves to be taken
in all possible contingencies in a one-shot or repeated game”248 a strategy. Even if
an officer enjoys full discretion, it does not mean that one acts at one’s own will
without any boundaries, limitations, or guidelines. According to Ericson’s study,
discretion is organizationally circumscribed and constrained. “The vast majority of
strategies employed and decisions made are neither creative nor original because
they are derived from the available stock of recipe knowledge about rule usage and
accounting practices.”
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The empirical analysis of this dissertation found that strategies shared among
core participants are the underlying factor determining discretionary behaviors. It
turned out that most discretionary behaviors in the investigation and evidence
collection situation did not have a large differentiation among various participants.
The investigative officers all tended to catch suspects by force rather than
subpoenaing suspects placed suspects in the case-handling agency rather than the
detention center and many of them copied and pasted the interrogation transcript.
Legal reviewers uniformly extended the detention period as long as they saw eligible
cases and turned a blind eye towards post hoc warrants. Inference drawn from the
above empirical findings seems obvious: collective strategies in the operation rather
than pure individual discretion tend to dominate the process.
It is worth mentioning that, although collective strategies can restrain officers’
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discretion to some extent—which is especially valuable in the situation where
discretion is not well controlled by the legislation—the strategies have at least one
negative impact on individual officers; they may dilute the individual’s perception of
their own responsibilities. The apparent reason is that the law has not punished
numerous offenders. The dilution of responsibility can explain why most police
officers are not aware of faults and misuses in their evidence collection routines or
case reviewing operations. Even if some officers privately admitted that some of
their practices were legally flawed, they did not take most of those flaws seriously.

4. Aggregation Rules

When choice rules assign different control to different positions, aggregation
rules determine who will participate in a choice at a decision node, how much weight
each participant will have, and how to add up the contribution of each participant’s
decision to a final choice about the action. When multiple positions are assigned
partial control over an action, aggregation rules are necessary.250 In the investigation
and evidence collection situation, different levels of decision-making authority are
assigned to different positions. Some positions have partial control over one action.
For example, the legal reviewers who review a case, the leader of the legal affairs
division, the deputy chief, and the chief share control over whether a specific warrant
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can be issued.
In fact, the supposedly multilateral aggregation rules are virtually reconstructed
in practice, becoming a unilateral one that could contribute to failure of internal
supervision and indirectly lead to formality issues. In concrete situations such as the
warrant approval or case reviewing situation, the decision-making process
determining whether a warrant can be issued or whether a case can be transferred
includes an initial review by a legal reviewer, a second review by a senior legal
reviewer or a division head, an approval from the deputy chief, and, lastly, a
signature by the chief. Given that personal stamps of the deputy chief and the chief,
as well as related digital certificates, used in each step of the computer system are in
the hands of on-duty legal reviewers, it is usually the people in the legal affairs
division who actually make decisions, unless the leaders give an order or implication
otherwise.
To be sure, legal reviewers’ total control in the decision-making process does
not guarantee that they are able to make correct decisions. Low visibility in
knowledge and information flow, inherent defects of post hoc text reviews, and
mixtures of interests could undermine legal reviewers’ abilities to make correct
judgments. First, investigation and evidence collection behaviors are run in enclosed
environments that legal reviewers, in the absence of adequate information and direct
experience, may find it difficult and costly to question the case-handling process that
they easily become rubber stamps.251
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Moreover, the case quality assessment as a post hoc method lacks capacity to
change what has already formed. When the legal reviewers are involved in the case
reviewing process, most evidence materials have been obtained and legal procedures
have been completed. After finding problems, legal reviewers are supposed to
remand the dossiers to the supervised investigative officers for further investigation
or evidence collection. Sometimes, however, remand is not an option due to the
impossibility of tying up loose ends after temporal and spatial changes or due to
investigative officers’ passive attitudes. In order to transfer the dossier successfully to
the procuratorate, in which the interests of the legal affairs division lie, legal
reviewers have to “reprocess” materials by themselves to make the dossier look as
good as possible.
Ultimately, the decentralization of the decision-making power set by the
aggregation rules in books becomes meaningless. The aggregation rules in practice
just make the decision-making process more troublesome without genuinely putting
it under control. In addition, total control in the decision-making process may invite
the possibility of misuse of power. With this unsupervised approving authority, legal
reviewers could save themselves trouble by letting dossiers pass, even if they think
the dossiers are actually below the criteria of qualification.
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5. Information Rules

The information about the overall structure of a situation, the current state of
individual state variables, and the previous and current moves of other related
participants252 are all important parts of any situation. The level of information
availability to participants is affected by information rules that authorize channels of
information flow among participants, determine the scope of communication,
regulate the frequency of exchange of information and the accuracy of information
and specify the language and form in which communication will take place. 253 In
terms of information rules in the investigation and evidence collection situation, the
current empirical analysis reveals some problematic issues.
First, channels of information flow are sometimes impeded due to structural
separation in the bureaucratic system and the key “positional advantage” the police
department as a whole has254 in comparison to other external organizations. The
overall structure of the investigation and evidence collection situation is complicated,
involving a variety of organizations within and outside the police department. The
information flow between team members runs smoothly, of course. The information
flow between two internal divisions is more likely to encounter obstacles, but it is

Because information about participants’ past moves are important to other participants for telling who is
trustworthy.
253 ELINOR OSTROM, supra note 192, at 206.
254 “Because these (external) organizations are dependent upon the police for accounts of what happened in
‘criminal’ events. Indeed, because the processes by which the police produce their accounts are not visible to the
other agencies…” RICHARD V. ERICSON, supra note 94, at 17.
252
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still far from being disrupted. By contrast, the channel of information flow between
the police department as a whole and the procuratorate is disrupted to some degree.
The prosecutors at the core of the supervision of an investigation solely rely on
dossiers to understand cases, as well as the process of making cases. The existing
laws in China do not require judicial review on police activities through a warrant
approval process, which excludes courts from checking investigation and evidence
collection behaviors, and defense lawyers have no opportunity to monitor the
investigation through participating in investigation. 255 Prosecutors and only
prosecutors can supervise investigative activities through issuing arrest warrants and
reviewing cases transferred for prosecution. Unfortunately, in the context where
dossiers play a pivotal role in the assembly-line mode, prosecutors can neither go
thoroughly into interrogations nor get involved in major investigative measures such
as search, seizure, or surveillance. The most convenient method—or rather the only
method—they have to gather information is to read dossiers transferred to them. In
other words, prosecutors are highly dependent upon the police for what happened
during the process, but the police merely provide the prosecutor with filtered facts
that have good appearance.
Participants’ recognition and conditions also hinder interdepartmental
information exchange. The participants in the early stage of the case-handling
assembly line do not need responsive information from those in later stages. The
police have long ignored whether the suspect is successfully prosecuted or convicted,
Liu Jihua (刘计划), Zhencha Jiandu Zhidu de Zhongguo Moshi jiqi Gaige (侦查监督制度的中国模式及其改
革) [The Chinese Model of Investigation and Supervision System and Its Reform], 1 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法
学), 245 (2014).
255
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because the mark of success is to “crack a case”256 rather than to win a case. In
addition, since the litigation period is generally long, using the result of one case as
one of assessment indicators for investigation work is not timely enough.
Foreseeable operational difficulties also occur when interdepartmental coordination
is not well established.
Second, few institutionalized information rules regulate scope, frequency, and
accuracy of communication among internal divisions. In the surveyed districts, one
basic means of communication that is close to a formal rule is a weekly meeting held
by each division respectively. The meeting provides individual officers, in an
arbitrary style, with some current state variables information, such as the current
tasks of the division, progress already made, resources at hand, individual or
departmental status in the performance evaluation system, new requirements set by
laws or norms and response recommended by experts in the division, etc.
Information on the previous and current moves of other related participants is shared
as well. In contrast to the weekly meeting within a division, meetings among
different divisions are not held regularly. Communication between participants in
two divisions is usually by phone, but is sometimes through face-to-face talks.
In general, arbitrary rules concerning information exchange give participants
more flexibility and less trouble. As the entire criminal justice system has been
fraught with complaints about heavy workloads, participants could readily take
advantage of the arbitrary rules to reject more process recordings and more
See Liu Huanyin (刘怀印), Jin Linshan (敬林山), Sanci Qiangzheng: Sharenfan bei Wuzui shifang (三次强震:
‘杀人犯’被无罪释放) [Three Shocks: ‘Murderer’ was aquitted], 7 JIANCHA FENGYU (检察风云), (2003).
256
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disclosure paperwork inherently requested by institutionalized information rules.
However, some negative outcomes are still very likely to emerge in absence of
institutionalized information rules that regulate communication.
Firstly, the dossier, as an official information carrier becomes so prevalent that
participants cannot help relying heavily on it. Without other kinds of police reports,
what is recorded in the dossier is the final version of the investigation and evidence
collection process. If the recording in the dossier is tampered with or polished, there
is no other official source of information that can corroborate or refute it.
Furthermore, the participants at the early stage of the assembly line lack
sufficient information concerning the litigation result of a case in subsequent
proceedings as feedback, so it is understandable that they tend to overlook errors and
problems in their investigation and evidence collection behaviors, let alone make
corrections in the future.
Lastly, if participants have no place to assess other participants’ trustworthiness,
they have to confine their trust within a small group. On the one hand, this reinforces
the influence of a small group, like an investigative team, on individuals and molds
the behaviors of individuals with collective strategies. On the other hand, this will
inevitably deepen the gap between divisions and increase the cost of communication
among divisions.
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6. Payoff Rules

Payoff rules determine external rewards or costs assigned to particular actions.
They are a set of rules in an action situation that directly affect the costs and benefits
of actions or outcomes for participants. An example of a payoff rule is assigning
salaries according to length of time spent on work or quantity of piecework.257
Payoff rules and a variety of payoff consequences—which are tied to boundary,
information, choice, and scope rules—can shape costs and benefits.258 Since the
police receive fixed salaries based on their ranks and positions, there are few direct
rules assigning external rewards or costs to a concrete action.
The lone exception is the veto system, which sanctions the most serious
violations. A veto means that in any case where a serious violation of the rules occurs,
all the other work this officer did for the entire year would be treated as unqualified.
Departments at each level of the organization responsible for this serious violation
would be sanctioned, too. Behaviors that seriously violate the rules are enumerated.
The performance evaluation on interrogation is an illustration. Illegal as well as legal
but non-compliant behaviors in interrogation can be divided into two categories. First,
if a behavior is enumerated on the list of serious violations of the law, such as
“causing serious injuries or deaths,” it triggers the veto. In comparison, a less serious
violation like the formality issues mentioned in previous chapters is dealt with by the
257
258
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grading system (discussed in the next section).
Given the presumption that any normal investigative officers in interrogation
would never torture suspects to vent their own anger, most means used in the
interrogation, regardless of their legal status, serve the purpose of constructing a case.
The meaning of the veto system is to draw the bottom line for investigative behaviors
for constructing a case. “The red line cannot be stepped on.”259 Investigators must
avoid—or at least pretend to avoid—serious violations of rules during operation. In
the meantime, less serious non-compliant behaviors or deviations are not likely to
attract the attention of case handlers due to the intrinsic difficulty of process control
and the relatively insignificant post hoc text review.

7. Scope Rules

Scope rules focus on an outcome rather than an action and affect action sets
through their effect on outcome variables.260 Via scope rules, the regulation’s goal
can be incorporated into the language of the rule, “specifying the desired level of
performance and allowing the targets of regulation to achieve that level.”261 Despite
general difficulty in evaluating police work due to its special features in the field of
policing,262 as an integral part of any well-managed organization, evaluation of
SZDD02.
ELINOR OSTROM, supra note 192, at 208.
261 Coglianese, C., Nash, J. and Olmstead, T., 2003. Performance-based regulation: Prospects and limitations in
health, safety, and environmental protection. Admin. L. Rev., 55, p.706.
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The concept of a “dark figure” of crime projects the difficulties in evaluating police work. The police cannot
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employee’s performance is also found in police departments.263 One reason for the
crucial role performance evaluation plays is because, according to Peter Manning,
the meanings of “self” and organizational “goal” can never be considered separately
when developing managerial policies or understanding the lower participants.264
Thereby the performance evaluation system runs as a bridge binding individuals’
interests with organizational goals in the context where direct influence of laws and
norms on participants’ behaviors is limited. The performance evaluation system
absorbs requirements of laws, regulations, and norms, synthesizes them with rules of
thumb on the basis of local realities, and finally establishes a set of indicators that
reward compliance and sanction non-compliance.
The clearance rate has been widely used as an evaluation indicator, whether in
China 265 where the administration plays a dominant role or in common law
countries where democratic style of evaluation has a greater impact on police
agencies. Regardless of its controversy, some scholars believe that the clearance rate
is effective to reflect the performance of the case-handling personnel.266
In comparison to relatively scattered police work evaluation in the United
States, 267 the assembly line mode of the case-handling system in China has
cultivated a more prevalent and longer-lasting performance evaluation system that
includes various kinds of clearance rates as vital indicators with which to judge
if their service is effective and efficient is hard or even impossible to verify, given that “we shall never know the
total volume of things ‘out there’ that could be made into crimes.” RICHARD V. ERICSON, supra note 94, at 8.
263 Assessment of police’s job performance is also a common practice in the U.S. see Samuel Walker, Charles M.
Katz: The Police in America: An Introduction, McGraw Hill Education 9th Edition, 194-195.
264 PETER K. MANNING, supra note 232, at 130.
265 For example, the task of cracking cases explicitly or implicitly relates to the clearance rate.
266
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, supra note 190, at 149-150.
267 The Police in America: An Introduction, McGraw Hill Education 9th Edition, 195.
223

officers’ actions. 268 Almost all working requirements are organized in the
performance evaluation system, imposing a certain portion of points on different
tasks and actions. Through adding points or deducting points, officers’ performance
regarding certain work can be assessed positively or negatively. Then, assessment
results are used as the most important annual evaluative criteria for groups or
individuals. The performance evaluation system has replaced laws and regulations on
the books and has been treated as one of the most important guidelines in practice by
participants at different stages in the Chinese criminal justice system. 269 Some
surveyed officers in the two districts thought that the function of the performance
evaluation system in daily work could not be emphasized enough for it is the most
important set of application rules in practice.
Indeed, the performance evaluation system treated as guidelines in practice has
direct impacts on the decision-making process before participants take any actions,
and some of its features may lead to issues related to the formality issues.
Unreasonably designed grading system
The grading system has inclusiveness that is able to easily apply to all tasks, and
its flexibility allows the current important and urgent work to be highlighted through
a mechanism of score allotment. An analysis of the content and score setting of the
assessment system may provide insights into possible behaviors or performance of a
rational person under this most important application rules system.

See Min Fengjin (闵丰锦), Shuzi Youxi de Zhongjie: Pibulv Kaohe zhi Quxiao Yanjiu (‘数字游戏’的终结：批
捕率考核之取消研究) [End of the Game of Figures: Research on Cancellation of Arrest Rate], 4 ZHONGGUO
RENMIN GONG’AN DAXUE XUEBAO (中国人民公安大学学报), (2015).
269 RICHARD V. ERICSON, supra note 94, at 41-67.
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Taking the grading system in Z police department in 2017 as an example, a total
score of 130 points is used to evaluate annual work done by a police station, which is
allotted to indicators that can be further subdivided into first-level, second-level, and
third-level. For each first-level indicator, a specific division takes the lead in
formulating concrete assessment rules. The first-level indicators relevant to the
investigation and evidence collection situation are the crime strikes (12 points) led by
the Criminal Investigation Division and the legal work (8 points) led by the Legal
Affairs Division (details see the table below).
Table: 2017 District Z Police Station Performance Evaluation Form (partial indication)
First- Lead
level division
Crime CID
strikes
(12
points)

Second-level

Third-level

Strike
(clearance)
Forensics

The number of targets for the transfer of prosecutions: deduct 0.1 point for each one less than the
number, and add 0.05 point for each additional person.
1. Fingerprint and DNA: Fingerprints and DNA must be collected from All suspects. Deduct 0.1
point for each one missing.
2. On-site inquest: the on-site inquest rate for criminal cases has to reach 100%, deduct 0.1 point
for each case without on-site inquest.
3. Rate of physical evidence extraction has to reach 80% of the filing criminal cases, deduct 0.1
point if not. If effective rate of physical evidence extraction (means help identify suspects) reaches 10%,
20%, and 50% respectively for the police stations at three different levels, add 0.05 point. If physical
evidence helps crack a case with the suspect in custody, add 0.05 point for each case.
1. SIM card collection: deduct 0.1 point for each one less than the number, and add 0.02 point for
each additional one.
2. The cross-regional case-solving platform: ranks in the number of published information. The
first to the fifth are not deducted. The sixth is deducted 0.05 points, the seventh is deducted 0.1 points,
and so on. If information is not replied in time, deduct 0.2 points each time.
3. Information of stolen or robbed cars: deduct 0.2 point for each delayed input, deduct 0.4 point
for a missing input.
4. In telecommunications fraud cases, deduct 0.3 points if paying in one case should be stopped
but not.
Each capture of a fugitive within the district, or a fugitive without the district, or a fugitive from another
city, or a fugitive from another province leads to additon of 0.03 point, 0.05 point, 0.08 point, and 0.2
point respectively.
Each conviction of gangster crimes leads to addition of 0.2 point (the judgment is needed).
Each prosecution leads to addition of 0.2 point.
Being discovered or pointed by the procuratorate and confirmed by the legal affairs division, each case
that is supposed to file but not leads to deduction of 0.05 point.
1. On the basis of the annual report of the procuratorate, each case not prosecuted due to
insufficient evidence or no criminal facts leads to deduction of 0.05 point.
2. Case quality: select some cases in the computer system quarterly, grade the quality and convert
them into 2 point annually.
1. Case relevant property does not be recorded online, each discovery leads to deduction of 0.05
point.
2. The management or use of the police law enforcement recorder is not standardized, and each
discovery leads to deduction of 0.05 point.
3. Other law enforcement standardization constructions are officially criticized by the provincial,
municipal, and sub-bureaus, each deducting 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1 point.

Information and
intelligence

Fugitive

Legal LAD
work
(8
points)

Gangster
Gun crime
Filing
Quality of case

Standardization

The table above uncovers problems in the grading system that may potentially
lead to formality issues. First, the current design of the grading system gives more
weight on completion of a task than completion of the task with quality guaranteed.
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When a police station makes work arrangements, it is very likely to grant priority to
work that can be quantified (the production of statistics), such as the number of cases
cracked. Because quantifiable indicators must be completed, there is no room for
negotiation otherwise. Given the strong incentive of cracking a case, investigative
officers may value obtaining confessions much more than protecting suspects’ rights,
and they are more concerned with gathering evidence rather than respecting
individuals’ privacy. This inclination provides fertile soil for many formality issues to
grow with regard to interrogation, search, seizure, etc.
By contrast, case quality is a flexible and insignificant indicator that can only
affect results in two scenarios. One is that the case is not prosecuted due to
insufficient evidence or lack of criminal facts. The number of such cases in practice
is extremely small. For instance, District Z has about ten unprosecuted cases a year
because only an absolutely unqualified case can trigger a decision not to prosecute
rather than a case with some defects. Furthermore, even if such a rare scenario were
to occur, only 0.05 points would be deducted. In comparison 0.1 points would be
deducted for an unfinished crime-striking task. The other scenario is quarterly
reviews of case quality, which takes up 2 points of the entire 130-point grading
system. Every three months, the legal affairs division selects and evaluates a certain
number of dossiers according to a set of complicated evaluation rules (52 pieces).
Quarterly earnings are calculated into final scores. In a sense, it is one of the most
important tools for the legal affairs division to control the quality of the dossier, but
its importance in the overall work is negligible from the perspective of the tiny
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proportion of scores.
Second, the indicators concerning criminal technology are not well designed
with reason. The rate of on-site inquests is required to reach 100%, and physical
evidence extraction has to cover 80% of criminal cases. Although the original
intention of setting such indicators is easy to guess, that is, to promote the collection
of physical evidence, the reasonability of the lines drawn is questionable. As
mentioned in previous chapters, the requirement of a 100% on-site inquest rate has
caused great trouble to investigative officers. Moreover, the rate of effective physical
evidence extraction has to reach 10%, 20%, and 50%, respectively, depending on the
type of police station. The arbitrariness within this indicator can be easily
perceived. 270 Simplified into a percentage, this indicator prompts investigative
officers to focus on unnecessary concerns when collecting evidence. Their focus may
be shifted from detecting and constructing the case to considering whether certain
actions would help them complete assessment goals.
Distorted enforcement
As mentioned above, the quarterly review of case quality, as an essential way of
evaluating the standardization level of dossiers, takes up only 2 points out of a total
of 130 points. The already minor importance of the case quality review could be
further undermined by the fact that reviewers tend to superficially enforce the review
process. When conducting a quarterly review, the legal reviewers in District Z
selected cases with relatively high quality from the database, according to their

A piece of physical evidence can be used to identify suspects, but it is affected by many factors that cannot be
controlled by investigative officers.
270
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memories. Line officers were requested to report cases that they thought were being
handled well. The entire review process changed from a random check to a
well-prepared performance where the real wrestling is the relationship between
departments and individual officers. In addition, it was difficult to expect that the
reviewers who had approved the cases before would make self-denial judgments in
the quarterly review. Even if a case was not handled by the same reviewer, some
other colleagues in the office must do it. “When evaluating, we always consider the
feelings of the people who have reviewed the case before. We work together every
day, and we have to give each other necessary respect.”271
Inadequate incentives
Under certain conditions, legal reviewers circulate a notification within the
police department to keep officers aware of problems during work. However, the
notification method has little effect on changing officers’ poor performance in the
absence of substantive punishments. The case quality report in District Z shows that
some formality issues revealed in this study have long been detected by the legal
affairs division, and officers have been repeatedly notified of these issues. The reason
why these problems have not been corrected, according to the legal reviewer
interviewed, is that the quality control of the case has no substantive binding on
investigative officers. “For case handling divisions, the notifications do not affect the
overall work evaluation. Some divisions that have nothing to lose do not care about
criticism. Gradually, we all feel that this kind of notification does not make any
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sense.”272
For the divisions and individuals with good performance, the benefits of the
performance evaluation are also few. A study has pointed out that the U.S. police's
job evaluation is a “punishment-based” evaluation system without incentives for
excellent performance.273 The Chinese police performance evaluation shares similar
problems. Absent supporting measures that can directly link outstanding performance
of participants to interests of the department or their own personal interest (honor,
year-end award, promotion, etc.), the performance evaluation system fails to
influence behaviors effectively.
Taking salaries as an example, the performance evaluation has set up a
complicated system, and even if this system were run justly—which is not the
case—the final result has a limited impact on the participants’ income level. The
officers in a department that earns the highest scores can get several hundred yuan
more in annual bonuses than those in a department with poor performance. Taking
promotion as another example, the influencing factors for promotion are far more
complicated than those of salaries. The performance reflected in the evaluation
system is just one factor and may not be the most important one. Investigative
officers believed that good performance in the standardization reform did not bring
obvious benefits in promotion. “I’d better do good publicity. If I cracked a big case
and leaders knew it, I might immediately get an opportunity of being rewarded or
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promoted.” 274 This phenomenon occurs partly because some leaders are not
professional and may be satisfied with results as long as publicity is done well, and
partly because the leaders themselves need to put something on the table, for the sake
of their own promotion. Whether or not evidence collection is done according to the
standardization requirements is hidden work, difficult to be viewed from the outside
world, so the leaders do not pay much attention.

B. Legislative Deficiencies
From an overall perspective, some problematic working rules derive from
legislative deficiencies including conflicts among rules and absence of the
“otherwise” clause. The empirical study of this dissertation revealed conflicted rules,
which can be corroborated by existing research. It has been pointed out that the
current administrative department or legislature has insufficient understanding of the
actual situation of grassroots public security work to formulate normative documents.
Of the police who were interviewed in that study, 32% considered “the conflicts and
inconsistencies between laws, regulations and rules” to be the most serious problem,
43% thought the rules had weak operability, and 25% criticized “legislative
imperfections.”275
Apart from the conflicts of rules, another deficiency in rule-designing system
plays a crucial role in formality; that is, the lack of penalty clauses in the normative
rules of standardization reform. In other words, the normative rules do not specify
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what punitive consequences participants should take if they do not comply with those
rules. Without “otherwise” clauses, there is a gradual loss of enforcement strength
from the Ministry of Public Security to the grassroots police stations.276
An illustrative example is one that has been discussed in previous chapters, that
is, to record the entire interrogation process. Article 121 of the Criminal Procedure
Law lacks the “otherwise” clause with regard to audio and video recordings. Article
24 of the Regulations for Video Recording on Interrogation of Criminal Suspects by
Public Security Organs (RVRICS) mentioned several types of liability: failing to
record audio and video as required, which results in the exclusion of evidence;
content of the recorded video that is seriously inconsistent with transcripts and
thereby affects evidence ability; splicing and deleting footage; failing to keep data in
accordance with regulations that results in data damage, loss, or disclosure; privately
or illegally collecting, using, or disclosing information thereby affecting the handling
of cases or infringing on the legitimate rights and interests of the parties; and others.
Analysis shows that each liability is consequence-driven. The high threshold makes it
almost impossible to hold individual police officers or the department accountable.
Only if related evidence is excluded does failure to make video recordings become
punishable; difference between transcripts and video contents has to be as significant
as damaging evidence ability, etc.
Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that the core participants would use such
regulations as the standard to guide their daily interrogation recording and video
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recording work, and it is easy to understand the resistance encountered in
interrogation recordings in practice.

C. Involution
The standardization reform of law enforcement as a variable introduced into the
existing working rules cannot change the deficiencies in the design of rules. The
reform is also unable to fundamentally change the underlying mode of control on
police power. “A large number of law enforcement normative texts bring only a more
comprehensive index system that judges performance, coupled with a complex
assessment mechanism.”277 Rather than being systematically designed and organized,
many reform measures for standardization have been patched layer by layer on top of
problems without changing the old mode of power control, which in practice
encourages more overlapping behaviors to cope with burdensome regulations and the
marginal effect of effective behaviors diminishes. This path of providing dense but
piecemeal norms (text-intensive path) without substantially changing the power
control mode leads the reform to involution,278 which stimulates the occurrence of
formality issues.

See Jiang Yong (蒋勇), Heyi “Neijuanhua” Woguo Jingchaquan Kongzhi Geju de Shenshi (何以‘内卷化’：我
国警察权控制格局的审视) [How to 'Involvement' A Survey of the Control Pattern of Police Power in China], 5
DONGFANG FAXUE (东方法学), 101(2016).
278 The concept of involution derives from Alexander Coldenweise who used it to describe a cultural mode. After
this mode has reached a certain final form, it has no way to stabilize, nor can it transform itself into a new form,
but it is constantly becoming more complicated internally. Clifford Geertz applied this concept in agriculture. Its
principal thesis is that many centuries of intensifying wet-rice cultivation in Indonesia had produced greater social
complexity without significant technological or political change. Phillip Huang used the theory involution in his
research on Chinese peasant economy. He called the way to achieve total output growth by investing a large
amount of labor on a limited land, that is, the way in which the marginal benefit of unit labor is diminishing,
growth without development. See Geertz, C., 1970. Agricultural involution: the process of ecological change in
Indonesia (Vol. 11). Univ of California Press; Huang, P., 1985. The peasant economy and social change in North
China. Stanford University Press.
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In general, after the existing criminal litigation system was formed, breaking
through the shackles of traditional ideas, vested interests and working inertia become
difficult. Despite having undergone minor repairs, the existing system, in terms of
police power control can hardly transform into a new mode.279 The old system
included a few vital features: (1) the public security organs themselves, rather than
any other participants in the criminal justice system, played main—or even sole—role
in constraining police power; (2) control was primarily exerted on individuals rather
than organizations; (3) control applied to broad targets including both law
enforcement targets and non-police work; and (4) indexical systems were widely used
as a means of control.280 Indeed, the old mode was effective in solving certain
unexpected problems in a short period of time, but it “apparently [was] not enough to
achieve the rule of law and the degree of good governance.”281 Especially when
facing legitimate crisis of police power, the old mode could only respond in a
“text-intensive” way.
In recent years, news of wrongful convictions and other police abuse of power
repeatedly came to the public’s attention. Legitimacy of the police power encountered
a crisis, and police authority suffered severe erosion, which led to the initiation of the
standardization reform.282 As a symbolic strategy, the rhetoric of standardization of
law enforcement can make the public security organs appear proactive. Revision or
development of new law enforcement norms has been used as a means of filling the
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legitimacy of police power.283 This text-intensive path is a strategy for the police to
demonstrate their ability and attitude in performance and to respond to requirements
grounded in the rule of law.
In fact, the Chinese police are not pioneers in this practice. In an analysis of the
London Metropolitan Police Department, Peter Manning observed that the external
symbolizations and presentational strategies of the police were used by the police
administration as bureaucratic rhetoric and imagery. Such strategies are used as a
means of signaling to internal or external audiences and as a means of rationalizing
police operations. Manning, at the same time, pointed out that this approach contrasts
with internal procedures resembling the situationally justified actions.284
Similarly, the text-intensive means brought about by the standardization reform
contrasts with the old control mode, which is the source of the formality issues in the
situation of investigation and evidence collection.
First, although the standardization reform aimed at systematically putting law
enforcement operations into standard and legal frameworks, only the public security
organs, rather than all participants in the criminal justice system, take part in the
reform, meaning that the status of the sole controller has not been changed. Because
the legislature granted such broad authority to the MPS to make rules and because
police enforcement is an abstract administrative action that cannot be sued, the polices’
disciplinary control and law enforcement accountability system have become a
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system of self-censorship, lacking judicial review and external supervision.285 Many
of the norms made by the MPS appear to be too conservative and full of compromises
with the past practices that did not conform to the rule of law. Even with some
provisions that were seemingly clarified, there is still room for grassroots officers to
maneuver. Since the internal norms do not have as much authority and rigidity as laws
have, the promotion of implementation depends mainly on the degree of leaders’
attention and the status of the legal affairs division in the organization. In the absence
of external supervision, no matter how strong a legal affairs division is, this
division—that is supposed to act as the internal supervisor—tends to think from the
perspective of the whole organization’s interests, trying to bury problems within the
police department and polishing dossiers that need to faces external scrutiny.
Second, the tendency of control over individuals and results rather than
organizations and processes is not helpful in maintaining the separation of form and
substance. Under the discourse of law enforcement standardization, the process by
which police exercise power is “legitimized” by various norms. Even if there are few
conditions for actually putting some norms into operation, those norms still have
meaning, in the sense of discourse, in bleaching certain processes. Meanwhile,
individual officers directly face assessment of their work performance based on
consequences of the operation without a comprehensive and effective sanctions
system.286 This simplistic and feeble result-oriented control mode cannot effectively
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286 See Zhan Jiancheng (詹建成) & Zhangwei (张威), supra note 90, at 145-146.
285

235

deter illegal behaviors for they are covered by positional advantages and are under
protection of departments. In addition, this mode makes it easy for an individual to be
dismissed as a scapegoat for some structural problems when a situation
deteriorates.287
Third, the old mode that controls broad targets, with both law enforcement
targets and non-police work included, is determined by the current Party-Government
system, which the standardization reform itself has far less ability to change. In other
words, in the context where “the adjustment mode based on rules is still unstable,”288
many problems cannot be solved by the law enforcement agencies independently. Any
meaningful solution would require coordination, promotion, and resource input from
the entire Party-Government system.289 On the other hand, the Party-Government
system emphasizes stability, which makes the public security organs directly confront
social disputes that are passed on by other governmental departments, which greatly
enhances the difficulty and complexity of police work. The flexibility necessary to
cope with this complicated situation is contrary to the characteristics of
standardization reform carried out in the top-down bureaucratic system, which
includes inclination to starkly follow rules, persistence in departmental interests,
unwillingness to bear risks, and conservativeness in responding to social problems in
a timely manner. In a sense, the efforts of standardization could be contrasted to

For example, after entering the period of high social conflicts, to maintain social stability, the Ministry of
Public Security uses whether police enforcement activities cause mass complaints or trigger mass incidents as an
important indicator for assessing local policing at the expense of interests of individuals officers. Jiang Yong (蒋
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keeping law enforcement efficient and maintaining social stability.290
Fourth, the index is used as a means of control, and the standardization of law
enforcement has not shaken the current dominance of this system. Rather, it may
increase the dependence on it. Even if the standardization reform attempts to prohibit
some indicators that seriously violate justice or the rule of law, it merely pushes those
indicators into a more concealed place due to the lack of alternative control means.
For instance, the MPS explicitly prohibits using the crime-cracking rate as an
indicator of assessment, and yet the practice continues to exist in one form or another.
“Otherwise, (without the crime-cracking rate indicator) in the current situation of low
morale, no one is willing to do any work.”291
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Chapter 13 Community Attributes
This chapter focuses on the police organization as a community, first exploring
how its essential attributes—or rather, the nature of the police social role itself—affect
the value police place upon themselves within the community. This chapter further
discusses how community attributes acting as exogenous variables introduced into the
investigation and evidence collection situation contribute to formality issues. Since
the definition of police occupational characteristics in China and the West is roughly
the same292 and the argument that the nature of the police community could affect
officers’ behavior has been explored elsewhere, discussion in this chapter draws
largely on the results of research on police organizations and culture in western
countries.

A. Working Personality
Jerome Skolnick, in his research on the nature of policing, has examined
distinctive cognitive and behavioral responses in police officers that are generated by
danger, authority, and efficiency. He calls it a “working personality” of police,
analogous to a “style of life.”293 In light of the constant pressure to appear efficient,
the element of danger and the element of authority make police officers more
suspicious and conservative than ordinary people, which influences the solidarity of
police.
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Owing to their distrustful nature, officers tend to become emotionally attached to
the status quo as a natural response to the element of danger associated with police
officers’ work. The same is true for the element of authority. Since officers engage in
enforcing a set of rules, the officers “also [become] implicated in affirming them.”294
Furthermore, the element of danger contains seeds of isolation that keeps the police
from the rest of the population and draws the police together. Police officers’ exercise
of power in maintaining public order may generate resentment, even hostility, which
could undermine the police officer’s authority, and a reduction in authority leads to
greater solidarity.295 Lastly, by studying British police and American police in terms
of their compliance with the rule of law, Skolnick pointed out that the combination of
danger and authority unavoidably frustrate procedural regularity. He held the view
that the illegal use of police authority would rise if danger or even the perception of
danger in the police officers’ job increased.296
Nevertheless, solidarity simultaneously brings about unification. “Police do not
appear to cooperate with one another merely because such is the policy of the chief,
but because they sincerely attach a high value to teamwork.”297 Richard Ericson, after
digging into such unification, pointed out that there was tolerance among colleagues
for a practice that might violate procedural regularity. Supervisors sometimes depend
so much on their subordinates for cooperation that they have to turn a blind eye to

Because “If the police did not believe in system of laws they were responsible for enforcing, they would have
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questionable conduct.298 This tolerance is finite, though. If a questionable conduct
were taken to excess and risked close administrative scrutiny on the entire group from
outside that would ultimately affect everyone, the troublemaker would be kicked out
of the protective ring provided by the institution.299
Chinese police have a similar, or even more salient, working personality
compared to their western counterparts with regard to conservatism and solidarity.
Investigative officers, who are persons within a community first and professionals
second, have a certain degree of homogeneity and exhibit the same cognitive patterns
as surrounding ordinary people. Because Chinese culture emphasizes substantive
justice, police officers, in this context, have a strong sense of social justice to conduct
case investigations and readily perceive themselves as guardians standing on a moral
higher ground. Criminal suspects, on the other side, are called “police property” in
Western countries. They generally live at the margins of society and cannot obtain
equal respect from the police in the case-handling process. They are perceived as the
objects of the criminal justice system, which the police bring to justice in order to
make a better world. That is why the surveyed investigative officers had much
prejudice towards murder suspects during the investigation process. When referring to
suspects, officers commonly used expressions like “to treat those people, it doesn’t
work if you are not (strict/tough/...) enough.”300 That is also why the sample cases
showed reluctance from officers to inform suspects their rights at the time of
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interrogation. Moreover, the fact that suspects are treated as the object of police tasks
is, apparently, part of the reason for police officers’ dislike of lawyers’ interference at
the beginning of investigation.
In general, the social security situation in China may not be as serious as that in
the United States, partly due to China’s strict policies of gun control. With limited
armed targets, Chinese police may face relatively lower risk factors in law
enforcement than their American counterparts may. However, as China is now going
through a transitional period with realignment of interests and an imbalance of social
psychology, the police responsible for combating crimes and maintaining social order
have to deal directly with burgeoning social contradictions.301 In this context, the
police are labeled as a group by the outside, and some common misunderstandings
and inaccurate imagery about the police have emerged. This has driven the police
inside the group to form a mind-set of “we (the police) fight against them (the rest).”
In the situation of investigation and evidence collection, work with formality
issues goes into the follow-up stage and, eventually, into the public’s sight. Once a
problem is uncovered, under certain circumstances, it generates negative public
opinion towards the police. The organization responds by applying individualized
control on the “associated person.” The misconduct is ascribed to the personality and
morality of individual police officers, who are then kicked out of the protective
ring.302 As previous research has pointed out, the logic of dealing with mishandled
cases in China is in use of a pan-moralism discourse, which links the issue of judicial
See JIN CHENG (金诚), ZHUANXINGQI ZHONGGUO JINGWU WENTI YANJIU (转型期中国警务问题研究),
Zhongguo Renmin Gong’an Daxue Chubanshe (中国人民公安大学出版社), (2007).
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justice with the personal morality of the individual who should take responsibility.
This discourse, in the end, emphasizes the rule of man and neglects the system and the
institutional environment that contribute to generating misconducts.303
Such individualized control is inevitably fraught with opportunism. Officers may
feel that they are victims of the current system. There are various objective reasons
that prevent officers from completely complying with the normative requirements.
Once an incident develops into a bad direction, however, they may find themselves
sacrificed as the scapegoat. “It feels like a passing game. If you are the last one, you
have no option but accepting the bad luck.”304 Consequently, the officers usually act
conservatively in response to risks on the one side, and they act recklessly in response
to working requirements that have mild consequences on the other. Acting
conservatively means trying to avoid all practices that might lead to occupational
risks, even if such an approach would be beneficial to the case. At the same time,
acting recklessly can bring about non-compliance.

B. Craftsman’s Bias
In addition to the working personality, Skolnick also found what he called the
“administrative bias of the craftsman” that police officers have, which is out of line
with due process of the law. The police view themselves as craftsman of their trade,
thus they tend to “emphasize their own expertness and specialized abilities to make
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judgments about the measures to be applied to apprehended ‘criminals’ as well as
their ability to estimate accurately the guilt or innocence of suspects.” 305 Accordingly,
they feel that they should be granted freedom to employ the techniques of their trade
and related regulations should contribute to their freedom to improvise rather than
constrict it.306 As a result of their confidence in distinguishing between guilt and
innocence, the police rarely consider the possibility of wrongly charging innocent
people and always feel that their work has been imposed by “seemingly irrational
requirements and procedural delays.”307
As a matter of a craftsman’s survival, the ultimate goal is to show that he is
competent. Those who interfere with this goal are punished and those who contribute
to his achievement are rewarded. During this process, whether the measures he takes
would implant or undermine the rule of law is not a big concern.308 In the United
States, those tendencies could be constrained to a degree by prosecutors, who play a
quasi-magisterial role. Despite being a sympathetic ally, the prosecutor demonstrates
to the police that it is possible to carry out the enforcement of substantive criminal
law while disagreeing with the rules of the game as long as “one learns skillfully how
to transform these rules into action.”309
The craftsman’s bias, such as overconfidence in his own expertise and resistance
to due process, is also found in the Chinese police for many reasons, as discussed in
previous chapters. In many cases of wrongful conviction in the past, investigative
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officers were guilty of overconfidence when they extorted a confession by means of
torture. They had a preconceived mindset, based on investigative experience, from the
beginning of the investigation. Then they formed a stereotype—originating from
cognitive patterns based on clues, motives, features of criminal behavior, and social
relations of victims, and so on—to search for suspects who matched these patterns in
reality. Of course, it is hard to say that this method is completely wrong because the
entire criminal investigation stage is based on similar logic in theory. 310 Such
overconfidence without constraint from due process, however, may lead to irreparable
damage to the case or at least the evidence, under extreme circumstances.
Nonetheless, police officers may be indifferent to risks hidden in the avoidance
of due process since wrongful convictions are infrequent. There may not have been
one wrongly convicted case in a given region for many years, and the number of
investigative officers who receive severe punishments as a result is minimal at best.
Among investigative officers, legal reviewers, division heads, and leaders in the two
surveyed districts, they all showed absolute confidence in the correctness of the cases
they handled, especially fatal cases. “There may be a few procedural flaws, but the
facts of the fatal cases I handled cannot be wrong.” 311 “The cases I reviewed,
especially the fatal cases, were taken very carefully. Despite not strictly following the
requirements of watching audio and video recordings, I can judge on the basis of
other evidence, so I still have absolute confidence in the facts of cases.”312This
confidence could breed resistance to some internal procedures. The investigative
310
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officers in District Z believed that the authenticating witness system was unfairly
weighted against them. It was considered the most typical example of distrust and of
adding unnecessary trouble to the investigation work. “If they (namely, the higher
authority) do not trust us, then please do not ask us to do jobs.”313 Investigative
officers with this mindset have no compunction about asking someone serve as a
recurrent authenticating witness.
In addition, Chinese prosecutors play a limited role in curbing the craftsman’s
bias of the police. Chinese police have a greater voice than the prosecutor does
throughout the entire criminal justice system. With the central role of dossiers, the
prosecutors responsible for investigative supervision or prosecution have not really
engaged in the investigation process. The carefully tailored dossiers usually appear
orderly so that the prosecutors can neither detect problems nor substantively control
the investigation process. Even if some problems are revealed, the behavior that best
suits the interests of the prosecutor may not be to correct them.
The notorious case of She Xianglin provides an excellent illustration that can
reflects what a prosecutor may face and what role a prosecutor may play in the chain
of criminal procedures. In 1998, She was sentenced to a 15-year jail term for murder
because She’s wife, Zhang, disappeared in January 1994. Three months later, after a
female body was found in a pond in the township, and relatives of She’s wife
identified it as Zhang. The miscarriage of justice came to light when Zhang, the
supposed victim of She’s “murder,” resurfaced after being missing for 11 years.
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Despite weak evidence, the prosecutor in the She Xianglin case did not dare to release
the suspect at that time due to several factors. First, the Commission of the
procuratorate, which had the ability to take pressure from higher authorities and the
public on the one hand, and to relieve individuals from the negative consequences,
was better situated to discuss such a high-profile case because collective
responsibility could dilute individuals’ anxiety about potential consequences. Second,
if the prosecutor did not press charges against She Xianglin due to insufficient
evidence, the public security organ responsible for the evidence collection would have
been embarrassed, and the procuratorate itself may have had to explain the decision to
higher-ranking authorities. As a result, all the contradictions could have been
transferred to the procuratorate. If the case had gone to the court instead, then the case
would have been ruled by the court, which means the result would have nothing to do
with the procuratorate. By simply deferring to the police, the procuratorate not only
“pleased” the police, but also dealt with public opinion without bearing any actual
responsibility. It was the best choice for the interests of the organization.314
The police are aware of prosecutors’ limited options, and they also understand
that a real relationship among the three organizations is one built on cooperation
rather than restriction. Therefore, they rarely take opinions of the procuratorate or the
court seriously:
The prosecutors often ask for evidence. How can you make up for evidence
that is not available at the crime scene? We all know that the prosecutors are
trying to get rid of their own responsibilities. So we will send a notice to
them guaranteeing that we will definitely make changes next time (which
we will not or we cannot). It is unlikely that they will refuse to bring the
314
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current case to court.315

C. Common Sense
In the field of discretion, conduct still needs to be rationalized, so police officers
rely heavily on rules of thumb shared within the group in which they are embedded.
In the context of broad discretion, as Peter Manning in his research on British police
put it, “Rational/legal models of police operation do not sufficiently reflect the range
of behaviors and procedures that can be uncovered through careful field
observation.”316 Rather than relying on the basis of an abstract theory of policing, the
law, or police regulations, all police decisions are made situationally on the basis of
common sense and discretion. Manning called it the “common sense theory of
policing.”317
Situationally justified actions have an inborn feature of the separation of form
and substance. For instance, patrol officers may make an arrest for one set of reasons,
but later cite different or additional legal facts embedded in the ex post facto account
as the justification for the arrest.318 Jerome Skolnick’s research on American police
reveals a similar feature, that is, “not that the police officer is simply a nice person or
an impulsive rule breaker, but that there are systemic pressures on police to break
certain kinds of rules in the interest of conforming to other standards.” 319 For
example, norms require the police to wear an uniform, but in the situation of
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investigating or arresting prostitutes, the uniform requirements are not followed for
obvious reasons.320
It should be noted that discretion is not considered to be attached to the personal
characteristics of police officers in socio-legal studies, but to be an element of social
organization.321 In the situation of investigation and evidence collection, investigative
officers control two main types of resources to serve specific interests when using
discretion. One is rules, including criminal legal rules, administrative rules, and
practical rules from organizational culture. Due to the overlapping nature of laws and
the complexity of criminal behavior, the police can often arrest and prosecute a
suspect for a variety of reasons. Thereby the police may choose to apply a provision
of laws that best suits the interests of the organization or individual in order to
simplify complex issues or to formalize an abnormal situation. Substantive laws could
be used as investigative tactics (or coercion in severe cases) to obtain information
from suspects and witnesses. Procedural laws, which are supposed to protect the
rights of suspects, have a considerable degree of ambiguity, leaving enough room for
manipulation. Judicial review, which reads cases backwards, often tends to be
deferential to the police.322
The second type of resource is information control. “Detectives are able to
produce accounts which give the appearance of conformity to the rules because those
persons to whom they are giving the accounts rarely have the inclination or the
capability to undertake an independent investigation which might produce a different
320
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version of events.”323 Therefore, only group members who directly share information
and experience can affect the discretionary behavior of investigative officers in
handling cases. This is the background for the emergence of a large number of
collective strategies. Some types of rules, which may are be observed in the
discretionary behavior, must be passed down through the channel when the senior
officer shows the rookie officer the process. The authoritative source in a group like
this may not satisfy the ideal types of legal-rational or traditional in the sense of Max
Weber, but are close to the charismatic type.324
The formality issues related to Chinese police behavior could also be understood
through the concept of the “common sense theory of policing.” In the early stage of
investigation, the investigative officers, who are facing a complexity of clues and
possibilities, depend on their common sense to determine the direction of the
investigation. They have to interview a large number of people—relevant or
irrelevant—and try to find clues in their statements. Due to the vast amount of people
interviewed, it would be both impractical and unnecessary for investigative officers to
be required to record all of those interviews in accordance with the procedure of
producing a formal witness inquiry transcript. As this study has revealed, the current
operation is problematic because of the potential separation between form and
substance. Investigative officers can only screen useful interviewees as witnesses after
the case is “cracked” and the suspect taken into custody. When officers ask an
interviewee to make a statement again in order to construct a formal transcript, they
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may face great temptation to “guide” the interviewee in the direction they want.
When the standardization reform attempts to resolve such separation under
existing conditions, investigative officers are required to make a standard transcript of
witness inquiry at the initial investigation stage. Then, they must decide whether the
transcript is relevant or useful for constructing the case in subsequent stages. Full
compliance with this requirement would greatly increase police officers’ workload.
Once produced, those transcripts could be put into the dossiers indiscriminately for
the purpose of displaying the results of their hard work or for the reason that the
investigative officers do not want to spend extra time on screening. It serves the view
that “the more evidence the better,” which results in a large amount of meaningless
material.
Investigative officers, who enjoy a great degree of discretion, control the
information in situations like producing transcripts, making audio-video recordings,
notifying legal aid lawyers after interrogation, and so on. They can decide the method
of making transcripts, the time to start recording interrogation, whether to inform a
lawyer in time, and so on. Because of the low visibility of interrogation, even if the
legal reviewers responsible for checking the case may not have experienced any
interrogation process before, the discretionary power of investigative officers in
interrogation turn into being virtually unsupervised.
In the context of information control, the most influential effect on investigative
officers’ conduct is the performance of the bellwether in the group. Ordinary officers
will improve themselves by learning and imitating the behavior of recognized good
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investigators. It is consistent with what is revealed by social learning theory. People
tend to decide how they should behave by imitating the behavior of others and
observing the consequences of others’ behavior.325 The immediate supervisor of line
officers often plays a crucial role as a reference for good behavior, where personal and
face-to-face contacts make judgments and imitations possible.326 In the Criminal
Investigation Division in District Z, every investigative officer admired the
vice-captain, YZ. Once they encountered a problem at work, they always asked YZ
for answers. The influence that YZ has in the group is not only because of his
rank—for both the captain and the instructor have a higher position than he has—but
also because of his personal charm. It could also be observed that the behavior of the
bellwether influences the behavioral tendency of team members. For instance, YZ
liked to make transcripts by handwriting them, and the investigative officers in
District Z generally handwrote transcripts even when the official discourse was
apparently to promote printed versions.
Outside the field of discretion, things are different. Once the criminal
investigation stage is over and the formal evidence production stage begins, both the
investigative officers and the legal reviewers face stricter and more rigid requirements
concerning the production of dossiers and online circulation. The results being
generated from relatively free behavior of investigative officers must be presented in a
fixed format template. The requirement that a material must be included or that a
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material must be recorded in a particular form may conflict with the actual
circumstances of prior investigation. In order to control the quality of a case—or
rather to ensure the proper appearance of a case—legal reviewers will select the part
of the dossier that fails to meet requirements and send it back to the investigative
officers to modify, or, sometimes, they may even modify it themselves. A formality
feature with the separation between form and substance is, thus, hardwired into the
dossiers.

D. Strata
Generally speaking, organizational members share a set of assumptions in
association with work, which is the basis of organizational integration. However,
one’s position in the organizational structure directly determines one’s perspective on
shared assumptions, which is a source of misunderstandings among officers of
different ranks.327 In the U.K., senior officers, on the one side, and average police
constables, on the other side, hold different beliefs concerning policing. The former
weighs the ultimate legitimacy and propriety of the law as well as public consensus as
priority. The latter sees the day-to-day difficulties and tensions when dealing in and
having contact with people who symbolize evil.328 Misunderstandings between the
higher strata and the lower strata are unavoidable. As Manning clearly puts it, “senior
officers continue to believe that they ‘understand’ their men, and they are encouraged
in this belief by excising their legitimate capacity to reverse decisions made by men
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on the street. Constables, on the other hand, deny this understanding, seeing most of
their senior officers as out of touch, careerist, preoccupied with paperwork, trivialities,
and public relations.”329
In China, this differentiation deriving from strata within the police organization
directly affects the attitude of grassroots officers330 towards the internal management
requirements proposed by the standardization reform. To high-level officials
(analogous to senior officers in the U.K.) and grassroots officers (analogous to police
constables), the meanings of the standardization reform of law enforcement may be
entirely different. A consensus has not yet been formed and may never be formed. The
top-down management model means that many officials living in Beijing or
provincial capital cities rarely experience direct contact with grassroots officers. The
laws and regulations enacted by the National People’s Congress and the Ministry of
Public Security often encountered criticism regarding failure to take local conditions
into consideration when they were passed on to the municipal and county public
security organs. Feedback channels are so narrow that it is very difficult for grassroots
officers to express opinions in the course of rule formulation.331 In this context,
grassroots officers may not only intrinsically reject the due process from their
working personality—or craftsman’s bias—but they may also disagree with the power
control regulations proposed by high-level officials because they generally believe
Id. at 145.
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that senior officers tend to make rules based on their political pursuit, thus, rendering
their innovations completely divorced from reality.
Strata opposition and dissatisfaction with work correlate with one another. One
of the factors contributing to dissatisfaction with police work is the different
understandings of the internal procedures between the higher and the lower strata.
Simultaneously, this dissatisfaction may in turn exacerbate mistrust and even
opposition between the higher and lower strata. As existing literature has found,
police officers’ dissatisfaction with their work has much to do with the lack of
accountability in the internal procedures. If officers have no opportunity to participate
in the decision-making process, they cannot tell whether the process is neutral or
unbiased, thus, dissatisfaction occurs. By contrast, internal procedural justice can
reduce individuals’ dissent, as well as the likelihood of deviant behaviors. 332
Regardless of being in urban or rural areas, the grassroots officers in China have
expressed strong dissatisfaction with numerous reports, documents, and transcripts by
which they feel stifled. They believe that such endless paperwork makes them walk
far away from the true and meaningful work worth doing.333
The same scenario can be observed in the situation of investigation and evidence
collection where standardization reforms have added a significant amount of
paperwork. Investigative officers are unhappy about the required number of
interrogations, identifications, and the rigid norms regarding online circulation of
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cases, which is very burdensome in officers’ eyes. Apart from coming up with
creative ways to deal with those requirements, they also hold grudges against legal
reviewers if they believe that their work has been nitpicked for the sake of the rule of
law.334 Ordinary legal reviewers, in theory, should have been classified into the lower
strata, but, in the eyes of the investigative officers the legal reviewers are apparently
on the opposite side.
Strata opposition and disagreement on shared assumptions may also result from
the fact that the channel of vertical mobility is narrow and morale at the grassroots
level is low. The situation in District N is illustrative. A police station of 30 to 40
officers only has 5 administrative posts at most: a director, an instructor, and 3 vice
directors. The possibilities of promotion to administrative posts outside the station are
even less. The opportunity to be selected needs good timing and depends on a set of
complex factors, many of which are not completely associated with work ability. In
the promotion channel of ranks in parallel with administrative posts, promotion
mainly depends on length of service with defined ceilings. For instance, an ordinary
officer without occupying any administrative post can only be promoted to the rank of
class III police supervisor. 335 The narrow channel of upward mobility drives
grassroots officers away from keeping their ambition. “Basically, if you have not got
promoted until the age of forty, you will end up with nothing.”336 For those grassroots
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Class II; Police Superintendent, Class III; Police Constable, Class I; Police Constable, Class II.
336 DNLA03.
334
335
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officers who see little chance of promotion, “they’re dead from the neck up.”337
Certainly, they will resist change of regulations given that any change will bring
trouble to the already formed working habits. In a sense, the stifling environment can
explain the shortage of labor in investigation, because only officers of a young age
keep working while older officers simply muddle along.
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PETER K. MANNING, supra note 232, at 142.
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Chapter 14 Conclusion and Implications
In regards to the standardization reform of law enforcement in China, the
discourse of “standardization” is generally viewed as the most concentrated narrative
of the rule of law within the public security organs. Regardless of many achievements,
the reform in pursuit of enhancing internal control and supervision has certain
limitations according to the comprehensive analysis of fatal case dossiers done by this
study. As enumerated in Chapter 6 through Chapter 10, the reform not only failed to
eradicate formality issues generally found in the situation of investigation and
evidence collection—where content reflected in written materials cannot accurately
reflect actual occurrence—but also pushed those issues from bad to worse to some
degree.
Thanks to the action situation elements identified by the Institutional Analysis
and Development (IAD) framework, this study has delved into the action stage of
investigation and evidence collection and presented interactive activities between the
elements in this action situation. Only through the analysis of action situations faced
by investigative officers in constructing a case and by legal reviewers in examining a
case can the choices they made be understood more easily. In light of the big picture
of the action stage, this study has treated the law enforcement standardization
construction as an external variable introduced into the whole system and explored
the roots of the unintended consequences of the standardization reform. Only through
overlapping and conflicting rules-in-use and interests different parties of the
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organization have can administrative logic overriding judicial logic over the course of
events become more apparent. This new analysis method can discover the internal and
external situations faced by key actors, in detail, and provide a panoramic perspective
to observe complex dynamic relationships between the various factors, lest the
interpretation transform into a grand narration or become stuck in individualized
research that provides only limited outlook.
The seven internal elements of the action situation, the rule configuration that
affects all the elements, and the police community attributes, all together, generate
dynamics in the situation bringing up most of the formality issues. For simplicity, a
specific scenario of dynamics could be summarized as follows: core participants, who
hold relevant positions in the situation of investigation and evidence collection with
cost-benefit calculation hardwired into their brains, face a large number of
requirements set by laws and norms. Due to flaws in the requirements, such as
ambiguity, contradiction, arbitrary setting of criteria, divorce from reality, a lack of
punitive provisions, meaninglessness, etc., the core participants, who serve interests
of themselves or the group they belong to, rely heavily on rules of thumb or collective
strategies formed in a group to guide their behaviors, especially discretionary
behaviors. Driven by the performance evaluation system—with quantitative indicators
in mind—and accompanied with painstaking conditions, such as scarce human
resources and multitasks, the officers, on the one hand, try to circumvent some
regulatory requirements by manipulating rules or simply ignoring requirements with
mild consequences, and so on. They produce an abundance of materials that lack
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actual meaning and polish their work results to show a good appearance in accordance
with the norms, on the other hand. Due to professional barriers, low visibility, and
jammed information flow lying among different internal divisions and between the
police department and external departments, the situation of investigation and
evidence collection is relatively isolated from the outside world, and external
supervision on the investigative power exists in name only. As a result, the
participants do not take their deviated or illegal behaviors seriously even though they
are clearly aware that those behaviors are non-compliant with laws and norms.
Naturally, they do not see any incentive to change.
The standardization reform of law enforcement as an external factor fails to
change flaws in the rules-in-use or the underlying control mode of police power.
Instead, it still relies solely on the performance evaluation system—in which
indicators and the grading system definitely need to be redesigned—and the results of
assessment and substantial benefits officers can eventually get need to be well
connected. Rather than being systematically designed and organized, many reform
measures have been patched layer by layer on top of problems without changing the
old mode of police power control. In contrast with the old mode of power control, the
text-intensive path is just a strategy for the police to demonstrate their abilities and
attitudes in response to the police justification crisis, which eventually misleads the
reform into an involution trap. Effectiveness of behaviors has marginally diminished
and already limited resources were spent on satisfying requirements in form rather
than regulations in substance.

259

Attributes of the police community also contribute to formality issues. First and
foremost, conservativeness and solidarity in police working personality have the
inclination to objectify or marginalize suspects or witnesses and ignore their rights’
protection, so does the philosophy in pursuit of substantive justice in the Chinese
people to whom police are attentive. The individualized control on police misconduct
in China, which prefers applying pan-moralism on individual officers to taking the
institutional environment into consideration further exacerbated the negative nature of
conservativeness and solidarity. Moreover, the police naturally have craftsman’s bias,
namely, the strong self-confidence bred in the repeated operations on the same
process, which makes officers resistant to the internal procedural provisions that can
“bind hand and foot.” In addition, the situational justification contains the tendency of
separation of form and substance given that behaviors or quick responses at the scene
are difficult to be completely reflected by the ex post records, and considerable
legitimate justifications are available. As a result, individual officers’ discretionary
behaviors can only be influenced by collective strategies and behaviors of other
members within the small group where information and experience are shared directly.
Lastly, hierarchical division within the organization makes officers at lower strata
tend to resist regulatory requirements formulated by officials at higher strata. The
upward mobility channel between the two classes is too narrow for the grass-root
officers to have a positive and progressive working attitude, which aggravates the
shorthanded situation, hence, partially cause the emergence of formality issues.
In addition to interpreting the unintended consequences of the standardization
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reform, the analysis of the situation of investigation and evidence collection can also
provide several implications for future reform or policies on internal control over
investigative power. This study has no intention to explore all possible solutions in
every detail—a task beyond its capacity. Only the most painstaking lessons taken
from the unintended consequences of the standardization reform would be briefly
addressed.
First, the complexity and dimensions of the institutional reform require designers
to fully recognize the importance of panoramic analytical thinking in the context of
situational interaction, and future reforms should be designed accordingly. Any
variable introduced into a system will cause a chain of effects, thus, a reform tugging
at one or a few variables without panoramic thinking will likely result in unintended
consequences, or even counterproductive results. In order to solve intertwined
problems in practice better, designers should pay attention to control and supervision
on the personnel, the organization, and the process rather than merely depend on the
existing path that simply emphasizes individual responsibility in dealing with police
misconduct. The collective strategies formed within a department, a division, or even
a group should be taken into account and examined carefully before any reform plan
is proposed or any project aiming at changing the status quo is initiated. For instance,
a clear distinction between a real interrogation to obtain information from the suspect
and a procedural declarative notification to the suspect during interrogation will help
put the audio and video recording process back on the right track, as well as develop
different procedural requirements for interrogation and notification, thus, savings
261

investigative resources.
Second, the direction of constructing a better investigation and evidence
collection situation with less separation of form and substance needs to first
deconstruct past evidence collection methods. Small repairs on the old model will
make formality inevitable. In the existing mode of police power control, no matter
how fine the quality of the dossier appears to be, these polished and selected written
materials cannot represent the real occurrences during the investigation and evidence
collection process. The text-intensive method—in other words, patching layers on top
of problems—is just a way of dodging the core problem, which appears to provide
dense but piecemeal norms without substantially changing the power control mode
and, in return, encourages more overlapping behaviors or meaningless gestures to
cope with burdensome regulations. One possible way to break the closure of the
investigation and evidence collection action situation must lie in putting key nodes of
the situation under scrutiny of effective external supervision. For example,
magistrates or supervisors with a similar function outside the police department could
rule on warrants currently issued by the public security organs themselves. Or
judgments in court could be used as indicators of officers’ performance on their
evaluation, lest the police stop performing their duties adequately after they complete
quantitative requirements, start to celebrate a victory right after a suspect is subdued,
etc.
Third, internal power control needs to follow the principle that administrative
logic ought to be consistent with judicial logic. Administrative logic asks for taking
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management demands and payoff rules into consideration, in the meantime, judicial
logic requests promotion of the principles of due process of law while handling
criminal cases. Of course, the flaws found in the quality control of the dossier do not
mean that all efforts of the internal control by the public security organs are useless,
thus, should be totally abandoned. Instead, administrative logic existing in internal
management should be studied carefully and should be connected with judicial logic
on the basis of sorting out the contextual interactions. On the one hand, the internal
discipline that accords with due process of the law and runs effectively should be kept
intact. On the other hand, conflicts between the two logics must be contrived in
advance. For instance, legal reviewing of the criminal cases has played a crucial role
in constraining the investigative power indeed, so this mechanism should remain.
However, according to judicial logic, the relationship between the legal affairs
division and the criminal investigation division is the supervisor and the supervisee
whereas they are treated as equal entities within one police department according to
administrative logic. In some places, the criminal investigation division, as the
supervisee, may even be viewed higher on the hierarchical ladder than the legal affairs
division as the supervisor. Consequently, in order to run a benign mechanism between
the two divisions, their delicate and sensitive relationship should be aligned in
accordance with concrete analysis of the distinctive organization interests. Only
through distinguishing and reinforcing the different organizational goals of the two
divisions can supervision, rather than collusion, stand. In addition, the role of the
deputy chief(s), who is (are) in charge of these two divisions, should also be adjusted
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accordingly.
Fourth, the key opinion leader in the situation should be identified and well
trained to improve the quality of work done by the whole team. Strengthening police
training should neither stay in slogan nor stick to conventional styles. One possible
innovation would be training on key features, specifically and effectively, as in-depth
analysis of the interpersonal interactions in microenvironments has provided
enlightenment on where and to whom trainings should be reinforced and
responsibility should be imputed. For instance, a leader with personal charisma on the
investigation team, who determines the direction of the entire team, should be the
focus of trainings concerning standardization norms. Meanwhile, an accountability
system within the organization that boosts open and transparent decision-making
procedures, fair and balanced promotion, and respect and adoption of opinions from
line officers at the grassroots level, should be established. This would reduce line
officers’ dissatisfaction with the organization, relieve their resistance—or even
hostility—towards burdens put on them by the inconsiderate high-level officials, and
enhance their sense of responsibility.
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Appendix
Interviewee’s Coding System
DNLA：Legal Affairs Division in City D, District N.
NQY—01；HK－02；AYZ－03；YX－04；MOK－05；IL－06；MXX
－07；MY－08
DNDD：Detective Division in City D, District N.
X－01
SZLA：Legal Affairs Division in City S, District Z.
UXI－01；ZYC－02；IMM－03；AR－04；EIZ－05；AK－06
SZDD：Detective Division in City S, District Z.
00 prefer staying anonymous；XA－01；ZA－02；YT－03；AY—04；
MX－05；AR－06
SZPS：Police Station in City S, District Z.
H－01；Z－02
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